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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The avionic systems for flight management and flight control on board current transport aircraft
have become quite complex, resulting in heavy penalties on development time and cost. These
systems have evolved during more than 20 years of ad hoc development, and now comprise very
large codes characterized by functional duplication, so that a single flight task can often be accom-
plished in several different ways. Weak functional coordination at the design level can result, under
unusual circumstances, in unsafe or inappropriate system actions. Furthermore, simulation is an
inadequate method for finding and eliminating such system behavior, because it is impractical to
simulate all possible cases. Excessively complex mode structure can result in pilot mode confusion,
preventing the flight crew from identifying unsafe or inappropriate system actions in time to avoid
potentially catastrophic consequences.
Recent advances in automation theory now enable an improved approach that ensures proper
coordination of system elements. New design principles are derived from long-established criteria
for aircraft design and certification. These criteria are based on more than 40 years of operating
experience with jet transport aircraft, and specify functional requirements for aerodynamic, struc-
tural, and propulsion design. However, no such broad functional criteria have previously been
applied to the design of avionic systems.
This report presents a detailed application to longitudinal control. Qualitative analysis based on the
governing differential equations shows that longitudinally the aircraft is capable of only three kinds
of dynamical behavior during manually controlled flight. Basic automated control modes are devel-
oped that correspond to each of the three kinds of behavior, and mode selection logic is then synthe-
sized in such a way as to guarantee that the complete system satisfies behavioral design principles
specified beforehand.
Formal system validation is based on rigorous proof of system behavioral properties. This formal
validation supplements informal validation achieved by means of piloted simulation, but, unlike
simulation, guarantees that unsafe or inappropriate system actions are ruled out by the system
design.
Principled design results in a drastically simplified mode structure. This simplified mode structure is
matched to an optimized division of cockpit duties between human crewmembers and the automated
system, and can be expected to eliminate pilot mode confusion.
To summarize, major design goals are (1) system design integrity based on proof of correctness at
the design level. (2) significant simplification and cost reduction in system development and certifi-
cation, and (3) improved operational efficiency, with significant alleviation of human-factors
problems encountered by pilots in current transport aircraft.
This report provides for the first time a firm technical basis for criteria governing design and certifi-
cation of avionic systems for transport aircraft. It should be of primary interest to designers of next-
generation avionic systems.
xi
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SYNTHESIS FROM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF A HYBRID SYSTEM
FOR TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT LONGITUDINAL CONTROL
Charles S. Hynes,' Gordon H. Hardy,' and Lance Sherry'
Ames Research Center
SUMMARY
Hybrid systems are dynamical systems that consist of both continuous and discrete elements. This
report presents a new method for synthesizing such systems from design requirements, and applies
the method to the design of a system for longitudinal control of transport aircraft. The resulting
system satisfies general requirements for safety and effectiveness specified a priori, enabling formal
validation of the complete system to be achieved.
The design process begins by describing three primitive (basic) modes for continuous control of
flightpath and airspeed that correspond to the three fundamental kinds of dynamical behavior
characterizing transport aircraft. For each mode, the dynamical behavior specified by the governing
differential equations is discretized by relating it geometrically to the aircraft performance envelope.
Validity conditions for each mode are derived from safety and effectiveness requirements imposed
a priori, and the three primitive modes are then combined to form a supermode that constitutes the
lowest-level hybrid system. Within this lowest-level supermode, discrete mode control logic is syn-
thesized directly from the validity conditions. Although synthesis is rigorous, heuristic arguments
based on general notions of maximum effectiveness and logical dominance simplify the process,
with the help of extensive use of elcmentary symbolic logic. In cases where aircraft performance
limitations preclude capture ol'path or speed targets, the exact nature of the limitation is annunciated
for resolution at higher levels within the mode hierarchy (or, ultimately, by the human crew), with
assurance of logical completeness. Extension to higher-level supermodes is described, with a
detailed altitude-control example.
The potential contributions of formal validation to system design integrity are discussed, and
analysis of several transport aircraft accidents and incidents selected to serve as examples leads to
the suggestion that new airworthiness criteria based on general safety and effectiveness properties
might improve operational safety. The design of the human/machine cockpit interface is discussed
briefly, and several heuristic guidelines for system and interface design are proposed. Regarding the
pilot's mode selection as a command given to the system enables analysis from the human-factors
viewpoint of the same accidents and incidents studied previously from the system design perspec-
tive, and leads to recommendations that cockpit interface design be integrated into the system design
process, and that formal validation be extended to include the cockpit interface.
1 Retired, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field. CA 94035.
Fonnerly at Honeywell International Inc., Flight Control Systems Design, Phoenix, AZ; currently at George Mason
University, 4400 University Drive, MS 4A6, Fairfax, VA 22030.
The present results may contribute by example to the development of more general theoretical
methods for synthesis of hybrid systems. They should also be of practical interest to designers of
next-generation transport aircraft avionic systems.
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PART I
BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION
Hybrid systems are dynamical systems that consist of both continuous and discrete elements. For
example, autopilots with multiple control laws, each specified by a different mode, are hybrid
systems in which the modes constitute the discrete elements. This report presents a new method for
synthesizing the discrete elements of such systems (that is, the mode selection logic) directly from
design requirements, and applies this method to the design of a system for longitudinal control of
transport aircraft. The resulting system satisfies general requirements for safety and effectiveness
specified a priori, enabling formal validation of the complete system to be achieved. Compared with
the systems installed in current transport aircraft, this new method for mode synthesis leads to dras-
tic simplification of mode structure, and has potential for streamlining system development and
certification, reducing costs, and eliminating pilot mode confusion.
In order to provide necessary background, this section discusses the flight management systems on
board current transport aircraft. It shows that the complexity of these large, reactive hybrid systems
imposes heavy penalties on development time and cost. It then reviews methods for verification and
validation of these systems. The simulation-based methods currently in use are limited by the impos-
sibility of testing all cases, but formal mathematical methods have potential for avoiding that limita-
tion. Recent advances in automation theory now enable an improved design approach, which is the
subject of this report.
The problem of predicting theoretically the dynamical behavior of hybrid systems is discussed in
detail, and it is shown how lack of predictability in safety-critical systems can lead to "automation
surprises" with potentially catastrophic consequences. Although theoretical prediction of dynamical
behavior is mathematically intractable for arbitrarily specified hybrid systems, the problem can in
principle be solved by inversion: starting from certain safety and effectiveness properties specified a
priori, the mode selection logic can be synthesized so as to force the completed system to satisfy the
specified behavioral properties.
After this brief review of automation theory, the design goals of the synthesis method and the tech-
nical approach are described, the specific objectives and scope of this work are presented, and the
section concludes with a detailed presentation of the plan of the report.
Vehicle Management System
The block diagram of figure 1 illustrates operation of a transport aircraft by its human crew within
the air traffic control (ATC) system. The illustrated system is termed a Vehicle Management System
to distinguish it from the flight management systems (FMS) on board current transport aircraft,
although the two systems share their major elements in common. In figure 1, solid lines represent
continuous signals, broken lines represent discrete signals, and blocks represent transformations of
signals from input to output. The diagram as a whole can be regarded as a simplified representation
of the process by which the flight plan on the left side is transformed into the aircraft motions on the
right side.
Pilot Roles
The human pilot is represented in two roles, the strategic (planning) role on the left of the dashed
vertical line, and the tactical (executive) role on its right. On the left (strategic) side, the pilot makes
up the flight plan, accounting for weather, route, fuel reserves, airline policies, and the like, and
proposes the flight plan to ATC. The pilot's strategic activities are knowledge-based (Rasmussen,
1976) because they require cause-and-effect understanding of whole disciplines such as meteorology
and airline flight operations. After accounting for other air traffic so as to provide separation, ATC
issues a clearance to the aircraft. On board the aircraft, the clearance must be checked for legality
and feasibility before acceptance, and an executable trajectory must be synthesized that specifies the
reference flightpath in space and time.
When the ATC clearance is accepted and the reference flightpath determined, the pilot's tactical role
(right side of diagram) comes into play. The pilot's tactical activities involved in executing the flight
plan and monitoring progress of the flight are rule-based, and could in principle be automated. In
practice, much of this lower-level supervisory activity consists of selecting appropriate modes for
the navigation, guidance, and flight control functions of the automated system, and monitoring
-
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Figure 1. Vehicle management system.
displays and annunciations. (Direct manipulation of the flight controls during manual flight, which is
a skill-based activity that is discussed later, is not illustrated.)
Functional Description
The navigation system combines onboard sensor data with radio and satellite receiver data to form
aircraft state estimates, which provide feedback of aircraft motions. The guidance system compares
the actual trajectory of the aircraft based on state estimates with the reference trajectory, and gener-
ates local targets for waypoint position, altitude, and airspeed that are intended to null trajectory
errors. The outer-loop control system accepts these local targets and generates a target velocity
vector intended to ensure capture of waypoint, altitude, and airspeed targets. The target velocity
vector is displayed to the flight crew and also injected into the inner-loop control system. The inner-
loop control system accepts the target velocity vector and generates commands to the control surface
and throttle servos of the aircraft that are intended to ensure capture of the target velocity vector. The
resulting aerodynamic and propulsive forces and moments then act on the aircraft to generate its
motions. These motions are displayed to the crew and fed back to the guidance and control systems
by means of the state estimate ,­ aircraft position and altitude are also fed back to ATC by means of
ground-based radar (not illustrated).
The actions of the navigation. ,g uidance, and control systems are subject to the laws (that is, transfor-
mational algorithms) specified b\ the navigation, guidance, and control modes, which are selected
partially by the pilot (tactical role) and partially by the automated system. The three hierarchical
levels of mode control illustrated b\ the diagram are explained lit 	 later, and should be ignored
for the present.
Environmental Influences
Figure 1 illustrates environmental influences of several kinds that act on the aircraft system. The
tactical (right) side of the dia L rann sJio\\ s that atmospheric turbulence and wind shear act on the
aircraft itself, disturbing its motion directly. Engine failure is considered an environmental influence,
because the failed engine is external to the remaining elements of the system. Likewise, failures
within other aircraft systems ( h\ draulic s ystem, electrical system, and the like) are external failures
to which the Vehicle Mana_uenicnt S y stem is required to react (fig. 1). Similarly, warnings from the
collision avoidance system anal the around proximity warning system are considered environmental
influences, because these warning s
 also represent external conditions to which the aircraft system is
required to react.
On the strategic (left) side of the dia g ram, factors that could force revision of the flight plan are
exemplified by deterioration of' \\ either
 conditions at the destination airport, depletion of fuel
reserves owing to unexpected hcad\\ Inds , or a change of route to avoid storms. Such factors also are
considered environmental intluences to which the aircraft system must react. To summarize, the
aircraft system must be regarded as reacting dynamically to more or less continuous external
disturbances.
Implementation Software
The code that implements the tli g ht management systems on board current transport aircraft consists
of about 2 to 2.5 million source-code instructions, and doubles in size about every 4 years (Sherry
and McCrobie, 1998). About 20%, of this code consists of computer modeling of continuous system
5
elements for state estimation, trajectory synthesis, guidance, flight control, and cockpit display. The
other 80% of the code consists of discrete decision logic. The complexity of this large, reactive
hybrid system imposes heavy penalties on development time and cost.
In general, the continuous elements of the system implement mathematically based algorithms. For
these continuous elements, existing knowledge of numerical analysis provides an adequate basis for
design provided that it is correctly applied, and the computational behavior of the resulting contin-
uous routines can be checked independently by well-understood input-output test methods. Further-
more, many of these routines can be reused.
On the other hand, design of the discrete decision logic relies largely on heuristics that lack a firm
mathematical basis. Furthermore, software architecture has evolved during more than 20 years of
ad-hoc development, current mode structures are vehicle-dependent, and are characterized by
multiply-overlapping functions. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that most industry
effort required for development and for verification and validation of implementation code is
expended on the discrete elements of the system. The next section discusses current industry trends
for verification and validation.
Verification and Validation
Flight qualification of safety-critical systems requires both verification and validation. Verification
seeks to determine that the system implementation satisfies its specification, while validation exam-
ines whether the specification itself is correct. The industry approach to verification and validation
has been based on massive testing of the completed system, and Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) certification has required inspection of the results of these tests. Development and certifica-
tion have become increasingly expensive and time-consuming as system complexity has grown, and
the industry is now seeking more efficient alternatives to labor-intensive manual coding and testing.
Formal Verification
One alternative method uses decision tables as the fundamental specification document for the
discrete decision logic, which as already noted comprises about 80% of the implementation code in
current flight management systems. When the specification is complete, the implementation code
can be generated directly from the decision table by an algorithm that has itself been formally veri-
fied. By this means, the verification process can, in principle, be automated, with very significant
reductions in development time and cost. However, it seems likely that new certification criteria
will be needed to enable regulatory approval.
Formal Validation
If the trend toward formal verification develops as anticipated, it may be expected that the potential
for formal validation will be explored next. Validation of safety-critical aircraft systems depends
ultimately on the judgment of human pilots. The industry approach to validation has been based on
the designer's interpretation of expert pilot judgments in formulating design specifications, and has
required extensive piloted simulation for evaluation of the complete system M all expected opera-
tional contexts. Such informal validation is subject to the same limitations as informal verification.
In practice, simulation cannot test all possible paths through codes as complex as those on board
current transport aircraft, and cannot explore all possible operational situations.
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Formal validation has potential for augmenting expert pilot judgment by eliminating any system
behavior that is in conflict with general requirements for safety and for effective operation. These
general requirements must be based on flight hazards identified a priori (Leveson, 1995), and on
control tasks necessary for flight operations within the ATC system. Just as for formal verification, it
seems likely that new certification criteria will be needed in order to take full advantage of this new
approach to validation. Formal validation could be based on theoretical prediction of the dynamical
behavior of the system, but no method is presently available for predicting the dynamical behavior
of an arbitrarily specified reactive hybrid system; the discussion turns next to this mathematical
problem.
Automation Theory
Continuous Dynamical Systems
The dynamical behavior of an aircraft can be represented mathematically by a system of continuous
differential equations that involve functions of state variables (that is, motion quantities such as
position and velocity) and their time derivatives. The variations of these state variables with time
(termed dynamical trajectories of the system) are illustrated by figure 2(a), which shows two possi-
ble trajectories determined by different applications of control or different environmental influences
such as atmospheric turbulence. It can be seen that, starting from the same initial condition, one of
these trajectories remains within the safe flight envelope, while the other, potentially catastrophic
trajectory exceeds the boundaries of the safe envelope.
Discrete Dynamical Systems
The various task-related modes of the automated control system of an airplane (for example, climb
mode, altitude and headinu hold modes, autoland mode, etc.) can be represented mathematically by a
discrete dynamical system, as illustrated by figure 2(b). In figure 2(b), the state variables of the
Figure 2. Continuous and discrete systems.
discrete system ( that is, the system modes) are represented by circles, and transitions between modes
are represented by arrows. Each possible transition is governed by an associated logical condition: a
transition occurs if and only if its associated logical condition is true. Starting from a known initial
state (fig. 2(b)), the path taken through the state space defines the dynamical trajectory of the dis-
crete system. It can be seen that different dynamical trajectories are possible, depending on the truth
or falsity of the conditions involved.
For example, let State A (tile initial state) correspond to the OFF condition, let State B correspond to
engagement of the altitude hold mode, and let Condition 1 be set to TRUE if the pilot presses the
button for selection of the altitude hold mode. Then the state transition diagram of figure 2(b) has the
interpretation that the system tra nsitions from OFF (State A) to ALTITUDE HOLD ENGAGED (State B)
when the pilot presses the selection button (Condition 1 TRUE). Other conditions could be set TRUE
or FALSE automatically, instead of being determined directly by pilot selection. Dependence of con-
ditions oil
	 states constitutes discrete feedback (fig. 2(b)).
Entry into certain states could result in undesirable or potentially catastrophic consequences, as
illustrated by the shaded State 1) in tilure 2(b). For example, State D could correspond to retraction
of the landing gear with the aircraft oil 	 ground, or to total electrical failure during an instrument
approach, or (in a military context) to accidental launch of a missile. Fortunately, a well-developed
theory of supervisory control cnahles the transition paths leading to such undesired states to be
identified systematically and blocked off(fig. 2(b)). However, all such states must be identified and
enumerated.
Hybrid Dynamical Systems
A dynamical system that contains coupled continuous and discrete elements, as illustrated by
figure 3, is termed a hybrid system. It can he seen that selection of control modes A, B, C, or D, each
of which is characterized b y a di l'Icrent control law, determines different trajectories for the continu-
ous system (left side of figure 3). Therefore, the continuous system is coupled to the discrete system
by means of the control laws characterizing the various modes.
Furthermore, because the truth or falsity of the conditions governing transitions within the discrete
system depends in general oil 	 conditions (that is, oil 	 state variables of the continuous
system), perturbations in the continuous trajectories determine different trajectories for the discrete
system (right side of figure 3) as the aircraft reacts to environmental influences. Therefore, the dis-
crete system is coupled to the continuous system by means of the logic governing mode transitions.
It follows that each of the two systems is coupled to the other.
Dynamical Behavior
The dynamical behavior of continuous systems governed by differential equations is well-known.
The theory of linear differential equations is mathematically complete, and the nonlinear differential
equations describing aircraft motions can be linearized for small perturbations in the neighborhood
of any desired operating point. Therefore, prediction of the dynamical behavior of the aircraft can be
based on broad theoretical kno\^ led`^e of the properties of the solutions of the governing differential
equations, such as stability or instability, without reliance on numerical solution of the differential
equations via simulation. Agreement between theoretical prediction, simulation, and experimental
flight test results is generally satisfactory for transport aircraft.
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Prediction of dynamical behavior is more difficLilt for discrete systems than for continuous systems.
When one trajectory is known for a continuous system such as an aircraft, physical continuity of the
forces acting on the aircraft ensures that all neighboring trajectories must be similar in form. For
discrete systems physical continuity plays no role, and even the notion of neighboring trajectories
loses all significance. Knowledge of system behavior along one trajectory implies nothing for behav-
ior along other trajectories, so that all combinatorial possibilities must be considered. Nevertheless,
computational methods are available for discrete systems that enable all possible trajectories to be
traced and enumerated, even for quite complex systems.
When a continuous system such as an aircraft is coupled to a discrete system consisting of several
automated control modes to form a hybrid system like the flight management systems installed in
current transport aircraft, the infinite-dimensional nature of the states characterizing the continuous
system precludes enumeration. Furthermore, the continuous system introduces variable dynamical
time delays that complicate the logical conditions governing state transitions within the discrete
system. Therefore, the dynamical behavior of an arbitrarily specified hybrid system cannot be pre-
dicted theoretically by any known method.
Automation Surprises
Further insight into the potentially catastrophic consequences of this lack of predictability can be
gained by analyzing the behavior of the simplified hybrid system illustrated by figure 4, which
shows the regions of validity in state space for two modes denoted as Mode A and Mode B. A
formal definition of validity is presented later. Briefly, any continuous-system trajectory that lies
within the illustrated boundaries is considered safe, and any excursion outside those limits is consid-
ered potentially catastrophic. These regions of mode validity must be regarded as bubbles floating in
multidimensional state space. Furthermore, these bubbles move about in the state space and change
shape as the system reacts to environmental influences.
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Figure 4. Regions of validity.
The diagram on the left (fig. 4(a)) illustrates a normal condition. At the operating point shown,
which could lie anywhere on one of the trajectories illustrated on the left side of figure 3, both Mode
A and Mode B are valid, and either could be selected safely. The selection logic is indicated by the
transition surface, which shows that Mode A is selected for points to the left of the transition sur-
face, and Mode B is selected for points to its right. For the operating point shown, Mode B would be
selected. It is clear that, for a safe transition, the transition surface must lie within the intersection of
the two regions of validity.
The diagram on the right (fig. 4(b)) illustrates an abnormal condition. It can be seen that the region
of validity for Mode A remains the same as in figure 4(a), but that the region of validity for Mode B
has moved to the right and diminished in size owing to system reaction to changes in environmental
conditions, such as engine failure or wind shear. As a result, the operating point no longer lies within
the region of validity for Mode B. If the transition surface in figure 4(b) remains specified as in
figure 4(a), then Mode B will be selected even though it is invalid under the changed environmental
conditions.
Such an invalid mode selection could result in automated system actions that are unsafe, or totally
inappropriate for the intended operation, actions that take the human operators completely by sur-
prise. A concrete example of an invalid mode selection that caused an aircraft accident is presented
later in the section "An Example Illustrating Invalid Mode Selection." In order to avoid such poten-
tially catastrophic mode selections, the transition surface must be adjusted as the system reacts to
environmental influences so that it always lies within the intersection of the two regions of validity,
as shown at the right of figure 4(b).
However, such adjustment of the transition surfaces in a complex reactive system is a very difficult
problem, because it would require that many independent entities be maintained in strict correspon-
dence under dynamically varying conditions. A simpler approach, which is taken in this report, is to
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eliminate separate transition surfaces entirely by making the regions of validity themselves the
agency of mode selection.
Design Methods
In the absence of any method for theoretical prediction of the dynamical behavior of reactive hybrid
systems, system designers have been forced to take a computational approach via simulation, as
already explained. The example illustrated by figure 4 shows that, because simulation of all envir-
onmental conditions is impossible, it cannot be determined by means of a purely computational
approach whether an existing system satisfies requirements that ensure valid transitions in general.
The resulting lack of behavioral predictability under exceptional conditions has been recognized as
a serious human-factors deficiency (Wiener, 1989; Billings, 1996).
There remains the possibility of a theoretical attack on the inverse design problem. This inverse
approach seeks to synthesize (that is, to deduce by a mathematical process) the specification of a
hybrid system in such a way as to ensure that the system satisfies a set of dynamical behavior
properties imposed a priori that rule out unsafe or inappropriate behaviors. This approach seems
especially attractive for the design of transport aircraft flight management systems, for which the a
priori specification of behavioral properties can take advantage of criteria for design and certifica-
tion of jet transports that are based on more than 40 years of experience with both civil and military
operation. This report presents a method for synthesizing mode selection logic for transport aircraft
flight management systems so as to satisfy general safety and effectiveness properties specified a
priori, enabling formal validation to be achieved.
Design Goals and Technical Approach
Design Goals
Major design goals are (1) system design integrity based on proof of logical correctness at the design
level, (2) significant simplification and cost reduction in system development and certification, and
(3) improved operational efficiency, with significant alleviation of certain human-factors problems
encountered by pilots in current transport aircraft.
Technical Approach
The technical approach to be taken leads toward these goals through development of a system archi-
tecture capable of formal verification and validation, which would replace much of the software
testing currently required for certification with logical proof of algorithmic properties for all safety-
critical system elements, and would enable comprehensive validation. Because such an architecture
must of necessity make use of a drastically simplified mode structure, it may be expected to alleviate
11 Liman-
	 problems relating to mode confusion (Hughes and Dornheim, 1995).
Synthesis Method
Following a suggestion of Michael Heymann (Heymann, personal communication, 1994), the pres-
ent approach concentrates on investigating the region of state space for each mode that corresponds
to valid operation of the system (fig. 4). Based on these well-defined regions, the state space is dis-
cretized geometrically, and the conditions for validity of each mode are tabulated. This table must be
inverted (interchanging tabulated quantities with their arguments) to provide the basis for a mode
selection strategy. However, it is found that naive inversion leads to a combinatorial explosion of
cases. To avoid this explosion, heuristic strategies are used to partition the validity table, and the
partitioned table is then inverted to obtain a logically complete enumerated list of relevant cases.
Each case is related geometrically to a well-defined region of the state space, and selection criteria
determine mode selection uniquely for each such region. The complete system satisfies general
safety and effectiveness properties specified a priori. Behavioral properties are summarized by
general theorems that enable formal validation of the complete system to be achieved. The potential
for generalization of the method to other hybrid systems will be discussed later.
Logical Consistency
A fully axiomatic treatment (Rushby, 1995) would seek to examine formally the logical consistency
of the specified safety and effectiveness properties, which is not attempted here. It might seem that,
in case of conflict between safety and mission effectiveness, in airline service the latter should
always be sacrificed in favor of safety. But this formulation is too simple to deal with situations in
which violation of effectiveness could in itself give rise to a safety hazard. For example, if a wind
shear that overwhelmed aircraft performance should be encountered during final approach, avoiding
the a priori hazard of stalling might seem to require maintaining the conventional generous airspeed
margins above stalling speed, even if this caused the aircraft to settle below the approach path. But it
is now well-accepted that the safest policy for traversing wind shear requires holding the approach
path to avoid striking the ground short of the runway, and sacrificing airspeed margin, if necessary,
right down to stalling speed. More subtle examples of cases in which violation of effectiveness could
create a hazard can be foUnd in the accidents and incidents selected for discussion in appendix G.
In several of these cases, the hazard was compounded by poor annunciations to the human crew,
compromising their- potential capability for resolving problems not known to the designers a priori.
Recognizing the limitations of our knowledge in this human-factors area, the present work does
not attempt a complete axiomatic treatment. Instead, it deals on a case-by-case basis with logical
conflicts between safety and effectiveness, such as performance limitations that preclude capture
of altitude or airspeed targets. In each case, the exact nature of the limitation is annunciated for
resolution at higher levels within the system hierarchy, or, ultimately, by the human crew. Assurance
that all such cases of conflict are certain to be identified is provided by a guarantee of logical
completeness.
Specific Objectives
The primary objective of the present work is to enable formal validation by developing a practical
design procedure, one useful to industry designers in the near term, for synthesis of hybrid systems
that satisfy general safety and effectiveness properties specified a priori.
A secondary objective is to realize the potential of formal validation for improved operational safety,
with particular concern for the design integrity of the complete system, including the human/
machine cockpit interface, and to provide a firm technical basis for certification criteria.
A tertiary objective is to contribute to the development of more general theoretical methods for
synthesizing hybrid systems directly from design requirements.
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Scope
This report treats only the problem of transport aircraft longitudinal control, which is more interest-
ing than lateral-directional control because two longitudinal response parameters (flightpath angle
and airspeed) are controlled by two control parameters (pitch and thrust). Furthermore, the longitud-
inal problem is complicated by abrupt saturation of the thrust control. In contrast, lateral-directional
control in coordinated flight with small sideslip angles involves only one response parameter (head-
ing) and one control parameter (bank angle) not subject to abrupt saturation. For simplicity, no
failures are treated in detail in this report, with the exception of abrupt failure of one engine, as pre-
viously explained. However, methods that enable detailed treatment of other failures are discussed
briefly.
The elements of the Vehicle Management System that are treated in this report are indicated by the
shaded blocks in figure 1. The continuous elements treated are the outer-loop control, the inner-loop
control, and the aircraft itself together with its control surface and throttle servos. The design of
these continuous elements uses the nonlinear inverse control concept developed theoretically by
Meyer (Meyer and Cicolani, 1981) and applied by Franklin (Franklin, Hynes, Hardy, Martin, and
Innis, 1986) to the flight control system of a NASA research aircraft.
As indicated by the shading in figure 1, the discrete elements of the Vehicle Management System
treated in detail in this report consist of the mode control logic for the first two levels of the mode
hierarchy, which correspond functionally to the autoflight systems installed in current transport
aircraft. As indicated by the cross-hatching in figure 1, guidelines are presented in this report for
simplified development of guidance functions and associated third-level supermodes, which corres-
pond functionally to current vertical navigation (VNAV) systems.
The navigation function and the corresponding elements for lateral-directional control can be treated
by applying the synthesis methodology developed in this report. It can be seen that, on the right
(tactical) side of the vertical dashed line in figure 1. the two remaining elements are, first, the cock-
pit interfaces grouped within the display function, and second, the human crew's role in tactical
supervision. Comments on human-factors research needed to model these elements, which could
enable complete integration of the human-automation system. can be found in the section "Future
Work."
Plan of Report
Contents of Report
The report is divided into two volumes and three major parts. Part I ("Background") begins with the
"Introduction," and presents a brief overview of the formulation and solution of the synthesis prob-
lem in the section "Overview of Design Method."
Next, in the section "Aircraft Model," the aircraft model is described in detail. The dynamical
response of the aircraft to longitudinal control is developed from the governing differential equa-
tions, and related geometrically to the forms of trajectories in the flightpath-airspeed plane.
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Part II ("Design Synthesis") begins with the section "Flight Control System," in which the mode
hierarchy is described, and the continuous elements of the flight control system are treated in detail.
The lowest-level elements in the mode hierarchy, which are termed primitive modes (that is, not
composite), relate directly to the dynamical behavior of the aircraft. The higher-level elements relate
to the control tasks required for operation within the ATC system, such as capturing and holding an
altitude, tracking the approach path, and the like. Three primitive modes for automated longitudinal
control are defined, and their stability properties are analyzed and related geometrically to certain
regions of the flightpath-airspeed plane.
In the section "Safety Requirements," flight safety hazards are identified a priori, and are associated
with certain boundary contours in the flightpath-airspeed plane. Safety margins are then applied to
these boundaries to define the safe flight envelope. Flight envelope protection is discussed, and
envelope protection modes are defined.
In the section "Effectiveness Requirements," the concept of effectiveness of the automated control
system for its intended purpose is developed, and related to the performance capability of the air-
craft. (The concept of effectiveness plays a role in the synthesis problem similar to that of liveness in
computer science.) Complete effectiveness is defined to require capture of altitude, airspeed, and
flightpath targets. Partial effectiveness is defined, and requirements for annunciation of violations of
effectiveness are specified.
In the section "Mode Validity," validity is defined to require both safety and effectiveness. Validity
is analyzed for each mode based on the differential equations specified by the control law, and is
related geometrically to the stability regions of the flightpath-airspeed plane studied previously. The
conditions for validity of each mode are summarized by a validity table, which completes the formu-
lation of the synthesis problem.
Solution of this problem for the lo ,.N , est-level hybrid system is discussed in detail in the section
"Synthesis of Path/Speed Command Supermode." Synthesis based on naive inversion of the validity
table is shown to be intractably complex. Heuristic strategies based on general notions of maximum
effectiveness, best approximation, and logical dominance are adopted, and are used to partition the
validity table, accounting for logical dependencies. The partitioned table is then inverted to obtain a
logically complete enumerated list of relevant cases. Each case is related geometrically to a well-
defined region of the flightpath-airspeed plane, and mode selection criteria determine mode selection
uniquely for each such region, statecharts specifying mode selection logic are constructed directly
from the mode selection tables. The complete system satisfies the safety and effectiveness properties
specified a priori.
In the section "Synthesis of Altitude Command Supermode," extension of the synthesis method to
the second level of the mode hierarchy is described, with detailed application to altitude control.
System properties are summarized by general theorems that enable formal validation of the complete
system to be achieved.
The section "Other Second-Level and Third-Level Supermodes" presents guidelines for simplified
development of other second-level and third-level supermodes based on modifications to the second-
level Altitude Command supermode, and shows how the complete Vehicle Management System
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could be used in airline service. This section completes the second major part of the report, "Design
Synthesis."
The last major part of the report, Part i1I, "Consequences," deals with assessment of its consequen-
ces for airworthiness and certification, and for human-factors design of cockpit interfaces. The
section "Airworthiness, Certitication, and Cockpit Interface Design Issues" discusses those issues in
the context of several transport aircraft accidents and incidents. These accidents and incidents are
selected to show the broad applicability of airworthiness principles based on the safety and effective-
ness properties developed in this report. Simple but plausible analysis shows that, although the
causes of these accidents and incidents differ greatly in detail, each of them resulted from some
violation of safety and effectiveness properties. On anthropomorphic terms, each of the automated
systems involved exhibited a lack of trustworthiness in carrying out its assigned task that would
have been recognized as unacceptahlc had the same task been assigned to a human crewmember.)
Furthermore, these problems hax e not been alleviated by experience, because the most recently
designed systems are charactcriied by violations of safety and effectiveness properties similar to
those encountered in previous desi,U'n generations. The discussion leads to the suggestion that formal
validation might signtficantl,^ inipro\ c operational safety. Cockpit interface design is discussed
briefly, and several heuristic Lurdelines are proposed.
The next section, "Future Work." discusses the possibility of modeling the lower levels of the
human pilot's activities invol\ ed in tactical supervision, enabling formal validation to be extended
to include the complete human marhinc cockpit interface. The potential for generalization of the
synthesis method developed w thu report to other hybrid systems such as highly automated indus-
trial plants for petrochemicals and nuclear power is discussed in some detail.
Finally, the "Conclusions" arc prc,cnted, and the "References" and "Figures" complete the report.
The main report is presented M 'A olume One."
Volume Two presents seven appendices, which are intended to make the main report accessible to
readers with various backu,round,.
Appendix A presents a tutorial rc\ ic\\ of the U. S. Standard Atmosphere, with atmospheric param-
eters tabulated at six selected ahitudes tier- reference.
Appendix B presents a tutorial rc\ ic\\ of transport aircraft design and operation. Dynamic models
with three different levels of tidcl,ty are developed to support the present work; however, these
models may also be useful for Iuturr studies. Dynamic simulation is implemented by means of a
widely available spreadsheet. and several flying qualities criteria are illustrated by time histories of
aircraft motions in response to cic%ator steps and pulses.
Appendix C presents a rigorous development of the aircraft equations of motion derived by elemen-
tary methods in appendix B. and generalizes those equations for symmetric (coordinated) turning
flight.
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Appendix D presents a brief tutorial review of elementary propositional logic, and provides a list of
theorems in symbolic logic for reference.
Appendix E discusses the application of elementary propositional logic to real-time embedded sys-
tems; statechart semantics are summarized, and modifications are proposed that facilitate implemen-
tation within a clock-based sequential machine.
Appendix F develops methodology for generating formal proofs, and applies it to provide rigorous
proof of several theorems that summarize the dynamical behavior of the transport aircraft and
control system described by the main report, enabling formal validation of the complete system to
be achieved. Independently verified regulator properties that ensure eventual capture of altitude and
airspeed targets are taken as axioms of the formal system, ignoring time-dependent detail. This
methodology enables application of ordinary (static) propositional logic to the dynamical system.
Currently available codes for automated hypothesis testing can provide the basis for a theorem-
proving tool, and it is suggested that such tools could play a crucial role in future system
development.
Appendix G presents brief statements summarizing the aspects of several selected transport aircraft
accidents and incidents that are considered relevant to issues of system design.
Recommendations for Readers
Readers desiring only an overview of the design procedure should read the section, "Overview of
Design Method," and then skip to the "Conclusions." Readers interested in the design and operation
of the complete system, but not in the details of the method of logical synthesis, should skip the
section "Synthesis of Path/Speed Command Supermode" and the synthesis discussion in the section
"Synthesis of Altitude Command Supermode." Readers interested primarily in the human-factors
aspects of formal validation should read the sections "Overview of Design Method," "Airworthiness,
Certification, and Cockpit Interface Design Issues," "Future Work," and "Conclusions."
Readers desiring additional background in transport aircraft design and operation can consult the
tutorial treatments in appendices A, B, and C, and the summary of selected accidents and incidents
in appendix G. Readers desiring additional background in formal logic and its application to real-
time computation within embedded systems can consult appendices D and E. Specialists in formal
logic and automated hypothesis testing who are interested ill 	 contribution that their expert know-
ledge can make to avionic system design should read the sections "Overview of Design Method,"
"Synthesis of Path/Speed Command Supermode," "Synthesis of Altitude Command Supermode,"
and appendix F. The formal proofs contained in appendix F are essential for formal validation of the
complete system, but it is expected that only readers familiar with formal logic and others with a
vital interest in formal validation will need to follow these proofs in detail; the introductory
discussion of proof methodology should be of more general interest.
16
OVERVIEW OF DESIGN METHOD
This section provides a brief, qualitative overview of the design method that is treated in detail in
this report. Because this section provides an overview of selected sections of the report, references to
tables 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7, and to figures 6 and 7 do not appear here in numerical sequence. The design
procedure, which is illustrated by the block diagram of figure 5, can be summarized by the following
steps (terms in italics refer to the elements of figure 5):
Formulation of Synthesis Problem
The aircra/i model for longitudinal motions in the plane of symmetry is developed, and the
governing differential equations are derived. The aircraft motion is described, like that of any
rigid body, by six ordinary differential equations. As a consequence of the assumed bilateral
symmetry of both the aircraft itself and the surrounding aerodynamic flow field, those six
equations separate into two uncoupled sets of three equations each, one set describing the
longitudinal motions, which are the subject of this report, and the other set describing the
lateral-directional motions, which are not treated.
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Figure 5. Design Method.
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The aircraft model is fin rther simplified by the assumption that elevator control is sufficiently
powerful and pitch response sufficiently rapid to generate any desired lift variation. This
assumption eliminates the pitching moment equation from the three-degree-of-freedom model,
reducing the aircraft model to two degrees of freedom. Because rotational pitch dynamics are
eliminated from the model together with the pitching moment equation, the two-degree-of-
freedom model treats the aircraft as a point mass concentrated at its center of gravity. A detailed
justification for use of this simplified model is presented, based on response calculations that
demonstrate the excellence of the approximation for representative transport aircraft
(appendix B).
The response parameters of the two-degree-of-freedom model (eqs. (1) and (2)) are flightpath
angle (climb angle) and airspeed. and the control parameters are pitch and thrust. The state space
for the continuous differential equations consists, therefore, of the two-dimensional flightpath-
airspeed plane. Furthermore, fli_g htpath angle and airspeed are also the selected output variables.
2. The differential equations are solved for the steady state, and theflight envelope diagram is
constructed (fig. 8) by cross-plottin_u flightpath angle versus airspeed with contours of pitch and
thrust as parameters. The physical limits of the flight envelope (envelope li»rits), which are
quasi-static, correspond to nllnlllium thrust, maximum thrust, minimum airspeed, and maximum
airspeed. Minimum airspeed is determined in normal symmetric flight by the stalling speed, and
in abnormal engine-out fli__ht b y the minimum control speed. Maximum airspeed is determined
by structural limits at low altitude and by compressibility (Mach) limits at high altitude.
During manual flight, the pilot controls pitch with elevator and engine revolutions per minute
(rpm) with throttle. It can he seen from the flight envelope chart of figure 8 that the steady-state
solution of the differential equations for any combination of control inputs is determined by the
intersection of the conrespondin_-, pitch and thrust contours. The desired solution is termed the
target operating point.
3. The dynamic response of the aircraft to control is related to its flight envelope as follows. The
accelerations acting on the aircraft can be determined graphically from the flight envelope
diagram by noting the position of the point corresponding to the current path and speed of the
aircraft relative to the pitch and thrust control contours (fig. 9), which is equivalent to construct-
ing the direction field ofsolutions to the differential equations. By stepwise numerical integra-
tion of the accelerations. each solution of the differential equations can be mapped into a unique
path in the path-speed plane. ( Representative paths connecting initial and final points are illustra-
ted in the flight envelope dia g rams of figure 10.) Thus, in principle, complete information about
the dynamical behavior of the aircraft is contained geometrically in the flight envelope diagram.
4. Analysis of the differential equations shows that, qualitatively, only three kinds of aircraft
behavior need to be considered. Ifboth pitch and thrust are available for control (termed Type (i)
control), then both flightpath angle (climb angle) and airspeed can be controlled independently.
If thrust is fixed (saturated) so that only pitch is available for control, then either airspeed can be
controlled at the expense of ili g htpath angle (termed Type (ii) control), or else flightpath angle
can be controlled at the expense of airspeed (termed Type (iii) control). By analyzing the
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stability properties of the solutions corresponding to each of the three kinds of dynamical
behavior, the flight envelope is partitioned geometrically into seven discrete regions (fig. 10),
within each of which the dynamical behavior of the aircraft is qualitatively similar. Physically,
the boundaries separating these stability regions correspond to thrust control saturation and to
speed for minimum drag.
These boundaries are treated as mathematically sharp. (Uncertainties contributed by noisy
measurements or external disturbances remain to be dealt with during implementation.) With
sharp boundaries, logical completeness of the classification scheme is established by inspection
of the flight envelope diagram to ensure that all points in the plane lie in one discrete region or
another, so that no point exists in the state space that is not identified by its region.
5. Primitive control modes are defined for the automated system (fig. 11) that correspond qualita-
tively to the three kinds of dynamical behavior, and control laws are specified quantitatively to
satisfy applicable flying qualities criteria for manual control.
6. Flight safety hazards are identified a priori, and safety margins providing protection against
these hazards are applied to the physical Iiinits of the flight envelope to define safe envelope
limits (fig. 13). Envelope protection is discussed, and envelope protection modes are defined.
General effectiveness properties that the complete system is required to satisfy to assure capture
of flightpath and airspeed targets are specified, and are related to the performance capability of
the aircraft. Steady-state values of flightpath angle and airspeed must lie within the aircraft flight
envelope. Complete effectiveness, partial effectiveness, and normal effectiveness are defined,
and requirements for annunciation of effectiveness violations are specified.
Mode validity is defined to require that both safety and effectiveness properties hold. For each
primitive mode, a validity analvsis based on the differential equations specified by the control
law is performed, and the region in state space (the flightpath-airspeed plane) is determined that
corresponds to valid operation of the aircraft in that mode. In figure 10(a), only Region I is valid
for Type (i) control. In figure 10(b), all regions except Regions VI and VII are valid for Type (ii)
control. In figure 10(c), only Regions 1, I1, 111, and IV are valid for Type (iii) control.
Discrete validity conditions are enumerated, and these conditions are related geometrically to the
discrete stability regions determined previously (fig. 10). The validity conditions are summarized
by a table (table 2) that gives the validity of each mode as a function of the instantaneous mea-
sured values of path and speed, and of the desired (target) values of these parameters. This
validity,
 table completes the formulation of the synthesis problem.
Solution of Synthesis Problem
9. In principle, the mode selection logic for the primitive modes can be synthesized by inversion of
the validity table (table 2), interchanging arguments with tabulated quantities. Before inversion,
validity conditions are tabulated. with modes and parameters as arguments. After inversion, truth
values would be tabulated with modes and validity conditions as arguments (that is, the inverted
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table would be a truth table for table 2). However, brute-force inversion based on enumeration of
all cases is shown to be intractably complex.
In table 2, there are 10 binary conditions. (These binary conditions can be seen more clearly by
expressing them in terms of symbolic logic, as in table 3.) It may be seen that there are 5 binary
conditions that determine the validity of the y-V Command mode (first column of table 3), 7 con-
ditions that determine the validity of the V Command mode (second column), and 7 conditions
that determine the validity of they Command mode (third column). If these conditions were all
independent, there would be 25
 = 32 combinations requiring evaluation for assessment of the
validity of the y-V Command mode, 2' = 128 combinations for the V Command mode, and
2' = 128 combinations for the y Command mode. After accounting for duplication of conditions
between columns, it is found that there are actually 10 independent conditions in table 3. It
follows that, for assessment of the validity of all three primitive modes by inversion of the whole
table, there would be 2 10 = 1024 combinations requiring enumeration. Furthermore, a mode
selection policy would have to be formulated specifying a unique mode selection for each of
these 1024 combinations. Therefore, it must be expected that a naive, brute-force approach based
on enumeration of all cases would be found intractably complex.
10. Heuristic design strategies for mode selection and for input screening of target values (table 4)
are developed, based on general notions of maximum effectiveness, best approximation, and
logical dominance. When adopted, these strategies can be regarded as part of the functional
specification if desired.
11. The validity table (table 2) is partitioned with the help of the heuristic strategies and extensive
use of elementary symbolic logic, accounting for logical dependencies.
12. The partitioned validity table is inverted to generate a logically complete list of enumerated
cases (table 6). Each case corresponds to a single combination of conditions that determine the
validity of each mode, and is related geometrically to a well-defined region of the tlightpath-
airspeed plane.
13. Mode selection criteria are applied to each enumerated case to generate the mode selection table
(table 7). In some cases validity considerations alone are sufficient to determine mode selection.
In some cases for which no modes are valid, the information available is nevertheless sufficient
to determine mode selection, otherwise, engineering analysis is applied on a case-by-case basis
to determine the least adverse choice. in cases for which multiple modes are valid, mode selec-
tion is based on maximifing gffectiveness. The resulting mode selection table (table 7) determines
mode selection uniquely for each enumerated case and for the geometric region (fig. 10) to
which that case corresponds.
14. The mode selection statechart (fig. 15) is constructed directly from the mode selection table,
specifying mode initialization according to a simplified initialization strategy developed
separately.
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15. After completing steps 1-14, system properties are summarized by concise statements of system
behavioral properties that enable formal validation of the complete system to be achieved. (For
the Altitude Command supermode, which is functionally similar to the Flight Level Change
mode in current transport aircraft, the dynamical behavior of the synthesized system is summar-
ized by five theorems (appendix F) that demonstrate satisfaction of the general safety and effec-
tiveness properties imposed a priori.)
An Example Illustrating Invalid Mode Selection
Partitioning of the two-dimensional state space into well-defined regions of mode validity, as just
discussed, has laid the groundwork for a concrete example illustrating the potentially catastrophic
consequences of invalid mode selection, which is presented next. This example supplements the
abstract discussion of automation surprises presented in the "Introduction."
Performance Envelope
Figure 6 illustrates the performance envelope for a representative transport aircraft. It can be seen
that the upper broken contour represents the variation of maximum flightpath angle (climb angle)
with airspeed with all engines operating at maximum thrust, and the solid contour (center of dia-
gram) represents its variation with one engine inoperative. The operating point shown (open circle)
is typical for the initial climb after takeoff. Comparison with figure 10(a), shows that the initial
operating point lies in Region I.
Engine Failure After Takeoff
Now assume that an engine fails abruptly, and that maximum available thrust is applied to the
remaining engines. The maximum possible climb angle is therefore reduced to the level correspond-
ing to the solid contour, and the thrust control becomes saturated. Since by definition Type (1) con-
trol requires unsaturated thrust, Type (i) control is not available, and either Type (ii) control (that is,
speed control) or Type (iii) control (that is, path control) must be selected.
System Behavior
Comparison with figure 10(c) shows that just after engine failure the operating point lies in
Region V, even though the operating point itself remains unchanged during the brief time interval
during which the failure is assumed to take place—it is the maximum thrust contour that changes,
not the operating point.
In Region V, Type (iii) control is invalid. If Type (iii) control is selected, the aircraft trajectory will
follow the horizontal path marked P in the diagram (fig. 6): path is controlled at the expense of
speed, which decreases steadily until penetration of the minimum-control-speed boundary (left side
of diagram) causes potentially catastrophic loss of control.
On the other hand, if Type (ii) control is selected, the aircraft trajectory will follow the vertical path
marked S in the diagram (fig. 6): speed is controlled at the expense of path, which decreases steadily
until equilibrium is reached as shown (tilled circle) oil
	 maximum-thrust contour. Certification
criteria require that the resulting climb gradient must provide adequate obstacle clearance, ensuring a
safe outcome when speed control is maintained.
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Discussion
It is clear that Type (ii) control should be selected after engine failure. The resulting operating point
has two desirable properties: first, it represents the best approximation to the initially selected
operating point that is physically realizable following engine failure; and second, it results in the
steepest climb gradient achievable at the selected airspeed. Nevertheless, selection of Type (iii)
control has caused at least one aircraft accident under similar conditions. Avoiding such catastrophic
mode selections presents a challenge to designers of automated systems.
The method of synthesizing mode selection logic that is developed in this report avoids selection of
invalid modes whenever possible. If none of the available modes is valid, case analysis based on
enumeration enables selection of the least adverse choice. If several modes are valid, the selection is
made so as to maximize effectiveness. This strategy results in best physically realizable approxima-
tions when the aircraft is subject to performance limitations of various kinds.
In the engine failure case discussed in this example, it should be noted that correct mode selection
need depend only on mode validity (which is based on general identification of geometrical stability
regions within the state space), and does not require specific identification of engine failure. With
this validity-based mode selection strategy, it is recognition that the target climb angle exceeds the
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performance capability of the aircraft that triggers reversion to Type (ii) control, not recognition of
engine failure. Therefore, any other failure that caused a similar loss of performance (perhaps a
hydraulic fault that prevented landing-gear retraction) would result in a similarly safe outcome—all
that is required is onboard determination of validity regions within the state space (that is, detennin-
ation of performance-envelope limits) with sufficient accuracy. This strategy stands in sharp contrast
to other design methods that attempt specific identification of each possible abnormal condition in
order to enable appropriate mode selection.
AIRCRAFT MODEL
The aim of the following discussion is to enable a qualitative understanding of "what the automated
control system is trying to do, and how it does it" that is accessible to readers without a detailed
mathematical grasp of the properties of nonlinear differential equations. The necessary background
follows: (1) elementary differential calculus for definition of derivative; (2) elementary integral
calculus for definition of integral, and for approximate evaluation of definite integrals by trapezoidal
rule; and (3) elementary physics for formulation of differential equations according to Newton's
second law.
Because the differential equations governing the aircraft motion are solved numerically by the
control system, and because this motion is driven by pilot control inputs and by atmospheric dis-
turbances whose forms are unknown until they are encountered in real time, classical methods of
solving differential equations for known forcing functions are of little help in understanding control
system actions and aircraft dynamic responses. (Dynamical responses to representative simplified
pilot control inputs are calculated numerically and discussed in detail in appendix B.) Fortunately,
the qualitative understanding of aircraft dynamical behavior that is essential for this report is not
difficult, and indeed is already familiar to pilots.
Definitions and Assumptions
Readers unfamiliar with aeronautical terminology would no doubt find unintelligible the summary
statement that the mathematical aircraft model to be developed will be based on path-frame descrip-
tion of the motion of a rigid aircraft with negligible thrust inclination during straight, symmetric,
wings-levelflighi in sti// air over a hat, rtonrotating Earth. The discussion must therefore begin by
explaining the technical definitions of the italicized terms and the simplifying assumptions they
imply. A more expanded treatment can be found in appendix B.
Symmetric
Not only is the aircraft structure bilaterally symmetric, but the aerodynamic flow fields on each side
of the aircraft plane of symmetry are mirror images of each other. The small asymmetric rotational
effects owing to like-rotation engines are neglected. The aircraft velocity vector lies in the plane of
symmetry.
Transport aircraft operate in symmetric flight except during crosswind landing and in case of engine
failure. The effects of thrust asymmetry owing to engine failure are discussed later.
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Straight
The projection of the aircraft trajectory in the ground plane (its track) is a straight line. For straight,
symmetric flight, the wings of a symmetric aircraft must be level. Results are generalized later to
include symmetric (coordinated) turning flight (appendix Q.
Rigid Aircraft
By definition, the distances between each pair of points in a rigid body must remain fixed, but trans-
port aircraft cannot be considered structurally rigid (indeed, they are quite flexible). Nevertheless,
the frequencies characterizing elastic structural deformations (vibration) usually lie so far above
those for rigid-body motions of the whole aircraft that the airflow can be considered to act upon the
deformed aircraft. In that case (the quasi-static assumption), the aircraft can be treated as a rigid
body provided that aerodynamic force and moment parameters are suitably modified to incorporate
the effects of structural deformation. With the quasi-static assumption, aircraft motions (like those of
any other rigid body) can be described by six ordinary differential equations involving six degrees of
freedom.
Movable control surfaces are assumed to be balanced and irreversibly actuated, so that no additional
differential equations are required for description of their motions. Gyroscopic effects of rotating
engine machinery are neglected.
Still Air
The static atmospheric environment is specified by the Standard Atmosphere (appendix A), which
describes the variations of ambient temperature, pressure, air density, and sonic velocity with height
above the surface of the Earth. The effects of atmospheric disturbances such as steady (horizontal)
wind, steady (vertical) draft, wind shear, and atmospheric turbulence are discussed later.
Flat, Nonrotating Earth
The gravitational force at the surface of the Earth is assumed to remain fixed independent of height,
and small Coriolis and centrifugal ("weightlessness") accelerations are neglected. The spherical
Earth is approximated by a tangent horizontal plane, with the point of tangency directly below the
aircraft (local tangent plane approximation). These approximations are valid for control of subsonic
transport aircraft.
Reference Frames
Body Frame
The origin of the body ./rame is located at the aircraft center of gravity. Its longitudinal X axis is
aligned with the aircraft reference fuselage axis (often parallel to the cabin floor). The lateral Y axis
is orthogonal to the plane of symmetry and positive toward the right wing. The vertical Z axis is
positive downward in the plane of symmetry, forming a right-hand orthogonal triad with the X and
Y axes. The pitch angle 6 measures the angular elevation of the X axis relative to the local horizon-
tal plane (fig. 7(a)). It is essential to describe the rotational motions of the aircraft in the body frame
to avoid appearance of the moments and products of inertia as time-varying parameters in the equa-
tions of motion.
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Path Frame
The origin of the path fi°ame is located at the aircraft center of gravity. Its tangential T axis is aligned
with the aircraft velocity vector. In symmetric flight, the lateral L axis is orthogonal to the plane of
symmetry, and coincides with the Y axis of the body frame. The normal N axis is positive downward
in the plane of symmetry, forming a right-hand orthogonal triad with the T and L axes. The flight-
path angle y measures the angular elevation of the T axis relative to the local horizontal plane. In
straight, symmetric flight the angle of attack a is equal to the angular difference (6 — ,y) (fig. 7(b));
symmetric (coordinated) turning flight is discussed later.
Pilots perceive these angular relationships from inside the aircraft, of course, and express them by
saying that the pitch angle describes where the aircraft is pointing, the flightpath angle describes
where it is going, and the angle of attack is the difference between where the aircraft is pointing and
where it is going. Except during takeoff and landing, the pilot's primary control task can be regarded
as control of the velocity vector in such a way as to realize the mission objectives summarized by the
flight plan; pitch control is then considered a means by which control of the velocity vector can be
achieved.
It will be shown next that the aerodynamic lift and drag forces and also the engine thrust force are
aligned with the axes of the path frame, so that only the gravity force requires trigonometric trans-
formation. Therefore, choice of the path frame for the translational motions is convenient from two
viewpoints: first, the pilot's task is closely related to the path-frame motion parameters (flightpath
angle and airspeed); and second, the force description and the resulting equations are simplified.
Lift, Drag, and Thrust
The propulsive force (gross thrust) acts in the plane of symmetry; its component along the T axis is
termed the net thi,ust. Thrust inclination relative to the T axis is negligible for conventional transport
aircraft, together with interference effects between engine efflux and external aerodynamic flow.
Therefore, the total engine thrust is assumed to act along the Taxis. By definition, the aerodynamic
drag force acts in the negative T (streamwise) direction, and the lift force L acts upward in the nega-
tive N direction (fig. 7(c)). Under the quasi-steady flow assumption (appendix B), the aerodynamic
forces are assumed to depend only on the (vectorial) velocity of the aerodynamic flow relative to the
aircraft.
Airstream
X Body	 AirstreamX Body	 Y	 L^.........	 W
H	 ^^	 Tangential	 Y	 p
X Earth	 X Earth
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a) Earth frame and body	 b) Path frame aligned with
	 c) Force equilibrium.
	
frame.	 velocity vector.
Figure 7. Reference frames.
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Equations of Motion
Under the assumptions just discussed, the aircraft motion is described. like that of any rigid body, by
six ordinary differential equations. As a consequence of the assumed bilateral symmetry of both the
aircraft itself and the surrounding aerodynamic flow field, those six equations separate into two
uncoupled sets of three equations each, one set describing the longitudinal motions, which are the
subject of this report, and the other set describing the lateral-directional motions, which are not
treated. The set of three longitudinal equations comprises (1) the longitudinal , force equation (some-
times termed the streamwise force equation), which describes translation along the T axis of the path
frame, (2) the normal_force equation (sometimes termed the lifi equation), which describes transla-
tion along the N axis of the path frame, and (3) the pitching-moment equation, which describes
rotation about the Y axis of the body frame.
Three-Degree-of-Freedom Model
These three equations of motion are obtained by application of Newton's second law to the rigid
aircraft. An elementary derivation can be found in appendix B, and a rigorous but nonelementary
derivation of the two force equations making use of vector-matrix methods is presented in
appendix C. The three longitudinal equations of motion are as follows (fig. 7(c)):
1 dV T — D
—	 — sin y
	
(1)
g dt	 W
Vdy_L
—	 — —cosy	 (2)
dt W
I d = M Y (q. da/dt, (x, V, 8ELEV)	 (3)
where the notation is given ill 	 "List of Symbols."
The quantity (1/g)(dV/dt) oil left side of equation (1) is the (normalized) longitudinal accelera-
tion, and the quantity (V/g)(dy/dt) on the left side of equation (2) is the (normalized) normal accel-
eration, which is proportional to curvature of the flightpath in the plane of symmetry. The lift and
drag forces are related to an-le of attack and airspeed by functions (appendix B) of the form
L = L (a, V) and D = D (L, V) 	 (4)
The angle of attack is related to pitch angle and fli ghtpath angle by the kinematic equation
	
a=6—y	 (5)
which is valid for straight, symmetric, wings-level flight, as already noted.
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It can be seen that equation ( I ) is coupled to equation (2) by the 7 term, and to equation (3) by the
lift and drag variations of equation (4). Equation (2) is coupled to equation (3) by the lift variation
(4) and the kinematic relation (5), and to equation (1) by the airspeed factor V on the left side of
equation (2). Equation (3) is coupled to the other equations by the functional dependence of pitching
moment on pitch rate, angle-of-attack rate, angle of attack, and airspeed, as indicated on the right
side of equation (3). Therefore, the three differential equations form a coupled nonlinear dynamical
system. Detailed numerical calculations of the response of this coupled system to elevator impulses
and steps are presented in appendix B.
Two-Degree-of-Freedom Model
The pitching moment My on the right side of equation (3) is proportional to the elevator deflection
SELEV, which the pilot controls directly during manual flight by means of the cockpit control column.
The pilot shapes the column control input as necessary to obtain the desired pitch response, despite
the unwanted coupling that results from the dependence of the pitching moment My upon the angle
of attack ct and its rate of change da/dt and upon the airspeed V (eq. (3)). This desired pitch
response then results in the desired angle-of-attack response (eq. (5)) and the desired lift (eq. (4)).
The lift determines the normal acceleration according to equation (2). Indeed, one of the oldest and
most important flying qualities criteria is the specification of column force required to generate an
incremental normal acceleration of 1 g.
The time integral of normal acceleration then determines the flightpath response according to
equation (2), which is coupled with equation (1), as already noted. Dynamic response calculations
for a representative transport (appendix B) show that fli ghtpath follows pitch with a time lag in the
order of 2 sec that characterizes the aircraft. Flightpath response to an elevator (column) impulse
stabilizes within 3 sec (the short term); airspeed responds much more slowly.
Therefore, provided that the elevator control is sufficiently powerful and the pitch response suffi-
ciently rapid (that is, pitch response bandwidth is sufficiently wide) relative to the flightpath
response, the pitch angle itself can be regarded as the controlled quantity instead of the elevator (or
column) deflection. It then follows from equations (4) and (5) that any desired variation of lift can be
generated by means of pitch control. This assumption is justified for transport aircraft designed to
meet applicable flying-qualities criteria for manual control, because pitch bandwidth and control
power are much higher than necessary for low-bandwidth automated control of flightpath and
airspeed, especially when modest acceleration limits are imposed for passenger comfort. (High-
bandwidth tasks such as automatic landing are not considered in this report.)
This assumption that pitch control can generate any desired lift variation eliminates the pitching
moment equation, reducing the aircraft model to two degrees of freedom. Because rotational dynam-
ics are eliminated from the model together with equation (3), the two-degree-of-freedom model
treats the aircraft as a point mass concentrated at its center of gravity. Appendix B presents a
detailed justification for choice of this two-degree-of-freedom model based on response calculations
that demonstrate the excellence of the approximation for representative transport aircraft.
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To summarize, the two-degree-of freedom model consists of the longitudinal force equation (1), the
normal force equation (2), and the functional relations (4) that describe the lift force L and the drag
force D. As a first step toward understanding the dynamical behavior of the aircraft, the steady-state
solution of these equations is studied in the next section.
Flight Envelope
For steady (trimmed) flight conditions, the acceleration terms on the left sides of equations (1) and
(2) must vanish, so that the equations become (as illustrated by figure 7(c))
	
Sill y = T WD	 (1 a)
and
cos y = L
	 (2a)
W
Denoting the trimmed (potential) 1ightpath angle by yroT, equations (la) and (2a) become
TD
sinyPOT
W	
(1b)
and
L
cosy t,ot- W	 (2b)
For flight in still air, yro,z is also an aerod ynamic flightpath angle that is referred to the air mass, as
are of course the aerodynamic forces L and D. The parameter yroT can also be regarded as a control
parameter that plays the sank role as thrust. (The parameter yroT is the same as that denoted by yTRiM
in appendix B.)
Lift and Drag Characteristics
Appendix B shows how the I i h and dritu forces are reduced to nondimensional coefficients whose
characteristic variations can he studied in canonical form. Briefly summarizing the results, the lift
coefficient CL and the drab coclfi( Iciit C I) are defined by the equations
z
L= PV_ S C' t (a,M)	 D= p 2 S C o (a,M) (B-6d)
In the equations (B-6d), the Alach number M is defined by M = V/a where a denotes the sonic
velocity, and the quantity pV','2 is termed the dynamic pressure, where p denotes atmospheric
density.
At low Mach numbers below M = 0.3, the effects of Mach number are unimportant, so that M can be
dropped from the functional relations (B-6d). Appendix B shows that the lift coefficient C L increases
28
W/S sin yg	 T — CDP V '"/2 — 
I	 W/S
sin 7NOT — n	 POTAR e P„VE-/2 	 W W/S P„ E
(B- l Od)
n AR e (p0VE^/2)
linearly with angle of attack, reaching its maxima» value at the stalling angle. At higher Mach
numbers, the lift-curve slope dCL/da increases slightly, and the maximum value of the lift coef-
ficient decreases as shock waves form on the aircraft wings.
Appendix B shows that the drag coefficient CD varies parabolically with angle of attack, and there-
fore with lift coefficient (that is, the drag polar curve is parabolic). At Mach numbers above M = 0.6
the drag coefficient increases with Mach number, slowly at first and then more abruptly as shock
waves form on the aircraft.
in steady flight, the lift L must equilibrate the normal component of aircraft weight W according to
equation (2a). Appendix B shows that the variation of the drag D with airspeed V determined by
equations (2a) and (B-6d) is quadratic, taking on its minimum value at an intermediate airspeed
termed the speed.for mininntin drag, and increasing at both lower and higher airspeeds.
Engine Thrust Characteristics
Appendix B shows that, at altitudes below 15,000 ft, maximum available engine thrust decreases
slowly with increasing airspeed and Mach number. As altitude increases, the slope dT/dM of this
thrust variation decreases; at cruising altitudes, the available thrust becomes nearly independent of
Mach number.
Performance Envelope
The aircraft performance envelope for steady flight (that is, for flight conditions in which both the
longitudinal acceleration dV/dt and the normal acceleration V (dy/dt) vanish) is determined by the
variation of the trimmed flightpath angle y i>oT with airspeed or Mach number, which is found by
substituting into equations (1 b) and (2b) the lift, drag, and thrust functions just discussed.
Appendix B shows that the resulting quadratic variation of yroT with airspeed is given by the
equation
where the notation is given in the "List of Symbols.”
Sample calculation— Equation (B-10d) gives the variation of the equilibrium (steady-state) flight-
path angle 71)o^ t with equivalent airspeed V t;, with the thrust T (or, alternatively, the engine rpm N) as
parameter. It can be seen that, at a known height H in the Standard Atmosphere (appendix A) and at
a selected equivalent airspeed V i , and with known aircraft parameters T/W, W/S, Cpp, AR, and e,
equation (B- I Od) is quadratic in sin yroT and can be solved for yPoT in closed form. The following
parameter values are representative for a transport aircraft climbing with maximum thrust at sea
level at the minimum-drag airspeed (table 1, appendix B):
W/S = 150 lb/ft' 	 Cpp = 0.0150	 AR = 7.19	 e = 0.83
V = 487.9 ft/sec	 VE = 289.1 kt	 M = 0.437	 T/W = 0.1765
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With these parameter values, equation (13-10d) becomes
sin 
YPOT — 0.028 286 sine YPOT = 0.1200	 (B-1 Oe)
The numerical solution for sin YPOT is 17.6766 ±17.5562, or, because the property sin (.):5 1 rules
out the positive sign,
sin YPOT = 0.1204	 YPOT = 6.92 deg
Because YPOT is small, the exact result differs trivially from the approximation obtained by neglect-
ing the small sin e 'YPOT term. At this climb angle and airspeed, the lift coefficient, the drag coeffi-
cient, the lift/drag ratio, and the rate of climb are found for reference to be
C L = 0.53	 Co = 0.0298	 L/D = 17.7	 dH/dt = 3524 ft/min
Thrust contours— Repeating the calculation over the airspeed range of interest and plotting YPOT
against V E or M (eq. (B-7m), appendix B) defines the contour for maximum thrust, which forms
the upper boundary of the flight envelope. The contour for minimum (idle) thrust forms the lower
boundary. Contours for intermediate values of thrust can be added as desired to complete the dia-
gram for the aircraft performance envelope (Innis, Holzhauser, and Quigley, 1970).
Pitch contours— A second set of contours corresponding to constant pitch angle can be constructed
in the following way. Solve equation (2b) and equation (B-6d) for the lift coefficient
CL = C W cosYPOT =[(W/S) /(pV2 /2)] COS YPOT
	 (B- l Of)
which determines the lift coefficient for any point (V E, YPOT) within the flight envelope, because YPOT
is given by the ordinate and the dynamic pressure (pV 2/2) is determined by the abscissa V E (or M).
Now, the lift coefficient is related to angle of attack by a linear equation, which can be solved to find
the angle of attack corresponding to the selected point. With both the flightpath angle YPOT and the
angle of attack a known, the pitch attitude 0 can be found from the following equation:
0=a+y	 (5)
which is valid for wings-level flight as already noted.
Flight envelope chart— A representative flight envelope is illustrated by figure 8. The left-hand
boundary corresponds to the stalling speed. The right-hand boundary is determined by structural
limits at low altitude, and by compressibility (Mach) effects at high altitude. The upper and lower
boundaries are determined by the maximum and minimum thrust limits, respectively, as noted
previously. Because at any fixed throttle setting (constant engine rpm), thrust decreases with speed
(eqs. (B-8f) and (B-8g), appendix B), the thrust contours take on their maximum values of YPOT at
airspeeds slightly below the speed for minimum drag.
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Figure 8. Aircraft performance envelope.
The flight envelope illustrated by figure 8 applies to an aircraft at maximum takeoff weight (wing
loading W/S of 150 Ib/ft) operating at sea level, as indicated on the diagram. Other parametric
values of wing loading and altitude would result in flight envelope charts similar in form but
differing in details. Various schemes are available for nondimensionalizing the parameters to enable
a single chart to serve for all flight conditions (Taylor, 1974). Appendix B shows that the equivalent
airspeed at which wing stall occurs depends only on aircraft weight (specifically, on wing loading),
and is independent of altitude. Therefore, at low speed the equivalent airspeed, which is approxi-
mately the speed that is indicated by the standard cockpit airspeed indicator, is an especially conven-
ient choice for the abscissa of the flight envelope chart. At high speed, the Mach number may be a
more convenient choice for the abscissa.
Onboard calculation— However, it is not necessary to calculate the entire flight envelope on board
the aircraft. The following discussion shows that knowledge of the upper flight envelope limit
yPoT MAx and the lower limit yroT MIN at the instantaneously prevailing (measured) airspeed is suffi-
cient to determine mode selection for the flight control system to be developed. For that purpose,
only the aircraft weight W, the drag D (estimated from the aircraft polar drag curve), and the maxi-
mum and minimum thrust limits are necessary (eq. (lb)). These parameters must be updated contin-
uously by the onboard system. Correction of the flight envelope for the effects of nonstandard
ambient conditions, of turning flight, of wind, draft, and wind shear, and of engine failure are dis-
cussed next.
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Nonstandard Atmospheric Conditions
The effects of nonstandard atmospheric conditions can be accounted for by using onboard measure-
ments of ambient temperature and pressure in performance envelope calculations instead of Standard
Atmosphere values.
Symmetric (Coordinated) Turning Flight
In symmetric (coordinated) turning flight with near-zero sideslip, the increased lift required can be
approximated by replacing the aircraft weight W with W/cos 0 in the lift equation, where 0 is the
angle of bank (appendix Q. Therefore, the effect of turning flight is the displacement of the
constant-thrust contours downward and to the right, the same as for increased weight. To verify this
effect, note that reducing the T/W term in equation (B-1 Od) reduces yro T displacing the contours
downward, while increasing V so as to hold the other terms constant at increased weight displaces
the contours to the right.
The increased angle of attack required to generate the increased lift can be approximated by dividing
the right-hand side of equation (5) by cos 0. Both these approximations are valid over the range of
bank angles encountered during controlled flight of transport aircraft (appendix Q.
Steady Horizontal Wind
Appendix B shows that the equations of motion remain unchanged during flight in steady horizontal
wind, provided that flightpath angle and speed are measured with respect to the airmass. Therefore,
the flight envelope also remains unchanged.
Wind Shear and Vertical Draft
If the airmass accelerates instead of moving uniformly, or if the wind field varies with altitude so
that the aircraft encounters changing winds during climb or descent, appendix B shows that an
additional term involving the wind shear (time rate of change of tailwind velocity) appears in the
longitudinal (streamwise) force equation. In an increasing tailwind. this wind-shear term acts to
reduce airspeed in the same way as a drag increase. Because lift is proportional to the square of
airspeed, the loss of lift owing to reduced airspeed results in downward acceleration, causing the
aircraft to settle below its still-air path. Aircraft performance can be severely degraded. Steady
downdrafts have a similar performance-degrading effect on the aircraft even though the airmass
moves uniformly, because level flight relative to the Earth requires climbing flight relative to the
airmass.
It follows that tailwind shear and downdraft displace the constant-thrust contours of the flight
envelope downward toward smaller y, and, conversely, headwind shear and updraft displace them
upward. Contour displacement can be estimated from onboard measurements (Funabiki, Bando,
Tanaka, Hynes, and Hardy, 1993). (Shear disturbances exceeding the FAA-specified threshold of
2 kt/sec must be detected, and must cause the control system to transition to a special wind-shear
recovery mode, which is not treated in this report).
Engine Failure
Engine failure causes a loss of thrust that displaces the maximum-thrust contour downward toward
smaller y, leaving the zero-thrust contour (lower envelope boundary) unchanged. Thrust asymmetry
combines with limited rudder control power to define a sloping minimum-control boundary (VMc
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contour in figure 8) such that, at airspeeds below Vmc aircraft controllability cannot be retained if
maximum thrust is applied to the operating engines. Since an engine could fail at any time, flight
below the minimum-control airspeed must be avoided in airline service. Actual thrust remaining
after engine failure can be estimated on board from measurements of engine rpm and ambient
conditions (appendix B).
Aircraft Dynamical Behavior
Pitch and Thrust Control
Specializing equations (1) and (2) for control of flightpath angle 'y and airspeed V by means of pitch
angle and thrust and placing the control quantities on the right, equations (1) and (2) become
1 dV
— + sin 7 = snl Y^,oT 	(1 c)
g dt
and
V d ^ + cos Y= 
W	
(2)
where YPOT is defined by equation ( I b). The complete solution of equations (lc) and (2c) determines
the dynamic response of the aircraft to pitch and thrust control, which is discussed next.
Response Trajectories
The dynamic response of the aircraft to pitch and thrust control is closely related to the geometrical
form of the flight envelope diagram. The discussion begins with an overview of design issues before
taking up the dynamical behavior of the aircraft in detail.
Overview– The dynamic response of the aircraft to pitch and thrust control depends on the initial
operating point within its performance envelope. Operating points are selected to realize the flight
profile summarized by the flig ht plan (appendix B). Each operating point corresponds to a steady-
state solution of the equations of' motion for specified pitch and throttle control inputs, and the
transitions from one operatin g
 point to the next correspond to transient solutions of the equations
of motion. Flying-qualities criteria based on pilot evaluation define what is meant by well-shaped
responses, which enable smooth. rapid capture of the desired (target) operating point during manual
control. Automated systems should be designed to achieve response shapes similar to those desired
for manual control, because from the flying-qualities viewpoint it can be taken as axiomatic that
behavior that is difficult to anticipate is difficult to monitor.
Steady-state solution– During manual flight, the pilot controls pitch with elevator and engine rpm
with throttle. It can be seen from the flight envelope chart of figure 8 that the steady-state solution of
the force equations (lc) and (2c) for any combination of control inputs is determined by the intersec-
tion of the pitch and rpm (thrust) contours corresponding to those control inputs. The desired steady-
state solution is termed the target operating point. By definition, the longitudinal and normal acceler-
ations must vanish at each steady-state solution point. It will be shown next that the accelerations
prevailing at any other point (that is, any point not corresponding to a steady-state solution) can be
determined directly from the flight envelope diagram.
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Determination of normal acceleration— Equation (2c) shows that, at any airspeed V, the (normal-
ized) normal acceleration (V/g) dy/dt is equal to the difference between the normalized lift L/W and
cosy In figure 9(a), L/W is related to the pitch angle contour corresponding to the instantaneous
pitch angle in the following way. At any fixed speed V, the lift force L is proportional to angle of
attack, and according to equation (5) the angle of attack is equal to the difference between pitch
angle and flightpath angle. Thus at any speed V and flightpath angle y, the normal acceleration is
proportional to the vertical distance from the instantaneous flightpath angle y upward to the pitch
angle contour corresponding to the instantaneous pitch angle 6. Therefore, if the pitch angle contour
is displaced upward from an equilibrium angle by an abrupt increase of pitch, the resulting normal
acceleration is proportional to the incremental displacement A6 (fig. 9(a)).
Mathematically, the variation of the lift coefficient C L with angle of attack a given by equation
(B-6d) can be linearized (appendix B). Then, by combining equations (2c), (5), and (B-6d), it can be
shown that the variation of normal acceleration (V/g) (dy/dt) with pitch angle 6 (while the airspeed
V and the fli ghtpath angle y remain fixed at their initial values Vo and yo) is determined approxi-
mately by the partial derivative
(a/a9) (V/g) (dy/dt) v.y = ( I /C W ) OCc/aa).
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Determination of longitudinal acceleration— Since equilibration of normal forces takes place
rapidly following any disturbance (appendix B), it is reasonable to assume that normal forces remain
in equilibrium during the change of airspeed that follows an abrupt change of thrust, especially since
thrust inclination to the longitudinal axis has already been assumed to be negligible. It then follows
from equation (4) that the variation of drag with airspeed remains the same during such a speed
change as in steady flight.
Under these conditions, equation (1c) shows that, for small y, the normalized longitudinal accelera-
tion (1/g)(dV/dt) is approximately equal to the increment y— YPOT. At any point, the normalized
longitudinal acceleration is therefore equal to the vertical distance from the instantaneous flightpath
angle y upward to the 7POT contour corresponding to the instantaneous thrust (fig. 9(a)). It follows
that, if the thrust contour is displaced upward from an equilibrium setting by an abrupt increase of
thrust, the resulting normalized longitudinal acceleration is equal to the incremental displacement
DyPOT• Extensive use will be made of this geometric relationship.
Direction field— The determination of the longitudinal and normal accelerations at a point (V, y) is
equivalent to construction of the direction field for the differential equations (I c) and (2c) at that
point. Starting from any initial point, each solution of the differential equations for specified pitch
and thrust control inputs can be mapped into a unique trajectory in the (V, y) plane by stepwise
numerical integration of the longitudinal and normal accelerations over the direction field. Thus,
in principle, complete information about the dynamic response of the aircraft is contained geomet-
rically in the flight envelope diagram.
Flying qualities criteria— The final point of each trajectory (the steady-state solution) is determined
by the intersection of the pitch and thrust contours corresponding to the specified control inputs, as
already noted. In order to capture a specified target point, these control inputs should cause the air-
craft to traverse a suitable trajectory from the initial point to the target point. Desirable trajectories
result in rapid but smooth capture maneuvers, subject to constraints on normal and longitudinal
acceleration and on control power. During manual control, the form of each capture trajectory is
generated by the human pilot. Flying qualities criteria applicable to transport aircraft specify aircraft
design characteristics that assure satisfactory dynamic response. These criteria are based on more
than 40 years of operating experience with both civil and military jet transport aircraft (Anonymous,
1985).
Dynamic Response
With the assumption that pitch control can generate any desired lift variation, as previously dis-
cussed, equation (2c) shows that the normal acceleration (V/g)(dy/dt) can be controlled as desired,
whatever the value of y. By adjusting the lift L to compensate for variations in airspeed V, the flight-
path rate dy/dt can be controlled as desired, whatever the prevailing values of V and y. For example,
by making dy/dt proportional to the path error relative to the target y, smooth, rapid control of y
without overshoot can be obtained independent of V
Similarly, equation ( l ) shows that the longitudinal acceleration dV/dt can be controlled as desired by
varying the thrust T. By making adjustments in T to compensate for variations in flightpath y and
drag D, dV/dt can be controlled as desired, whatever the prevailing values of 'Y and D. For example,
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by making dV/dt proportional to speed error relative to the target V, smooth, rapid control of V
without overshoot can be obtained independent of y.
Pitch and thrust control— By combining control of the flightpath angle yby varying the lift L (that
is, by varying pitch angle 6) and control of the airspeed V by varying thrust T, both the flightpath
angle y and the airspeed V can be controlled independently by simultaneous pitch and thrust control
inputs. Geometrically, the final solution point in the flight envelope diagram (fig. 8) is then deter-
mined by the intersection of the specified pitch and thrust contours, which can be made to coincide
with any target (V, y) point within the steady-state flight envelope.
Pitch control of airspeed with thrust saturated— If the thrust T is saturated at maximum or
minimum thrust, or fixed at any intermediate value so that only pitch is available for control, then
equation (2c) shows that the flightpath angle y can be controlled by pitch just as before. Equation (1)
shows that, if the flightpath angle y is regarded as the control variable replacing the thrust T (which
is now fixed), then dV/dt can be controlled as desired by making adjustments in yto compensate for
variations in drag D. For example, if dV/dt is maintained constant over a range of airspeed, then the
locus of operating points lies on a contour parallel to the fixed-thrust contour, but displaced from it
vertically by a distance equal to the normalized longitudinal acceleration (1/g)(dV/dt), as illustrated
by figure 9(a) (with the arrow reversed in sign). In order to control airspeed by varying pitch, the
flightpath angle 'y must be controlled so as to obtain the desired value of dV/dt in equation (1). The
flightpath angle y therefore cannot be controlled independently.
Geometrically, the final solution point in figure 8 is then located at the intersection of the fixed-
thrust contour with the vertical line corresponding to the target airspeed. By selecting the fixed
(target) thrust appropriately, any target point within the steady-state flight envelope can be captured.
(Strictly speaking, it is throttle setting that is maintained at a fixed value during manually controlled
flight; thrust itself then exhibits some variation with airspeed. For simplicity, thrust will be treated as
the control variable.) However, this report is concerned chiefly with thrust saturation at either maxi-
mum or minimum thrust.
Pitch control of flightpath with thrust saturated— It remains to study the control of the flightpath
angle y by varying pitch while thrust remains fixed. In contrast to the control of airspeed by pitch
just discussed, it will be shown that, when flightpath is controlled by pitch while thrust remains
fixed, it is not possible to capture any target point within the steady-state flight envelope, but only
those points that lie at or above the speed for minimum drag. This restriction results from considera-
tions of speed stability when the flig htpath is constrained, which is analyzed in the next section.
Speed Stability With Thrust Saturated
If the tli-htpath angle y is controlled by varying pitch with thrust fixed, equation (2c) shows that
flightpath rate dy/dt can be controlled as desired, as noted previously. However, it is clear from
equation ( I ) that, with the variation of y specified, the longitudinal acceleration dV/dt cannot be
controlled independently when thrust is fixed. For simplicity, it is assumed that the flightpath angle y
is controlled so as to capture a fixed ytarget. Geometrically, the final solution point in figure 8 is
then located at the intersection of the specified fixed-thrust contour with the horizontal line corres-
ponding to the target flightpath.
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But inspection of figure 8 shows that the intersection of these contours does not determine a unique
solution. Because of its concave-downward form, any fixed-thrust contour has two possible points of
intersection with a horizontal line correspondin(, to a target flightpath, one at an airspeed above the
speed for minimum drag and the other below it. This ambiguity can be resolved by studying the
speed stability at each of these two points of equilibrium (fig. 9(b)), which illustrates longitudinal
stability while maintaining lift equilibrium (that is, dy/dt = 0).
Stable airspeed equilibrium- Considering first the speed stability in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium point to the right ol' the speed for minimum drag (point A in figure 9(b)), it can be seen
that at lower airspeeds to the Ich o1' point A where the target y lies below the fixed-thrust contour for
YPOT, the longitudinal acceleration is positive (eq. (1 c)), so that the airspeed tends toward point A.
Similarly, at higher airspeeds to the right of point A, the acceleration is negative, and again the
airspeed tends toward point A. It is clear that point A is a point of stable equilibrium.
Unstable airspeed equilibrium- By a similar argument, point B is found to be a point of unstable
equilibrium. Physically, this instabilit y
 at point B results from its location below the speed for
minimum drag. There, the total dra_, fierce is dominated by the induced drag, which increases with
decreasing speed (appendix 13). Thus the tangent dy/dV is positive along the fixed-thrust contour
near point B.
Geometrical regions- Geometricall y , it is clear from figure 9(b) that point A is an attractor point
whose region of attraction includes all points to the riglht of point B on the flightpath target line
through points A and B. l l' the taruct Ili_(Ihtpath angle is increased (or the fixed target thrust is
reduced), points A and B approach each other until they coincide at the speed for minimum drag. If
the target flightpath anglc is increased still tarthcr, it lies above the target thrust contour everywhere.
No steady-state solution then c\ists. and the long itudinal acceleration dV/dt is negative for all points
on the target flightpath line.
Aircraft operating characteristics -1 lie consequences of these facts for aircraft operation areas
follows. if the flightpath target lies hclo\y
 the fixed-thrust contour anywhere, so that some points of
equilibrium exist, then, startin,_ I 'rom an y initial point on the flightpath target line to the right of
point B, the aircraft will capture and hold point A no matter what airspeed target has been selected.
On the other hand, startin^u, troni it)% initial point to the left of point B, the airspeed will diverge
toward stalling speed. By selcctln,' the tlxcd (target) thrust appropriately, any target point within the
steady-state flight envelope can he captured. provided that it lies to the right of the speed for mim-
mum drag. But the aircraft cannot capture a target point that lies within the steady-state envelope to
the left of the speed for minin1un1	 (that is, a point of unstable equilibrium). Dynamic response
calculations that illustrate these hcha y iors are presented and discussed in detail in appendix B.
If the aircraft attempts to capture a point that lies above the maximum-thrust contour everywhere, no
steady-state solution exists hccausc the target path exceeds the performance capability of the aircraft.
The airspeed will then diverge to\\ard
 stalling speed, whatever the initial speed. For example, this
situation could arise following cn,inc failure during high-altitude cruise, if the remaining thrust were
insufficient for level flight. (The aircraft must then "drift down" to some lower altitude at which
sufficient thrust becomes availahle.)
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The instability characterizing control to a constrained path below the speed for minimum drag with
fixed thrust has been known for a long time (Neumark, 1953). Some early barometric-hold auto-
pilots could stall the aircraft if given sufficient pitch authority. Clearly, this potentially catastrophic
behavior presents a challenge to designers of full-authority fly-by-wire systems to provide some
means of ensuring safety.
On the other hand, operation at a point of stable equilibrium presents no inherent safety hazard even
though the target airspeed is not captured. Overspeed must be avoided, of course, but for some pur-
poses such as level-flight cruise, operation with fixed thrust (that is, with autothrottle off) may be
preferred because all unwanted throttle activity owing to airspeed disturbances is suppressed. Some
wandering of airspeed must then be accepted, but this can be reduced by permitting some altitude
deviation ("soft" altitude control).
Dynamical Behavior Theorem
The dynamical behavior of the aircraft resulting from control of flightpath angle and airspeed by
means of pitch and thrust can be summarized by the following theorem, which results directly from
the aircraft equations of motion:
Theorem— If both pitch and thrust are available for control, then (i) flightpath angle
and airspeed can be controlled independently. If the thrust is fixed so that only pitch
is available for control, then either (ii) airspeed, or else (iii) flightpath angle can be
controlled, but not both.
The aircraft is therefore capable of only three kinds of dynamical behavior:
if thrust is available for control, then
(1) path and speed can both be controlled;
if thrust is fixed, then
(ii) speed can be controlled at the expense of path,
or else
(iii) path can be controlled at the expense of speed.
It is clear from the statement of the theorem that Type (i) control is restricted to the interior of the
steady-state performance envelope of the aircraft, which is the only region of the state space where
thrust is available for control. The previous discussion showed that Type (ii) control is unrestricted,
but Type (iii) control results in airspeed instability at airspeeds below the speed for minimum drag.
Therefore, the theorem can be regarded from a mathematical control-theoretic viewpoint as a qual-
itative statement of controllability resulting from the form of the differential equations (1) and (2):
if both pitch and thrust are available for control. then both airspeed and flightpath angle can be
controlled throughout the region of interest; if thrust is fixed, then airspeed is controllable through-
out the region of interest, but flightpath angle is controllable only within a subset of the region of
interest.
These three kinds of behavior are familiar to pilots. Automated control modes that correspond to
these three fundamental types of control are developed later in this report. Geometrically, the three
types of control partition the flightpath-airspeed plane into several discrete regions, which are
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tenned stability regions. Within each of these regions, the dynamical behavior of the aircraft is
qualitatively similar. These geometric stability regions are examined next.
Geometrical Stability Regions
Capture trajectories corresponding to the three types of control just discussed are illustrated by the
three diagrams of figure 10.
Type (i) control— In figure I O(a), which illustrates Type (i) control, region I corresponds to the
steady-state flight envelope. Two representative capture trajectories are illustrated. Because the
flightpath response to pitch is much more rapid than the airspeed response to thrust (appendix B), as
a rough approximation the initial trajectory is nearly vertical, so that capture of the path target is
nearly complete before significant change in airspeed has taken place. The final portion is nearly
horizontal, as capture of the speed target is completed with little change of flightpath. No Type (i)
control is possible outside region 1, because thrust is saturated there.
Type (ii) control— Type (ii) control is illustrated by figure 10(b). Representative capture trajectories
when thrust is saturated at maximum thrust are illustrated in regions IV and V, and representative
capture trajectories when thrust is saturated at minimum thrust are illustrated in regions II and 111.
Intermediate thrust settings are not illustrated. It will be seen that each final solution point is located
at the intersection of the specified fixed-thrust contour with the vertical line corresponding to the
target airspeed, as already noted. All these points are points of stable flightpath equilibrium, because
the lift-curve slope is positive for all angles of attack below the stalling angle (appendix B). Target
flightpaths lying in regions II. 11 1. IV, or V are not captured because they lie outside the performance
capability of the aircraft. Portions of the capture trajectories for which the longitudinal acceleration
is constant are parallel to the specified fixed-thrust contours, as noted previously.
Type (iii) control— Type (iii) control is illustrated by figure I O(c), in which the maximum and mini-
mum thrust contours are the same as in figure I O(b). It will be seen that each final solution point is
located at the intersection of the specified fixed-thrust contour with the horizontal line corresponding
to the target flightpath angle. The solution points lying along the lower boundary of region V are
points of unstable equilibrium, from which negative airspeed excursions would cause divergence
toward stalling speed. (Positive airspeed excursions into region I are of no particular concern,
because there the thrust is not saturated and Type (i) control becomes possible.) Attempts to capture
target flightpaths lying above the maximum-thrust contour everywhere in regions IV and V also lead
to airspeed divergence toward stalling speed. No equilibrium solutions exist along these target flight-
paths because they lie outside the performance capability of the aircraft. Thus for behavioral classi-
fication, the points of unstable equilibrium and of no equilibrium in region V can be grouped
together, because they lead to the same airspeed divergence. Furthermore, target points in region IV
that lie outside the performance capability of the aircraft need not be considered separately, because
the airspeed divergence resulting from attempts to capture them leads inevitably into region V.
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Figure 10. Aircraft dynamical behavior.
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The final solution points lying above the speed for minimum drag (regions II and IV) are points of
stable airspeed equilibrium. (Points of stable airspeed equilibrium with maximum thrust (region IV)
are often used for high-altitude cruising flight with auto throttle disengaged.) It will be seen that
attempts to capture steeply descending target flightpaths in the interior of region II can cause air-
speed divergence toward overspeed. Points on the upper boundary of region III are points of unsta-
ble equilibrium. (Airspeed excursions from these points into region I are of no particular concern,
because there the thrust is not saturated and Type (1) control becomes possible.) Positive airspeed
excursions lead into region II where overspeed is possible, but even if a point of stable equilibrium is
reached that avoids overspeed, the increase of airspeed can be excessive. In no case of Type (iii)
control is the target airspeed captured.
Summary— To summarize, the stability regions I, II, 111, IV, and V are discrete regions within each
of which the dynamical behavior of the aircraft is qualitatively similar in response to Type (i),
Type (ii), or Type (iii) control. For logical completeness, regions VI (underspeed) and VII (over-
speed) are also defined; region 1 is defined as open with respect to thrust, and the others closed. It
can then be verified by inspection of figure 10 that no point exists in the (V, y) plane that does not lie
in one of the seven identified regions.
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PART II
DESIGN SYNTHESIS
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
Concept
The flight control system is a major element of the Vehicle Management System, as already men-
tioned. The following brief functional description is taken from a previous publication (Sherry,
Youssefi, and Hynes, 1995) to summarize the concept.
Manual Control
Augmented manual flight control modes have been developed that accept commands for horizontal
track angle, vertical flightpath angle, and airspeed. During manual flight, the pilot commands track-
angle acceleration with the wheel and flightpath angle rate with the column. The pedals command
sideslip. With the controls centered, commanded track angle rate and flightpath angle are held fixed
against external disturbances. For these modes, the high-reliability autothrottle remains engaged at
all times during flight, accepting airspeed commands entered manually into the mode control panel.
By minimizing aircraft response to unwanted external disturbances, this advanced control augmenta-
tion improves precision of control and reduces pilot workload (Franklin, Hynes et al., 1986). In
particular, the high-reliability autothrottle alleviates difficulties with manual control of airspeed
owing to the strongly "backsided" variation of drag with speed that characterizes certain transport
aircraft durin g landin g approach.
Automated Control
During fully automated flight, a velocity-vector command generated by the guidance function is
injected directly into the same input port of the flight control system as that used during manual
flight. This interface between the guidance and tliuht control functions can be regarded as the
specification of the three components of the aircraft velocity vector in a mixed Earth/airmass
spherical coordinate frame. (In the present report, only the two longitudinal components, that is,
flightpath angle and airspeed, are treated.) This structure satisfies two human-factors criteria. First,
specification of the velocity vector is more meaningful for the pilot than the roll, pitch, and auto-
throttle loop closures often specified in current aircraft, because the velocity vector relates directly
to the pilot's task. Servo loop closures are confined to the interior of the flight-control function,
together with other vehicle-specific details. Second.. use of the same control algorithms during fully
automated flight as those used for manual flight provides the crew an intuitive understanding of
"what the automated system is trying to do" (Billings, 1996). Thus specifying the velocity vector as
the input command to the tli<Lht control system is a simple, natural choice that is desirable from
several points of view.
This system is similar in concept to the Total Energy Control System developed by Lambregts
(Lambregts, 1983), and successfully evaluated in flight experiments conducted on the NASA-
Langley B-737 research aircraft in 1984. The present NASA-Ames implementation makes use of the
43
nonlinear inverse control concept originated by Meyer (Meyer and Cicolani. 1981), and applied by
Franklin to the NASA-Ames quiet short-haul research aircraft (QSRA) (Franklin, Hynes et al.,
1986). This nonlinear inverse control system contains an internal model of the aircraft, which
enables response characteristics such as column force per unit of normal acceleration (that is, per g)
to be held constant over the entire flight envelope without explicit gain scheduling. A separate con-
trol system incorporating conventional pitch damping is used for ground operation.
The discussion of the flight control system now proceeds by describing the system structure. First, a
definition is presented that formalizes the notion of mode so as to apply in general to all real-time
process-control systems. A brief discussion of system structure then shows how the control modes
to be described tit into their supporting hierarchical framework within the Vehicle Management
System. These structural matters are the subjects of the next two sections, after which the design of
the flight control system is examined in detail.
Mode Definition
The design process must begin with careful consideration of exactly how the aircraft is to be
operated under both normal and abnormal conditions. These considerations define the modes from
the engineering design viewpoint. Mathematically, a mode is a set of actions that the machine can
take; that is, a physical behavior. From the control-theoretic viewpoint, a mode is specified by its
topological structure (for example, its block diagram) together with specific details of gains, limiters,
and the like that determine its characteristic behavior. In the human-factors view of aircraft systems,
the human pilot selects a mode in order to obtain its characteristic set of actions, so that mode selec-
tion can be regarded as an expression of the pilot's intentions. In the implementation software, a
mode corresponds to a path through the code along which the commands for its characteristic
actions are generated.
Mode Hierarchy
In the system to be described, the flight control modes are organized into a hierarchical structure
with three levels, as illustrated by figure 1. In bottom-up order, the modes at the lowest level are
termed primitive modes. They constitute elements of the higher-level supermodes, but do not them-
selves contain any subelements; that is, they are not composite. The three primitive longitudinal
control modes to be described correspond to the three types of dynamical behavior of which the
aircraft is capable, as already discussed in detail.
The second level of the mode hierarchy relates to the control tasks required for operation in the ATC
system. such as capturing and holding an assigned altitude or tracking an approach glideslope. Dur-
ing manual operation, the crew defines the desired flightpath by setting the desired altitude and air-
speed targets into the aircraft mode control panel. For example, in current aircraft the Flight Level
Change mode occupies the second level of the mode hierarchy. On this second level, operational
efficiency is determined entirely by the crew's manual selections.
The third and hi o hest level of the mode hierarchy enables trajectory optimization for conservation of
time or fuel by trajectory-synthesis algorithms (Erzberger, 1982) resident within the onboard flight-
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planning function. Readers can consult a previous publication (Sherry, Youssefi, and Hynes, 1995)
for a more detailed description of the Vehicle Management System.
This report discusses the first level of the mode hierarchy in detail, and shows how the three primi-
tive modes can be combined to form the lowest-level supermode, which is termed Path/Speed
Command. The present work focuses on the design method and does not treat the complete mode
hierarchy, although one second-level supermode termed Altitude Command is developed in detail
in order to illustrate extension of the design method to higher level. Guidelines for extension to the
third level of the mode hierarchy are presented briefly. The three primitive modes, termed y-V Com-
mand, V Command, and Y Command, are described in detail in the following sections. As noted
previously, they correspond to the three fundamental kinds of dynamical behavior, namely Type (1)
control, Type (ii) control, and Type (iii) control, respectively.
The complete longitudinal flight control system is illustrated by the block diagrams of figure 11. The
altitude regulator function on the left of the broken vertical line in figure I I (a) is discussed in a later
section, and should be ignored for the present. The three primitive modes to be described next are
illustrated by the structure to the right of the broken vertical line. It can be seen that the external
inputs are the target flightpath angle YTGT and the target airspeed VTGT.
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Figure 11. Flight control system.
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Figure 11. Flight control systems (continued).
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Figure 11. Flight control systems (concluded).
y-V Command Mode
Control Law
The y-V Command mode corresponds to Type (i) behavior, and requires that both pitch and thrust be
available for control. The control l.m fOr the y-V Command mode is obtained directly from the air-
craft differential equations ( 101 and (20 by specializing them as follows.
in equation (lc). the desired (conmwnded) normalized longitudinal acceleration, denoted by
( I/g)(dV/dt)cm D, is generated h\ the airspeed regulator (fig. 1 1(c)), which compares the measured
airspeed with the desired alr^pccd V, 111 and generates a longitudinal acceleration command intended
to null the airspeed error. If the airspeed regulator contains an integral term, the integrator must be
clamped to prevent wind-up i f' the thrust response becomes rate-limited. For simplicity, it is assumed
that the airspeed regulator contains only a proportional term. The rate-limited reference airspeed
VLIM is obtained by passing the tar get airspeed VTGT through a pre-filter that limits its rate of change
to a maximum of 2 kt/sec (about U.1 U). Making use of the measured flightpath angle, equation (lc) is
then solved for the desired potential fli g htpath angle, which is denoted by yPOTCMD•
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In equation (2c), the desired normal acceleration, denoted by (V/g)(dy/dt)CMD , is generated by the
flightpath regulator (fig. 1 I(e)), which compares the measured flightpath angle with the desired
flightpath angle yCMD and generates a normal acceleration command intended to null the flightpath
error. During automated flight, yCMD is obtained by passing the target flightpath angle YTGT through
a rate limiter that limits normal acceleration to 0. I g for passenger comfort (figs. I I (a) and 1 I (d)).
During manual flight, yCMD is obtained from the time integral of column deflection, and is rate-
limited by the human pilot (fig. 11(a)).
The control law for the y-V Command mode, which is derived ill the manner just described, is given
by the equations
I (IV
— CMD + S111 Y = Sln YPOT CMD	 (6a)g dt 
and
g
d7 CMD + COS y = CMD	 (6b)
W 
Path errors are fed back to pitch control, and speed errors are fed back to thrust. This topological
structure is the appropriate choice for transport aircraft with small thrust inclination. As already
noted, the characteristics of the airspeed regulator and the flightpath regulator are selected to meet
flying qualities criteria based on extensive operating experience with transport aircraft.
Thrust Command
The thrust command is generated by specializing equation (lb) and solving for thrust, making use of
the prevailing drag calculated from the onboard aircraft model:
TCMD W sill y POT CMD + D	 (6c)
Tlie parameter yrOT CMD is calculated from equation (6a). The commanded thrust TCMD must be
physically realizable. The throttle servo command is then obtained by inverting the engine thrust
characteristic, as illustrated by the autothrottle diagram of figure 1 I(g).
Thrust Saturation
Thrust saturation must be absent in the y-V Command mode, as previously noted. To avoid over-
boosting the engines, some means for determining thrust saturation, such as observation of exhaust
gas temperature (EGT), exhaust pressure ratio (EPR), or the like, must be available on board the
aircraft. What is needed for mode selection is a mode-independent method of determining whether
thrust would be saturated if the y-V Command mode were selected under prevailing flight condi-
tions. For simplicity, it will be assumed that maximum thrust TMnx and minimum thrust T MiN can be
calculated from the onboard engine model with sufficient accuracy.
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To aid the determination of thrust saturation, a reference thrust termed T REF is calculated by
specializing equation (6c):
TREF 
W sin 7 POT REF + D	 (7a)
In equation (7a), yPOT REF is calculated from equation (6a), as shown in figure I I (c):
I d t cmn + sin y = sin y POT REF	 (7b)
g d
The reference parameters TRE,: and 7130T REF differ from their command counterparts TcMD and
7130T cm[) because, during an accelerating climb or a decelerating descent, T REF and yPOT REF can
exceed the physically realizable values corresponding to the performance capability of the aircraft
(eq. (1 c)), whereas TcMD and yPOT cmn must be physically realizable. Therefore
TCMD TREF when TMIN < TREF C TMAX	 (70
Thrust saturation corresponds to the conditions
T <_T	 T >_ T	 (7d)
REF	 MIN	 REF	 MAX
or, equivalently, to the conditions
7 POT REF C 'POT MIN	 7 POT REF >y POT MAX	 (7e)
Equation ( I b) is specialized as follows:
__ TMAX — 
D
sin yPOT MAX
	 W	 (7f)
T —D
sin yPOT MIN _ 
MINW(7g)
It should be noted that the parameter yPOT MIN is negative for transport aircraft. Furthermore, the
condition TMAX > T MIN holds except during total propulsion failure.
Pitch Command
The derivation of the elevator servo command is illustrated for completeness by the block diagrams
of figure 1 I (e) and I I (f), but it is not treated in any detail by this report because the pitch control
assumption already made implies that the lift command is identically satisfied. It can be seen that the
angle-of-attack command is obtained by solving equation (6b) for the lift function L = L((x) and then
inverting, as illustrated by fi gure 1 1(e). The pitch command OCMD is then obtained by making use of
49
the measured flightpath angle and bank angle (compare equation (5)). The pitch regulator and the
inversion of the pitching acceleration command to obtain the elevator servo command are illustrated
by figure 1 1(f).
V Command Mode
The V Command mode corresponds to Type (ii) behavior. Thrust is fixed, so that only pitch is
available for control, and airspeed is to be controlled at the expense of flightpath angle by feeding
back airspeed error to pitch control. Again the control law is obtained by specializing the aircraft
differential equations.
Thrust Command
As already noted, this report is chiefly concerned with thrust saturation at maximum or minimum
thrust, but for generality it is assumed for the present that the thrust can be fixed at any physically
realizable value TTGT. In the V Command mode, the commanded thrust is then given by the equation
	
TCNII TTGT when TMIN C TTGT C TMAX	 (8a)
Equation (lb) is specialized as Iollmvs:
s " ,  Y^	 =
TTGT — D
7P OT
	 W
Reference Thrust
In the V Command mode, the reference thrust is calculated just as it is for the y-V Command mode
(eqs. (7a) and (7b)).
Control Law
In equation (lc), the desired ilormah/ed longitudinal acceleration, denoted by (1/g)(dV /dt)cMD, is
generated by the airspeed regulator I i (c)), just as in the y-V Command mode. With the thrust
fixed at TTGT, yPOT is fixed at '(r„I r,,l (eq. (8b)), and equation (lc) can be solved for the flightpath
angle required to satisfy the lon_Itudinai acceleration command. Denoting this flightpath angle by
ySPEED, equation (1c) becomes
	
Il V	 _	 /
	dl (\11 ) — sill y POT TGT — — Sill 7SPEED	 lge)
The derivation ofyspl:ED is illustrated by the block diagram of figure I I(C). ySPEED is then rate-limited
and applied to the input of the path regulator to generate the normal acceleration command
(figs. 1 1(a) and I I (e)).
(8b)
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Equation (6b) is solved for the lift command just as it is in the y-V Command mode (fig. I I (e)):
b d	 W
CMD + COS y = CMD	 (8d)
It should be noted that equations (8c) and (8d) are not solved simultaneously, because the immedi-
ately previous value of the drag D is used for the calculation of yi >OT TGT in equation (8b).
Longitudinal Acceleration Limiting
Following Lambregts (Lambregts, 1983), an acceleration limiter is incorporated within the airspeed
regulator (fig. 1 I (c)) that limits the longitudinal acceleration command in a manner to be described.
The acceleration limiter logic is independent of mode, but it is described here because its function is
essential for the V Command mode. For clarity, the basic concept is presented first without refine-
ments to be incorporated later.
Concept— The acceleration limiter is specified conceptually by the following equations:
(1/g)(dV/dt)CMD Mery < (I W(dV/dt) CMD <— (1 /g)(dV/dt)CMD MAX
	
(9a)
(1/g)(dV/dt)cMD MAX — K v sin 7 POT MAX	 (9b)
(1/g)(dV/dt)CMD MIN — K v sin y POT MIN	 (9c)
where 0<— Kv < 1.
The parameter Kv determines the division of excess thrust between acceleration and climb, or
between deceleration and descent. For example, assume that thrust is saturated at maximum thrust
and that the target thrust yPOT TGT is set equal to yPOT MAX, and denote the corresponding value of
ySPEED by ySPEED MAX . Then equation (8c) shows that ysPEED MAX is given by the equation
sin ySPEED MAX - sin y POT MAX - I dV CMD	 (9d)
Further assume that the commanded longitudinal acceleration (1/g)(dV/dt)c MD takes on its maximum
value of Kv sin yPOT MAX according to equations (9a) and (9b). With this assumption, equation (9d)
becomes
sin ySPEED MAX — (I — K V ) Sin 7POT MAX	 (9e)
Equation (9e) shows that, if Kv = 0, then ySPEED MAX = yPOT MAX, so that all available excess thrust
(TMAX — D)/W = sin 7POT MAX is used for climb. If Kv = 1, then ysPEED MAX vanishes, so that all excess
thrust is used for level-tlilght acceleration. The positive upper bound on commanded acceleration
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(eq. (9b)) prevents an excessive positive acceleration command from causing the aircraft to descend,
because the right-hand side of equation (9e) is nonnegative for all Kv within its range 0 <_ Kv 5 1.
Similarly, the negative lower bound (eq. (9c)) prevents an excessive negative acceleration command
from causing the aircraft to climb. if thrust is saturated at minimum thrust and the target thrust
YPOT TGT is set equal to 7POT MIN, and if the commanded longitudinal acceleration (1 g)(dV /dt)CMD
takes on its minimum value of Kv sin YPOT MIN, then it can be shown by a similar argument that
equation (9d) becomes
sin 7SPEED MIN — (I — K v ) sin 7 POT MIN
	 (9f)
Because the condition (7POT MIN < 0) always holds for transport aircraft, as already noted, the right-
hand side of equation (9f) is nonpositive for all Kv within its range 0 <_ Kv 5 1.
Pilot evaluation— Evaluation of these limiter characteristics by means of piloted simulation has
shown that the condition (Kv = 1) is unacceptable, because some definitely positive flightpath angle
is required for climb. Similarly, a definitely negative flightpath angle is required for descent. There-
fore, the parameter Kv should be bounded away from unity by adopting the modified specification
05 Kv < 1. The nominal value of Kv has been set tentatively to 0.7, based on pilot opinion obtained
during an exploratory simulation carried out on the NASA-Ames Vertical Motion Simulator (Sherry,
Youssefi, and Hynes, 1995).
Performance degradation— A second refinement is needed to deal with the possibility that the con-
dition (YPOT MAX < 0) might hold, which could occur, for example, following engine failure during
high-altitude cruising flight if aircraft performance became so severely degraded that available thrust
were insufficient for level flight. In that case, equation (9b) shows that the system would command
anomalous negative acceleration unrelated to airspeed error, resulting in airspeed divergence toward
stalling speed.
in order to prevent this potentially catastrophic behavior and ensure that some minimal positive
acceleration capability is always retained, a lower bound of 0.00525 g = 0.1 kt/sec is imposed on the
upper acceleration limit (dV /dt)c^MD MAX. This minimal acceleration capability is selected to coincide
with the acceleration available at maximum cruising altitude (appendix B), which is discussed later.
It is clear from equation (9b) that imposing this lower bound of 0.00525 5 Kv sin YPOT MAX also
requires that the parameter Kv be bounded away from zero.
Limiter properties— With the two refinements just discussed, the final limiter specification can be
stated as follows:
I /g)(dV
/dt)cMD MIN < (1/g)(dV /dt)CMD 5( i /g)(dV/dt)cMD MAX	 (9a)
0.005255 ( 1/g)(dV /dt) 
CMD MAX — 
K v sin 7 POT MAX	 (9g)
(1/g)(dV/dt)CMD MiN — K v sin 7 POT MIN	 (9h)
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where 0 < Kv < 1.
The limiter specified by conditions (9a), (9g), and (9h) is characterized by several properties that
will be used extensively during later developments. If aircraft performance is normal, then the
condition (Kv sin 7POT MAX ? 0.00525) holds. In that case, equations (9e) and (9f) show that the
conditions
7SPEED MIN < 0	 7SPEED MAX > 0
	 (9i)
must hold. Furthermore, as a consequence of the physical condition (7POT MIN < 7POT MAX), which
holds in the absence of total propulsion failure, the condition
SPEED MAX > 7 SPEED MIN
	 (9j)
holds by definition of ySPEED.
If aircraft performance is degraded, so that the condition (Kv sin 7POT MAX ? 0.00525) does not hold,
then the condition (7SPEED MAX > 0) can hold only if the condition (V > V TGT ) holds, because in that
case deceleration commanded by the airspeed regulator augments 7SPEED MAX according to equation
(9d). With the specification 0 < Kv < 1, equation (9f) shows that the condition (7SPEED MIN < 0) holds
generally, because as already noted yPOT MIN is negative for transport aircraft.
Pitch Command
In the V Command mode, the pitch command is calculated just as it is for the y-V Command mode
(figs. 1 1(e) and 1 1(f)).
7 Command Mode
They Command mode corresponds to Type (iii) behavior. Thrust is fixed, so that only pitch is
available for control, and iightpath angle is to be controlled at the expense of airspeed by feeding
back path error to pitch control. As before, the control law is obtained by specializing the aircraft
differential equations.
Control Law
In equation (2c), the desired normal acceleration (V/g)(dy/dt)c MD is generated by the flightpath regu-
lator (fig. 1 I(e)), and with the measured flightpath angle 7equation (2c) is solved for (L/W) CMD , just
as it is in the y-V Command mode.
In equation (1c), the normalized longitudinal acceleration ( 1 /g)(dV/dt) is determined by the instan-
taneous flightpath angle y and the target value of yPOT, which depends on the fixed target thrust
(eq. (8b)). In the y Command mode, there is no closed-loop control of airspeed.
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The control law for the Y Command mode is given by the equations
i dV + sln Y = sln YPOTTGT	 (I Oa)g dt
g cl CMD + cos Y= W CMD 	(1 Ob)
Pitch Command
In the Y Command mode, the pitch command is calculated just as it is for the Y-V Command mode
(figs. 1 1(e) and 1 I (f)).
Thrust Command
III
	 y Command mode, the commanded thrust is given by equation (8a), just as it is in the
V Command mode.
Reference Thrust
In the y Command mode, the reference thrust is calculated just as it is for the y-V Command mode
(eqs. (7a) and (7b)).
Dynamic Thrust Saturation
Now that the control laws for the three primitive control modes and the details of the longitudinal
acceleration limiter have been specified, it is of interest to study the geometrical stability regions for
each of the primitive modes that correspond to the regions of figure 10, accounting for thrust satura-
tion under dynamic conditions (that is, including the contribution of the (dV/dt)CMD term according
to equation (6a)). It will be shown that contours corresponding to dynamic thrust saturation will
subdivide the (V, Y) plane.
Thrust Saturation Contours
The thrust saturation contour corresponding to the variation of YsPEED MAX with airspeed can be
obtained as follows. Substitute the condition YPOT TGT = YPOT MAX and the definition of YPOT MAX
(eq. (7f)) into equation (8c) to obtain the equation
sin Y	 = TMAX — D i dV cMD.	 (1 1 a)SPEED MAX	 `]^J
	 g dt
In equation (1 1 a), the drag D should be evaluated under the assumption that the normal forces
remain in equilibrium during speed changes, as previously discussed. The variation of TMAX with
airspeed is known (appendix B), and the variation of the commanded longitudinal acceleration
(dV/dt)CMI) is defined by the speed regulator law (fig. I I(c)). It follows that the variation of
YsPEED MAX with airspeed" is determined by equation (1 1 a). Similarly, replacing TMAx by TMIN in
equation (I I a), the variation of YsPEED MiN with airspeed is given by the equation
and
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sin ySPEEll MIN 
EMI 
W	
d CMD.	 (I I b)
g
Equivalent Conditions for Thrust Saturation
As already noted, thrust saturation is evaluated by comparing the reference thrust TREF, which is
calculated continuously, with the maximum thrust TMAx and the minimum thrust T MIN (eqs. (7a) —
(7g)). It can be seen from equations (7a), (7f), and (7g) that this thrust comparison is equivalent to
comparing 'yPOT REF with yPOT MAX and YPOT MIN . Equivalent conditions for thrust saturation that are
useful for study of the corresponding geometrical regions can be developed as follows.
Equation (7b) can be put in the form
	
sin Y = Sin	 CMDYPOT REF —
1 dV
t C11
	 (7b)
Restating equation (8c),
	
_	 1 dVSill 7sPEED —Sln YPOTTGT g (fit CMD	 (I 1C)
Equation ( l lc) can be subtracted from equation (7b) to obtain the equation
Sin — sin y SPEED — Sin 7 POT REF — Sin y POT TGT	 (I Id)
By substituting yPOT MAX and yPOT MIN for yPOT TGT in equation (1 1 d), the following equations for
ySPEED MAX and ySPEED MIN can be obtained:
sin y — Sin y SPEED MAX — Sin 7 POT REF — Sill 7 POT MAX	
(I le)
and
Sin y — sin y SPEED MIN — sin y POT REF — sin 7 POT MIN	 (1 1 f)
Equations (1 1 e) and (1 l t) show that the following conditions on measured flightpath angle 7 are
equivalent to the thrust saturation conditions (7e) on YPOT REF:
(y > ySPEED MAX ) — %OT REF > 7 POT MAX)	 (I I g)
and
(y^ySPEF.DMIN^ (7POTRF.F^yPOTMIN) 	 (1111)
Extensive use will be made of the alternative thrust saturation conditions (I Ig) and (1 1h).
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Geometrical Stability Regions
The contours corresponding to ysPEED MAX and ysPEED MIN are illustrated by figure 12 for each of the
three primitive control modes. In figure 12, the contour for ysPEED MAX corresponds to the maximum
instantaneous flightpath angle y that can be obtained without thrust saturation while simultaneously
satisfying the longitudinal acceleration command. Similarly, the contour for ysPEED MIN corresponds
to the minimum instantaneous flightpath angle y that can be obtained without thrust saturation while
simultaneously satisfying the longitudinal acceleration command.
It can be seen that the contours of ysPEED MAX and ysPEED MIN separate the (V, y) plane into three
regions that correspond to thrust saturation or to its absence, after accounting for the contribution of
the commanded longitudinal acceleration (dV/dt) CMD
 to the total thrust required. The hatched central
region corresponds to the absence of dynamic thrust saturation; elsewhere, the thrust control is satur-
ated. It is convenient to designate the regions in which thrust would be saturated if yTGT were cap-
tured by defining the conditions P and Q as follows:
P ( y TGT > y sPEED MAX ) 	 Q (yTGT < ysPEED MIN)	 (11 i)
The regions in which yTGT must lie when P and Q hold are marked on the diagrams of figures 12(a)
and 12(b).
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Figure 12. Geometric stability regions for primitive modes.
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In figures 12(a) and 12(b), contours of ySPEED MAX and ySPEED MIN for a representative target airspeed
VTGT are illustrated. The forms of these contours result from limiting of the longitudinal acceleration
command, as discussed previously (eqs. (9a)-90)). For airspeeds near V TGT , the commanded
longitudinal acceleration is proportional to the airspeed error (fig. 1 1(c)), so that the portions of the
contours for ySPEED MAX and ysrEED MIN near VTGT are steeply sloping straight lines. (Integral control
within the airspeed regulator would distort their linear form to some extent.)
For larger airspeed errors, the acceleration limiter becomes active. In that case, because the acceler-
ation command is limited to a constant fraction o f 'YPOT MAX or yPOT MIN (eqs. (9a), (9g), and (9h)),
the ySPEED MAX and ySPEED MIN contours lie roughly parallel to the maximum and minimum thrust
contours (figs. 12(a) and 12(b)). It can be seen that the displacement of the ySPEED MAX contour from
the yPOT MAX contour is approximately equal, for small angles, to the normalized longitudinal acceler-
ation command (l/g)(dV/dt)c MD, as required by equation (I Ic), and likewise for the displacement of
the ySPEED MIN contour from the yPOT MIN contour.
y-V Command Mode
In figure 12(a), the hatched central region that corresponds to absence of dynamic thrust saturation is
available for operation in the y-V Command mode. Capture of a representative target point (VTGT,
VTGT) is illustrated (point A). Outside the hatched region the thrust control is saturated, so that the
y-V Command mode cannot be engaged there. However, if operation in the y-V Command mode
were permitted with saturated thrust, the dynamical behavior of the system would be the same as it
is in they Command mode, which is discussed shortly.
During operation in the y-V Command mode, any target point can be captured provided that it lies
within the steady-state performance envelope (region I, figure 10(a)), but this is not required of the
initial point. As illustrated by figure 12(a), if the target lies at point A, it can be captured starting
from points such as point D that lie outside the steady-state performance envelope. In this example,
the y Command mode would be selected for the initial part of the capture trajectory DCA, and the
y-V Command mode would be selected when the trajectory enters the central hatched region
(fig. 12(a)).
V Command Mode
In the V Command mode the thrust setting is fixed, as noted previously, but the physical signifi-
cance of the hatched central region in figure 12(b) is the same as it is in figure 12(a): the hatched
region is that within which the instantaneous operating point (V, y) must lie to enable the longitud-
inal acceleration command to be satisfied with a physically realizable thrust setting.
During operation in the V Command mode, the flightpath target yTGT is ignored by the system, and
ySPEED is captured instead. For example, suppose the instantaneous operating point (V, y) lies initially
at point D (fig. (12(b)). If yPOT TGT is set to yPOT MAX and the V Command mode is selected, the flight-
path angle ySPEED MAX is captured. After path capture is complete, the (V, y) operating point must lie
on the ySPEED MAX contour at some point such as point C', with the acceleration directed toward the
target airspeed (indicated by arrows on the diagram). In figure 12(b), point B indicates the point
on the ySPEED MAX contour with coordinates ( VTGT, ySPEED MAX), which is the point finally captured.
Point B is the best approximation to the target point (point A, as in figure 12(a)) that can be realized
with maximum thrust when the target airspeed is specified as shown.
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The points on the YsPEED MAX contour to the left of point B correspond to an accelerating climb, and
those to the right of point B correspond to a decelerating climb. Similarly, during minimum-thrust
descent, the (V, y) operating point lies oil
	 YsPEED MIN contour. with the acceleration directed
toward the target airspeed.
y Command Mode
In the y Command mode the thrust setting is fixed, just as it is in the V Command mode, but in the
y Command mode any target flightpath angle yTGT call captured without restriction to the steady-
state flight envelope. Because there is no closed-loop control of airspeed, the airspeed target VTCT is
ignored by the system, and no use is made of the commanded longitudinal acceleration (dV/dt)CMD•
The instantaneous longitudinal acceleration is determined from equation (10a), which can be put in
the form
(I/g)(dV/dt) = sin 
yPOT TGT
—sin	 (1 Oa)
where y is the instantaneous flightpath angle. Equation (10a) shows that, in they Command mode,
the sign of the longitudinal acceleration dV/dt is determined by comparing the instantaneous flight-
path angle y with the fixed target thrust yPOTTCT-
During operation in the y Command mode, the sign of the longitudinal acceleration for any selected
value of yTCT can be determined from figure 12(c). For example, suppose that the selected target
(VTCT, yT(;T) lies at point A (fig. 12(c)), the initial operating point (V, y) lies at point C, and yPOTTCT
is set to yPOT MAX .
 
Then the longitudinal acceleration is positive at both point C and point A, as
required by equation ( I Oa). As shown by figure 12(c), the trajectory overshoots the target at point A
and captures point B, where the longitudinal acceleration vanishes. Point B is the best approximation
to the target (point A, as in figure 12(a)) that can be realized with maximum thrust when the target
flightpath angle is specified as shown.
If the initial operating point (V, y) lies at point D, the initial longitudinal acceleration is negative,
becoming positive when the trajectory enters the hatched region as shown (fig. 12(c)). This example
shows how the initial part of the trajectory DCA shown in figure 12(a) can be generated by selecting
the y Command mode while thrust is saturated.
If the y Command mode is selected when the target point lies in region V, then the behavior of the
system is quite different. For example, suppose that the selected target lies above the yPOT MAX con-
tour (point E, figure 12(c)), and the initial operating point lies in region V (point D) or the upper part
of region IV (point D'). In either case, the longitudinal acceleration (marked oil
	 diagram by an
arrow) is negative, as required by equation (10a). The trajectory overshoots the target at point E, and
the airspeed diverges toward stalling speed (fig. 12(c)). Therefore, when the target point lies in
region V or the upper part of region IV above the yPOT MAX contour, selection of they Command
mode would not be acceptable.
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Summary
Dynamic thrust saturation has been analyzed, and it has been shown how contours corresponding to
dynamic thrust saturation subdivide the flightpath-airspeed plane into geometric regions (fig. 12).
Several examples have illustrated the behavior of each of the three primitive modes for target points
in each of those regions.
These examples suggest some of the dynamical issues that must be addressed during mode selection.
It is essential to provide a comprehensive strategy that ensures appropriate system behavior when
thrust saturates. Before a valid mode control logic can be developed, it is necessary to specify the
requirements for safety and functionality that the system must satisfy, and to define explicitly what
is meant by mode validity. These matters are discussed next.
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Transport aircraft safety requirements are based on a priori identification of safety hazards, as are
safety requirements in several other industries (Leveson, 1995). Safety margins intended to provide
protection against these hazards are then applied to the ultimate physical operating limits of the
aircraft to define a safe operatingu cm elope within which all normal operation is required to take
place. Thus the development of satet\ requirements for the longitudinal control system begins with
a survey of known flight hazards that restrict the physical operational envelope of the aircraft.
Flight Hazards
Wing Stall
Wing stall occurs at the ang le of attack tier which the lift function takes on its maximum value
(appendix B). The stalling airspeed depends on aircraft weight and on normal acceleration, and thus
on the flight demonstration techni(lue used during certification to establish the stalling speed experi-
mentally. In some cases, a\ ailahlc pitch control power may not be sufficient to permit demonstration
of a well-defined stall. In others. satct y hazards anticipated from wind tunnel tests (such as deep stall
or pitch-up at high angles of attar k ) make it inadvisable to approach the stall closely during certifica-
tion flight tests, so that certification is based on a declared maximum angle of attack that can be
demonstrated safely. The consequences of exceeding such a declared limit are presumed to be cata-
strophic. Whatever the basis, tine values for stalling angle of attack and airspeed for all aircraft
configurations and weights are determined during the certification process.
Thrust Asymmetry
If engine failure occurs, the resultin_u thrust asymmetry generates yawing and rolling moments that
can threaten transport aircraft controllability. Because control power decreases with decreasing
airspeed, a minimum control airspeed exists below which controllability cannot be retained with
maximum thrust applied to the operating engines. Engine-out controllability is assessed during the
certification process, and minimun1 control airspeeds are determined for all aircraft configurations
and weights. The consequences of' % iolating minimum control-speed restrictions are presumed to be
catastrophic.
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Overspeed
The maximum airspeed is determined at low altitude by structural limits such as excessive airloads
or flutter, and at high altitudes by compressibility (Mach) effects that degrade controllability (for
example, Mach buffet) as shock waves form on the aerodynamic surfaces of the aircraft. Just as for
wing stall, maximum airspeed limits are determined for all aircraft configurations and weights
during the certification process, and the consequences of exceeding those limits are presumed to be
catastrophic.
Ground Contact
At large airports suitable for transport-category aircraft, a survey plane is established at the approach
and departure ends of each runway, and the locations and heights of all obstacles penetrating this
survey plane (nominal gradient 2%) are marked on aeronautical charts. The gradients specified for
all instrument approach procedures for each runway are selected to provide safe terrain clearance in
the vicinity of the airport. Similar surveys determine safe minimum en-route altitudes for all airways
throughout the National Airspace System. The consequences of contact with the ground other than
the runway, or with an obstacle such as a building or a radio tower, are presumed to be catastrophic.
Safety Margins
Airspeed Margins
An airspeed margin equal to 30% of the stalling speed is applied to the stalling speed to determine
the minimum airspeed to be used during final approach. Intentional operation below this reference
approach speed is prohibited in airline service. Other airspeed margins are applied to the takeoff
stalling speed and to the engine-out minimum control speed to establish the takeoff safety speed, and
still others are subtracted from the maximum airspeed limits to determine the maximum safe operat-
ing airspeeds for all aircraft configurations and weights in both smooth and rough air.
Safe Descent Margins
At low altitude, the maximum safe descent gradient during instrument approach is determined by the
published approach procedure. At higher altitudes, operational limits on rate of descent are often
imposed by airline operating policy to avoid excessive rates of descent that could lead to violation
of safe altitude limits. At high altitudes where terrain clearance is not an issue, excessive rates of
descent that could lead to overspeed should be avoided. These rate-of-descent limits can be expres-
sed as 1lightpath angle limits on the descent angle ysAFE that vary with airspeed.
Safe Operating Envelope
Application ot' the airspeed margins and the safe descent margins to the physical envelope limits
determine the safe envelope limits VMiN, VMAx, and ySAFF within which the automated control
system is required to operate (fig. 13). To provide protection against violation of safe operating
envelope limits, envelope protection modes are developed in the next section.
Discussion
The presence of these envelope protection modes should not be regarded as reducing the designer's
obligation to ensure that the normal control modes operate safely. To the contrary, if the design of
the normal control modes is valid, envelope protection should be invoked (activated) only in cases
where aircraft performance limitations preclude other alternatives.
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Figure 13. Safety envelope for Path/Speed Command supermode.
Envelope Protection
Envelope Protection Requirements
Envelope protection requirements can be stated as follows. Protection against underspeed should
be provided by setting VT(;T equal to VMIN plus a small tolerance and selecting the y-V Command
mode. Similarly, protection against overspeed should be provided by setting VTGT equal to VMAx
less a small tolerance and selecting the y-V Command mode. In both cases, if the thrust saturates, the
V Command mode should be selected to give priority to airspeed.
Protection against penetration of the ysAFE boundary should be provided by setting yTCT equal to
ysAFE plus a small tolerance and selecting the y-V Command mode. If the thrust saturates, the
y Command mode should be selected to give priority to path. In case of conflict between speed and
path envelope violations, priority should be given to airspeed protection, except in the presence of
strong wind shear. Shear disturbances exceeding the FAA-specified threshold of 2 kt/sec must be
detected, and must cause the control system to transition to a special wind shear recovery mode that
is not treated in this report.
In all cases where envelope protection is invoked, the maximum thrust limit should be increased as
much as possible (takeoff or contingency thrust), and appropriate warnings must be annunciated. It
is also desirable to increase the limits on normal and longitudinal acceleration imposed during fully
automated flight for passenger comfort. The system should revert to normal operation if that again
becomes valid.
Envelope Protection Modes
The envelope protection logic developed to meet these requirements is specified by table 1, which is
presented to illustrate representative control logic for envelope protection modes. Because the focus
of this report is on the modes engaged during normal operation, no validity analysis is performed on
the envelope protection mode logic, and no claims are made for its formal validation. A detailed
description of condition-action decision tables like table i can be found in appendix D.
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TABLE 1. SELECTION OF ENVELOPE PROTECTION MODES
Condition Underspeed Protection Overspeed Protection Descent Path Protection
< V< VMAXVMIN—
------------ ----------------
TRUE
-----------------
V< VMIN
----------
TRUE
--------------------------------
V > VMAX TRUE
y? ysnr•E
y ^ ysnrr: TRUE
Action Set VTCT equal to	 Set VTGT equal to VMAX Set yTGT equal to
VMIN + tolerance	 — tolerance ysAFE + tolerance
Set thrust limit to contingency thrust
Increase acceleration limits
-------------------------------------------------
Select y-V Command mode. If thrust saturates:
Select V Command mode Select
y Command mode
The purpose of the tolerance parameters in table l is to provide hysteresis that prevents repetitive
cycling of mode transitions ("chattering"). Appropriate values for these parameters should be
selected during implementation. What exactly is meant by "giving priority to airspeed or to flight-
path angle" is clarified in the next section.
EFFECTIVENESS REQUIREMENTS
Effectiveness Concept
In addition to the a priori safety requirements already discussed, the system must also be effective in
performing its intended function. This notion is termed effectiveness. (In the design procedure to be
presented, effectiveness plays a role similar to that of liveness in computer science.) The specifica-
tion of desired system functionality in terms of general effectiveness properties is the task of this
section.
For the longitudinal control system, the desired effectiveness can be stated as a general stability
property in the following way. Starting at any initial operating point specified by (V, y) coordinates,
abrupt change of target to a new point specified by ( VT(,T, yTGT) coordinates lying within the closed
flight envelope F- (fig. 8) should cause the aircraft to capture and hold the new target smoothly,
without exceeding (in smooth air) the acceleration limits imposed for passenger comfort. If the tar-
get lies outside the closed flight envelope E, the aircraft should capture and hold a point within the
closed envelope that provides an acceptable approximation to the target.
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The desired safety properties require that the aircraft remain at all times within the envelope safety
limits illustrated by figure 13, as previously discussed. These proposed statements of safety and
effectiveness properties taken together restrict the effective targets to points within the steady-state
(trimmed) performance envelope, and do not permit exploitation of dynamic maneuvers to provide
enhanced performance. This limitation seems consistent with both the mission and the operating
characteristics of transport aircraft, but likely would not be satisfactory for higher-performance
aircraft.
If a single mode (for example, the y-V Command mode) could provide the desired effectiveness
throughout the closed envelope E, that system would consist of a single continuous element, and the
required stability property could be established by known control-theoretic methods. Such use of
the y-V Command mode would require avoidance of thrust saturation, as previously discussed. But
thrust saturation cannot be avoided in practice, because efficient operation during climb and descent
requires operation on the thrust saturation boundary (appendix B). Both the V Command mode and
the y Command mode can deal with thrust saturation, but neither can capture both path and speed
targets simultaneously. Therefore, none of the three primitive modes can provide the desired effec-
tiveness throughout the closed envelope E.
However, it will be shown that the desired effectiveness can be achieved by combining the three
primitive modes into a higher-level entity that will be termed a supermode, with a well-defined
strategy for choosing among the three primitive modes whenever a thrust saturation boundary is
encountered. This supermode, which is termed Path/Speed Command, constitutes a hybrid system as
previously defined. The desired safety and effectiveness properties must therefore be established for
this hybrid system, a problem for whose solution no general theoretical method is known. It is hoped
that the present study may contribute by example to the development of more general methods. The
resulting design method should also be of practical interest to designers of next-generation transport
aircraft avionic systems.
To aid in fixing ideas, the discussion of effectiveness will begin with a detailed example that illus-
trates use of the three primitive modes already discussed to perform a representative higher-level
task. The task selected is that of capturing an altitude assigned by ATC; other representative tasks
could have been chosen.
Altitude Capture Example
It is assumed that an aircraft in level fli ,,ht at 15,000 ft is cleared to climb to 35,000 ft (Flight Level
350). For efficiency, the aircraft is to climb at 250 kt, and then accelerate to 280 kt for cruise. To
execute this clearance, the first task is to pull up from level flight into a steady climb, maintaining a
constant normal acceleration of 0.1 g during the pull-up. This pull-up task can be accomplished by
the automated control system in the following way.
Pull-up
Referring to figure 1 1(a), the altitude regulator function is illustrated by the structure to the left of
the broken vertical line. In this example, the target altitude HTGT is changed abruptly from 15,000 ft
to 35,000 ft while the measured altitude H remains at 15,000 ft. The altitude error AH is therefore
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35,000 — 15,000 = 20,000 ft. It can be seen from the upper row of the block diagram of figure 1 1(b)
that the commanded vertical velocity (dH/dt)CMD then becomes
(dH/dt)CMO = 2(3) [JOH1— H () /2] = 6 [20,000 — 150] = 345.1 ft/sec
At 15,000 ft, an equivalent airspeed (EAS) of 250 kt corresponds to a true airspeed (TAS) of
531.9 ft/sec (appendix B). The sine of the commanded flightpath angle yTGT is calculated to be
sin 7TGT = (dH/dt) CMD /V = 345.1/531.9 = 0.6488 	 7TCT = 40.45 deg
Clearly, the raw 7TGT calculated from the parabolic law greatly exceeds the performance capability
of the aircraft. (It may be recalled that in the numerical example illustrating calculation of the flight
envelope, the maximum climb angle 
'JVOT MAX was found to be only 6.92 degrees at sea level with
maximum thrust at 289 kt EAS). In practice, to ensure application of maximum thrust during climb,
the flightpath angle 7ToT is set to an angle 3 degrees steeper than 7POT MAX (fig. I I (b)). This value of
7TCT and the airspeed target VTCT of 250 kt provide the inputs to the primitive mode structure to the
right of the broken vertical line (fig. i I (a)). In the y-V Command mode, the normal acceleration
limiter limits the rate of change of flightpath angle to
d7/dt = (-/V)(0. 1) = (32.174 / 531.9X0.1) = 0.00605 rad/sec = 0.35 deg/sec
and the aircraft pulls up at this constant rate, increasing thrust to maintain airspeed constant
(fig. 1 1(c)). When the reference thrust T KEF exceeds the maximum thrust TMAx the thrust command
saturates (eq. (7d)). The y-V Command mode used during the pull-up is then no longer viable, and
one of the other two primitive modes must be engaged.
Climb
It is assumed that, for efficiency, the climb to 35,000 ft is to be conducted with maximum thrust at
the target airspeed of 250 kt EAS, accepting whatever climb angle results as thrust decreases with
altitude. Such a climb procedure is representative of subsonic jet transport operations (appendix B).
Clearly, it corresponds to operation in the V Command mode, which must therefore be selected
when thrust saturation occurs, settin wy
 the target thrust TTGT equal to TMAX (figs. 11(a) and I I (c)).
During the initial climb, the 111 g htpath angle target 7ToT remains on its upper limit (fig. 1 1(b)), but
as the aircraft approaches the target altitude of 35,000 ft and the altitude error is reduced, yrGT is no
longer limited, and it decreases smoothly to zero as the aircraft reaches the target altitude. But in the
V Command mode in which the aircraft is operating during the climb, the system captures and holds
ysPEEn, ignoring 7TH ;, (fi g . I I (a)). Therefore, to capture the target altitude smoothly, the y-V Com-
mand mode must again be selected as soon as 7TGT becomes equal to or less than 7sPEED MAX . The
aircraft then pushes over to level flight as the altitude error is nulled.
Altitude Capture
Up to this point, the altitude capture example has made use of only two of the three primitive modes.
The aircraft must now accelerate to a cruising airspeed of 280 kt EAS at the top of the climb, the
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airspeed target being changed abruptly from 250 kt EAS to 280 kt EAS at the start of the push-over
for altitude capture. The increased thrust required for longitudinal acceleration then maintains thrust
saturation during the initial altitude capture. Capturing and tracking the flightpath angle target yTCT
with the thrust saturated requires use of the y Command mode (fig. 1 1(a)), which must be selected at
the start of altitude capture. As the aircraft approaches the target airspeed, the commanded longitud-
inal acceleration is reduced until eventually the thrust is no longer saturated, and the y-V Command
mode can once again be engaged.
Transition Paths
The transition paths in the (V, y) plane corresponding to the altitude capture example are illustrated
by the diagrams of figure 14, which are similar to those of figure 12. In figure 14(a), point A corres-
ponds to the initial condition in level flight at 15,000 ft and 250 kt. Point B corresponds to the target
point when the target altitude of 35,000 ft is first entered. The target flightpath angle yTGT is limited
to an angle 3 degrees above the maximum thrust contour at the target airspeed of 250 kt, as previ-
ously explained. During the pull-up, the rate-limited flightpath angle yLIm traverses the path extend-
ing vertically upward from point A as the system, operating in the y-V Command mode, attempts to
capture the target point B. When the thrust saturates at point C, the V Command mode is.selected,
and the system then holds YSPEED at 250 kt (point C) during the steady climb. The target flightpath
angle YTCT remains on its upper limit (point B) until the aircraft approaches the target altitude of
35,000 ft. When the limit is no longer active, the flightpath target (point B') moves downward
toward point C as the altitude error is reduced (fig. 14(b)). When yTGT coincides with point C, the
airspeed target is changed to 280 kt, and the y Command mode is selected. During altitude capture,
the flightpath and airspeed follow the path C-D-E, the thrust remaining saturated until point D is
reached. At point D, the y-V Command mode is engaged, and the altitude capture is completed in
level flight at the cruising airspeed of 280 kt EAS (point E).
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Figure 14. Altitude capture example.
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Figure 14. Altitude capture example (concluded).
As previously noted, there is no closed-loop control of airspeed while thrust is saturated along the
path C-D. Nevertheless, the longitudinal acceleration is positive throughout the altitude capture,
and the airspeed target is captured as expected. On the other hand, premature selection of the
y Command mode before the target flightpath angle has reached point C (that is, before the aircraft
has approached the target altitude closely enough) could result in operation in they Command mode
at point B'. In that case, the longitudinal acceleration would be negative during the initial portion of
the altitude capture, contrary to the desired behavior.
The altitude capture example just presented has brought out several key points. In the next section,
this example is generalized as a first step toward definition of requirements for a systematic mode
selection strategy for the Path/Speed Command supermode.
Path/Speed Command Supermode Specifications
Path/Speed Priority
An essential element of this mode selection strategy is the priority to be placed on controlling path
or controlling speed when thrust saturates, because only one of the two parameters can then be
controlled. It is clear that operation in the y Command mode gives priority to path, because it holds
path at the expense of speed. Similarly, operation in the V Command mode gives priority to speed.
Thus the priority placed on path or speed determines the selection of either they Command mode or
the V Command mode within the Path/Speed Command supermode whenever thrust saturates.
But this priority decision must be made at a higher level within the mode hierarchy where sufficient
information is available. The altitude capture example shows that the correct decision depends on
the phase of flight (initial pull-up, climb, altitude capture, and the like), which is not known within
the Path/Speed Command supermode. Therefore, the path/speed priority must be provided as an
external input to the Path/Speed Command supermode that is specified by the higher-level entity in
the mode hierarchy that invokes the Path/Speed Command supermode as a lower-level element. For
the altitude capture task, this higher-level entity is a supermode termed Altitude Command; it is
discussed in detail in a later section. The path/speed priority transmitted from the upper level to the
lower can be regarded from a general system design viewpoint as control flowing downward.
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Mode Hierarchy
From the viewpoint of the higher-level supermode invoking the Path/Speed Command supermode,
the higher-level supermode provides to the Path/Speed Command supermode three parameters:
(I) a target flightpath angle, (2) a target airspeed, and (3) a choice of path or speed priority if thrust
saturates. The Path/Speed Command supermode hides all information relative to the performance
capability of the aircraft, its flight envelope, and the differential equations governing control of
flightpath and airspeed, and annunciates to the invoking supermode the effectiveness to be expected
in capturing the flightpath and airspeed targets. In the next section, these general notions are made
precise by formal definition of three different classes of effectiveness.
Effectiveness Definitions
The stability analysis carried out previously shows that, depending on which primitive mode is
engaged, the Path/Speed Command supermode can exhibit three different kinds of behavior in cap-
turing path and speed targets, which correspond to Type (i) control, Type (ii) control, or Type (iii)
control.
Complete effectiveness is defined as capture of both path and speed targets within small
tolerances that account for expected disturbances, which characterizes Type (i) control. If
thrust saturates, Type (i) control is not available, and either Type (ii) control or Type (iii)
control must be selected. In that case, capture of the target that is given priority (either
path or speed) is assured, but the other target is ignored by the system.
Partin/ o.fectiveness is defined as capture of a point of stable equilibrium that provides
an acceptable approximation to the target that is ignored.
Normal effectiveness is defined as follows: If the target path and speed have not yet been
captured, but the normal and longitudinal accelerations have the expected signs leading
toward capture, this behavior is termed normal effectiveness.
It follows from their definitions that complete effectiveness implies partial effectiveness and is
therefore logically dominant, whereas nornial effectiveness is a weaker property that is useful
chiefly in the short term.
Application of these definitions to each of the three primitive modes is described next. To enable
effectiveness to play a useful role in mode selection, it is essential that each effectiveness property
be defined in such a way that evaluation based on its definition is independent of the mode selected
at the time the evaluation is made.
Effectiveness of y-V Command Mode
For the y-V Command Mode, normal effectiveness holds immediately upon engagement, and com-
plete effectiveness holds in the long term. These properties follow directly from the stability of the
flightpath and airspeed regulators. Partial effectiveness does not apply to the y-V Command mode,
which can be engaged only in the absence of thrust saturation.
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Effectiveness of V Command Mode
In the V Command mode, priority is given to airspeed. The flightpath angle YSPEED is captured, and
subsequent capture of the target airspeed is assured by the stability properties of the path and speed
regulators (figs. 1 1(c) and i 1(e)). Therefore, normal effectiveness for the V Command mode applies
only to capture of the airspeed target, for which it always holds because of the stability of the air-
speed regulator. The flightpath target YTGT is ignored, but partial effectiveness of the V Command
mode requires that YsPEED constitute an acceptable approximation to YTGT . How should this require-
ment be interpreted?
Partial Effectiveness
if the flightpath target YTGT lies in the region of thrust saturation above the YsPEED MAX contour in
figure 12(b) (that is, if the condition P = (YTGT ? YSPEED MAX) holds), then the best physically realiz-
able approximation to YTGT is the point on the YSPEED MAX contour nearest YTGT at the prevailing air-
speed. For example, if point D (fig. 12(b)) has the coordinates ( VD , YTGT), then the best physically
realizable approximation is the point D', which has coordinates (VD, YSPEED MAX)•
To realize the best approximation whenever the condition P = (YTGT ? YSPEED MAX) holds, the thrust
target YPOT TGT should be set equal tO YPOT MAX, so that YSPEED is equal tO YSPEED MAX; no other physi-
cally realizable thrust setting could provide as good an approximation. In contrast, suppose that P
holds, but YPOT TGT is not equal to YPOT MAX. That case should be considered a violation of partial
effectiveness of the V Command mode, because the best approximation is not realized; the same is
true if Q holds, but YPOT TGT Is not equal to YPOT MIN ( fig- 12(b))•
Therefore, expressing logical negation by the word NOT and denoting partial effectiveness of the
V Command mode symbolically as PE (V), a preliminary definition for PE (V) based on general
notions of best approximation can be stated as follows:
PE (V) = NOT [P AND (YPOTTGT $ (POT MAX)] AND NOT [Q AND (YPOTTGT $ 7 POT MiN)]
To relate PE (V) to the geometrical regions illustrated by figure 12(b), its definition must be sim-
plified. It is shown in appendix D by means of symbolic logic that the definition for PE (V) just
stated can be simplified in the following three ways:
If (YPOT TGT — YPOT MAX) holds, then PE (V) = NOT Q.
if (YPOTTGT YPOTMIN) holds, then PE (V) = NOT P.
if (7POTTGT ^ YPOTTGT ^ YPOTMAX) holds, then PE (V) = NOT P AND NOT Q.
(To verify the first statement without the use of symbolic logic, which otherwise will not be needed
until later, assume that (YPOTTGT = YPOT MAX) holds. Then the definition of PE (V) becomes
PE (V) = NOT [P AND FALSE] AND NOT [Q AND TRUE].
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Because the proposition within the first right-hand bracket is FALSE whatever P may be, its negation
NOT FALSE must be TRUE. The proposition within the second bracket reduces to Q, with negation
NOT Q. With these simplifications, PE (V) becomes
PE (V) = TRUE AND NOT Q,
which reduces to the statement that PE (V) is equivalent to NOT Q, verifying the first result. The
other two statements can be verified in a similar manner.)
These three simplified statements show that PE (V) is related to the regions illustrated by figure
12(b) in the following ways. When 7POT TGT is set equal to YPOT MAX and PE (V) is therefore equiva-
lent to NOT Q, then PE (V) holds \^ hell YT( ;T lies in the region above the YSPEED MIN contour where
NOT Q holds (fig. 12(b)). When 7po l tc;T is set equal to 7POTMiN and PE (V) is therefore equivalent to
NOT P, then PE (V) holds -vvhen y j( , I lies in the region below the YSPEED MAX contour where NOT P
holds (fig. 12(b)). When ypm I( ; I is set equal to an intermediate thrust level and PE (V) is equivalent
to NOT P AND NOT Q, then PL (V) holds when Yi p; I lies in the central hatched region (fig. 12(b))
where NOT P AND NOT Q holds.
It is clear that, in general. \ iolation of' PE (V) would result from inappropriate setting of the target
thrust YPOT TGT . The condit I011s (YP() I I(- I # YPOT MAX) and (YPOT TGT # YPOT MIN) are made more specific
later.
Effectiveness of y Command Mode
In the y Command mode. priority is given to path. Following engagement of the y Command mode
with a fixed-path target, capture ofthe selected path target is ensured by the stability property of
the path regulator (fig. I I(c)). 'i he airspeed target V TGT is ignored, but partial effectiveness of the
YCommand mode requires that a point ol'stable airspeed equilibrium be captured that provides an
acceptable approximation to ,, ,, . \1 hat conditions must be imposed to ensure partial effectiveness
of they Command mode?
Partial Effectiveness
After path capture is complete. the instantaneous flightpath angle 7 remains fixed at Y T( ;T . It will be
recalled from the previous diScuSSion of' the dynamical behavior of the aircraft that, when flightpath
angle is constrained to a fixed anLde such as YT( ;T with thrust fixed, one point of stable airspeed
equilibrium lies above the speed lur minimum drag at the intersection of the horizontal line corres-
ponding to YTGT with the fixed-thrust contour (point A of figure 9(b)). Furthermore, this point of
stable equilibrium will be captured il'the operating point (V, Y) lies within its region of attraction,
which consists of all point, oil 	 horizontal jT( ;j line to the right of the point of unstable equilib-
rium (point B of figure 9(h) ). a, prc\ iously explained. Depending on the thrust setting YPOT TGT, there
are three cases, the case correspondinu to maximum thrust is treated first.
Maximum thrust— When Y I ,„ I i( ; I is set equal to YPOTMAX and YTGT lies in region I (point A of
figure 12(c)), point B is a point ol' stable equilibrium. Its region of attraction consists of the points on
the horizontal YTGT line either ^\ ithin region I or within the lower part of region IV (fig. 12(c)). This
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region of attraction is defined by the condition (YTGT < 7POT MAX) for region I and by the two condi-
tions (YTGT ? YPOT MAX) and (V > V MIN DRAG) for region IV.
Therefore, a preliminary definition for partial effectiveness of the 7 Command mode (denoted by
PE (7)) based on the requirement that the operating point (V, 7) lie within the region of attraction of
a point of stable equilibrium can be stated symbolically as follows:
PE (7) _ (7TGT < YPOT MAX) OIZ L(YTGT > YPOT MAX) AND (V > VMIN DRAG)
It is shown in appendix D by means of symbolic logic that this definition of PE (Y) can be simplified
as follows:
PE (7) — (7TGT < YPOT MAX) OR (V > VMIN DRAG)
(This result can be verified without the use of symbolic logic, which otherwise is not needed until
later, but that exposition is awkward and is not presented here.)
Violation of PE (y), which requires annunciation to be discussed later, is expressed by its negation,
using the word NOT:
NOT PE (Y) = (7TGT YPOT MAX) AND (VS VMIN DRAG)
It can be seen that, with this logical definition, PE (y) holds if -YTGT lies in region I at the prevailing
airspeed (point A of figure 12(c)), but is violated in region V, where the violation-defining condi-
tions (YTGT ?YPOT MAX) and (V 5 VMIN DRAG) both hold (point E of figure 12(c)). If the operating point
(V, y) should penetrate region V under these conditions, then the airspeed would diverge toward
stalling speed, as explained previously. Thus the required annunciation of PE (y) violation gives
warning of potentially catastrophic behavior that can enable timely recovery action, avoiding invo-
cation of underspeed protection.
Discussion— The preliminary logical definition for PE (y) just stated appears faulty if YTGT lies in the
upper part of region IV above the YPOT MAX contour for all airspeeds within region IV (point D' of
figure 12(c)). In that case, PE (7) holds according to the stated definition, but no point of equilibrium
can be captured because none exists, contradicting the defining property for PE (7). The airspeed
diverges toward stalling speed because the condition (YTGT ? YPOT MAX) holds for all airspeeds
(fig. 12(c)). However, airspeed divergence presents no immediate threat to safe operation while the
operating point remains within region iV. Furthermore, the operating point must eventually pene-
trate region V, generating a timely warning. Therefore. unnecessary complication can be avoided
without compromising safety by allowing PE (y) to hold everywhere in region iV. The preliminary
definition is then satisfactory in the form stated.
This definition also appears faulty if the condition (YTGT < YPOT MAX) holds at VMAX, because in that
case PE (7) holds according to the definition, but no point of equilibrium can be captured because
none exists below VMAX (fig. 12(c)). Overspeed could occur. However, if 7TGT lies in region I at
VMAX (that is, If the condition (7POT MiN < YTGT < 7POT MAX) holds at VMAX), overspeed can be
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prevented by selecting the y-V Command mode, which provides closed-loop control of both airspeed
and path, as already noted. The 7-V Command mode is available for selection unless thrust saturates.
Therefore, the stated definition of PE (y) is satisfactory provided that thrust remains unsaturated. The
case in which YTGT lies below region I is treated shortly.
Minimum thrust— When yPOTTGT is set equal to YPOT MIN, a point of stable equilibrium (if one exists)
lies on the yPOT MIN contour to the right of VMIN DRAG (fig. 12(c)). Overspeed could occur if the condi-
tion (YTGT < Y POT MIN) holds at VMAX, even though PE (y) holds under the stated definition.
However, YTGT is required to lie above the safe descent limit YsAFE, as previously discussed. At high
altitudes where YsAFE is not constrained by considerations of terrain clearance, airline operating
policy often imposes a limit (dH/dt)s AFE on maximum rate of descent, which is related to YsAFE by
the equation (dH /dt)sAFE = V sin ysAFE• Therefore, overspeed can be prevented by choosing the safe
descent limit so that the condition (YsAFE: ! yrOT MIN) holds at VMAX, and by enforcing the constraint
(YTGT ? YsAFE) on YTGT. These two conditions together imply that the condition (YT(;T? YPOT MiN) holds
at VMAX, which is sufficient to ensure that a point of stable equilibrium will be captured without the
occurrence of overspeed (fig. 12(c)).
Therefore, the stated definition of PE (y) remains satisfactory in this case also, provided that over-
speed is prevented by a suitable choice of YsAFE• (At low altitudes, of course, the safe descent limit
could be further restricted by terrain clearance considerations.)
Intermediate thrust— Finally, assume that thrust is fixed at an intermediate level, so that the condi-
tion (yPOT MIN C yPOT TGT C YPOT MAX) holds. If the condition (YTGT "'^ yPOT MAX) also holds, then PE (y)
holds under the stated definition. However, airspeed could diverge toward stalling speed if the
condition (YTGT ^! YPOT TGT) holds, or toward overspeed if (YTGT C YPOT T(; T) holds. However, if YTGT
lies in region I (that is, if (yPOT MIN 'c:^ YTGT ^ YPOT MAX) holds), airspeed divergence can be prevented
by selecting the y-V Command mode, which is available for selection unless thrust saturates.
Therefore, the stated definition of PE (y) is satisfactory in that case provided that thrust remains
unsaturated.
If YTGT lies below region I (fig. 12(c)) (that is, if (YTGT < YPOT MIN) holds), the situation is the same as
that discussed previously for mininulm thrust: overspeed could occur, but can be prevented by a
suitable choice of ysAFE• In that case, the stated definition of PE (y) remains satisfactory in the form
stated.
If YTGT lies above region I (fig. 12(c)) ( that is, if (YTGT ? YPOT MAX) holds), the situation is the same as
that discussed previously for maximum thrust: the stated definition of PE (y) is satisfactory in the
form stated.
Summary— To summarize, analysis has shown that, with the stated definition
NOT PE (Y) = (yTGT > YPOT MAX) AND (V S V MIN DRAG)
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partial effectiveness holds in several situations in which airspeed diverges, and no point of stable
equilibrium is captured. If YTGT lies in region 1, airspeed divergence can be prevented by selecting
the Y-V Command mode unless thrust saturates. Furthermore, only saturation at maximum thrust is
of concern, because at minimum thrust airspeed divergence toward overspeed can be prevented by a
suitable choice of YSAEE• The same is true if yT( ;-i lies below region 1. However, if thrust saturates, the
Y-V Command mode is not available for recovery.
Therefore, to ensure that PE (y) holds only in cases where a stable point of equilibrium is captured
(the original definition), or else in cases where airspeed divergence can be prevented by some other
means, the thrust saturation condition (Y _> YSPEED MAX) will be conjoined to the previous definition of
NOT PE (Y), so that the final definition can be stated as follows:
NOT PE (Y) = (YTGT > YPOT MAX) AND (V< VM[N DRAG) AND (Y ^! YSPEED MAX)•
Normal Effectiveness
In the y Command mode, normal effectiveness always holds for capture of the flightpath target
because of the stability property of the path regulator. Normal effectiveness may or may not hold for
capture of the airspeed target, as shown by the altitude capture example.
By definition, normal effectiveness for capture of the airspeed target requires that the sign of the
longitudinal acceleration be matched appropriately to that of the airspeed error. In the y Command
mode, the longitudinal acceleration is given by equation (10a):
(I /g) dV/dt = sin YPOT TGT —sin y
	 (I Oa)
When the flightpath target is captured, the flightpath angle 'y becomes equal to Y TGT, and equation
(10a) becomes
(I /g) dV/dt = sin YPOT TGT —sin YTGT
	 (12)
Equation ( 12) shows that in the medium and long term after path capture is complete, the longitud-
inal acceleration dV/dt is deternined by comparing the target flightpath YTGT with the target thrust
YPOTTGT . Similarly, the airspeed error is determined by comparing the prevailing airspeed V with the
target airspeed Y TGT . Nine possible combinations require evaluation, they are summarized by the
following table:
DV/dt > 0
71 GI < YPOT TGT
DV/dt = 0
Yrc r = YPOT -I-G-I
DV/dt < 0
YrG "i > YPOT TGT
V< V-1 -G-r Case I Case 4 Case 7
V = VTGT Case 2 Case 5 Case 8
V < VTG-i Case 3 Case 6 Case 9
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It can be seen that normal effectiveness holds by definition in cases 1, 5, and 9:
	
1.	 V < VTGT	 DV/dt > 0
V = VTGT	 DV/dt = 0
	
9.	 V > VTGT	 DV/dt < 0
In the other cases normal effectiveness is violated. To facilitate meaningful annunciation, it is
convenient to group cases 2, 3, and 6 together by defining the property NOT NE I as follows:
NOT NE1 = R V = VTGT) AND ( 'VTGT < YPOTTGA OR RV > VTGT) AND (YTGT G YPOTTGT)l
If the condition NOT NE 1 holds, the system should annunciate the cautionary message "More drag."
Similarly, the property NOT NE2 is defined by grouping cases 4, 7, and 8 together:
NOT NE2 = [(V =VTGT) AND (VTGT > Y POT TGT)1 OR [(V < VTGT) AND ('VTGT > YPOTTGA
If the condition NOT NE2 holds, the system should annunciate the cautionary message "More
thrust." With the violations NOT NE1 and NOT NE2 defined as stated, normal effectiveness can then
be defined symbolically by the property NE, where
NE = NE1 AND NE2
It should be noted that normal effectiveness is not essential, because its violation presents no
immediate threat to continued safe operation in the y Command mode. Therefore, the required
annunciations should be presented to the human crew as cautions (advisories), not as warnings.
Annunciation Requirements
To assure design integrity, two kinds of requirements for annunciation of the effectiveness of the
Path/Speed Command supermode must be imposed. In the first place, complete effectiveness, partial
effectiveness, and normal effectiveness must be evaluated continuously, and violations must be
annunciated over the whole mode hierarchy up to the top-level entity invoking the Path/Speed
Command supermode, which specifically includes the human crew.
Secondly, the certainty that violations of effectiveness will be correctly identified in every case must
be provided by a guarantee of logical completeness. The foundation for this logical completeness
has already been laid by the previous demonstration that no point exists in the flightpath-airspeed
plane that does not lie in one of the seven geometrical stability regions of figure 10. Therefore,
definition of effectiveness over all seven regions ensures logical completeness.
This statement of annunciation requirements completes the specification of effectiveness for the
Path/Speed Command supermode. In the next section, safety and effectiveness are combined to
define mode validity.
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MODE VALIDITY
Validity Concept
Definition
Validity is defined to hold when both safety and effectiveness requirements are satisfied; at least
partial effectiveness is required. Under this definition, invalid operation is inevitable if aircraft
performance limitations preclude even partial effectiveness. For example, because envelope protec-
tion modes sacrifice effectiveness in favor of safety, by definition they are invalid relative to the
purpose for which the Path/Speed Command mode is selected.
Validity Regions
With validity defined, the next task is to determine the regions of state space that correspond to valid
operation in each primitive mode, as suggested by Heymann (personal discussion). For the aircraft
longitudinal control problem considered here, the relevant state space is that of the two controlled
variables, that is, the (V, y) plane. To avoid an invalid mode transition, the transition boundary
between each pair of candidate modes must lie within the intersection of their regions of validity, as
explained by the previous discussion ("Introduction"). Furthermore, this condition must hold not-
withstanding the effect upon the shape of each validity region of external influences (such as wind
shear or engine failure) to which the hybrid system must react.
These regions of validity are determined in two stages. First, validity conditions for each primitive
mode are determined directly from their governing differential equations. Second, these validity
conditions are related to the geometrical stability regions studied previously (figs. 10 and 12).
Validity of y-V Command Mode
Condition on VTGT
The a priori safety requirement that prevailing airspeed remain within the limits VMIN < V < VMAX
imposes the same condition on the target airspeed:
VMIN < VTGT < VMAX	 (13a)
If the measured airspeed lies outside these safe envelope limits, envelope protection is invoked, as
described previously, but these envelope protection modes are not treated in detail by this report.
Thus for normal operation in the y-V Command mode in the absence of envelope protection, it
follows that both the target airspeed and the measured airspeed must lie within the safe envelope
limits.
Condition on VTGT
Similarly, the a priori safety requirement that the flightpath avoid penetration of the ysAFE boundary
imposes the same condition on the target flightpath:
yTGT ? ysAFE
	
(I 3b)
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If the measured flightpath penetrates the ysAFE boundary, envelope protection is invoked, as
described previously, but this envelope protection is not treated in detail by this report. Thus for
normal operation in the y-V Command mode in the absence of envelope protection, it follows that
the target flightpath and the measured flightpath must both lie within the safe envelope limit.
Condition on y
For validity of the y-V Command mode, thrust saturation must be avoided, as discussed previously.
Thus the condition TMIN < TREF < TMAx must hold (eq. (7d)). As shown by equations (1 lg) and
(1 1 h), this is equivalent to the condition
ySPEED MIN < y < ySPEED MAX
	 (14)
(To verify condition (14), substitute TREF from equation (7a), TMAx from equation (7f), and TMIN
from equation (7g) into the condition ( TMIN < TREF < TMAX), cancel the drag D, divide out the
weight W, and take inverse sines; then substitute the negations of conditions (1 1 g) and (1 1 h).)
The y-V Command mode is valid if and only if conditions (13a), (13b), and (14) hold.
Validity of V Command Mode
Condition on VTGT
In the V Command mode, the same validity condition on the target airspeed must hold as for the
y-V Command mode:
VMIN < VTGT < VMAX
	 (13a)
Condition on ySPEED
The safety condition (13b) is required to hold in general. In the V Command mode, however, yTGT is
replaced by YSPEED. Therefore, the a priori safety requirement that flightpath avoid penetration of the
ysAFE boundary imposes the same condition on ySPEED:
ySPEED > ysAFE
	 (15a)
It can be shown that the system to be developed makes no use of the V Command mode unless con-
dition (15a) holds, provided that aircraft performance is normal (that is, the condition (yPOT MAX ? 0)
holds). However, if aircraft performance is severely degraded (that is, if the condition (yPOT MAX < 0)
holds), then condition ( 15a) could be violated. In that case, no practical alternative exists that could
prevent enforcement of the condition (y >_ ysAFE) by invocation of descent path protection. Therefore,
condition (15a) is not required to hold for validity of the V Command mode.
Condition on PE (V)
The conditions discussed previously that determine the partial effectiveness of the V Command
mode can be summarized symbolically by the statement that, for validity of the V Command mode,
the property PE (V) must hold.
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Condition on YPOT TGT
As previously discussed, in the V Command mode the target thrust must be set to some physically
realizable value:
TMIN < TTGT < TMAX	 (15b)
This is equivalent to the condition
7 POTMIN <7 POT TGT <7 POT MAX	 (15c)
To verify condition (15c), substitute TTGT from equation (8b), TMAX from equation (7f), and TMIN
from equation (7g) into condition (15b), cancel the drag D, divide out the weight W, and take
Inverse sines.
Path/Speed Priority
As previously discussed, for validity of the V Command mode, the path/speed priority must give
priority to speed:
PRIORITY ° SPEED
	 (15d)
As previously discussed, normal effectiveness of the V Command mode applies only to capture of
airspeed, for which it always holds. Therefore, no evaluation of normal effectiveness is required in
the V Command mode. The V Command mode is valid if and only if conditions (13a), (13b), (15c),
and (15d) hold, and partial effectiveness PE (V) holds.
Validity of (Command Mode
Condition on VTGT
In the 7 Command mode, the same validity condition on the target airspeed must hold as for the
7-V Command mode and the V Command mode:
VMIN < VTGT G VMAX
	 (13a)
Condition on YTGT
In the 7 Command mode, the same validity condition on the target flightpath (eq. (13b)) must hold as
for the y-V Command mode and the V Command mode:
7 TGT 7SAFE
	 (13b)
Condition on PE(y)
The conditions discussed previously that determine the partial effectiveness of the y Command mode
can be summarized symbolically by the statement that, for validity of the y Command mode, the
property PE (y) must hold.
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For validity of the y Command mode, the normal effectiveness property NE is not required to hold,
as noted previously, but violations must be annunciated as required.
Condition on 'POT TGT
In the 7 Command mode, the requirement that the target thrust be physically realizable imposes the
same condition (eq. (15c)) on YPOT TGT as for the V Command mode:
7 POT MIN 
< y 
POT TGT G y POT MAX
	 (15c)
Path/Speed Priority
As previously discussed, for validity of the y Command mode, the path/speed priority must give
priority to path:
PRIORITY = PATH	 (16)
They Command mode is valid if and only if conditions (13a), (13b), (15c) and (16) hold, and partial
effectiveness PE (y) holds.
Summary of Validity Conditions
Collecting results, the validity conditions for all three primitive control modes are summarized by
table 2.
Geometrical Regions for Mode Validity
With qualifications to be pointed out, the validity conditions summarized by table 2 are simply
related to the geometrical regions of the flightpath-airspeed plane illustrated by figures 10, 12, and
13, which were discussed previously. The two upper rows of table 2 show that the validity condi-
tions of the target point ( VT(;T, YTGT) apply to all three of the primitive modes. For validity, the target
point must lie in region 1. 11. 111. IV, or V (fig. 10); it cannot lie in region VI or VII, nor below the
YSAFE boundary (fig. 13). Additional requirements are as follows.
1- V Command mode— For validity of the y-V Command mode (first column of table 2), the instan-
taneous operating point (V, y) must lie within the central hatched region of figure 12(a), within
which the condition (ysPEED MIN < Y ^ YSPEEU MAX) holds and thrust saturation is therefore absent.
V Command mode— For validity of the V Command mode (second column of table 2), the thrust
target YPOTTGT must lie within region i or on its boundary (fig. 10(b)), and priority must be set to
SPEED (not illustrated).
Furthermore, PE (V) is required to hold. The definition of PE (V) (table 2) shows that its truth value
depends on P, Q, and YPOTTGT• 1 f yPOTTGT is set equal to 7POTMAX, then the condition PE (V) = NOT Q
holds, restricting yTGT to lie above the YSPEED MIN contour (fig. 12(b)), as previously noted. If 7POTTGT
is set equal to YPOT MIN, then PE (V) = NOT P holds, restricting 7TG ;T to lie below the ysPEED MAX con-
tour (fig. 12(b)), as previously noted. If 7POT TGT is set to some intermediate thrust level, then
PE (V) = NOT P NOT Q holds, restricting 7TG ;T to lie within the central hatched region of figure 12(b),
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TABLE 2. VALIDITY CONDITIONS FOR PRIMITIVE MODES
'y V Command V Command y Command
VTGT VMIN < VTGT < VMAX
'frG'I' YTGT ^! YSAFE
PE(V), PE(V) PE (y)
PE (y)
y Y > YSITI I) MIN
OR YPOT MIN < YPOT TGT	 YPOT MAX
'y,>o r'rG'r Y ^ yPi i n ^I ^^
PRIORITY SPEED PATH
DEFINITIONS:
PE (V) = NOT [P AND (11,,,1 H I	 YPOI MAX)] AND NOT [Q AND (YPOTTGT $ YPOT MIN)]
PE (Y) — (YTGT C YPOT M \\^ t )It (` > V MIN DRAG) OR (Y ^ YSPEED MAX)
NOT PE (y) = (yTGT	 I \I \0	 (V < V MIN DRAG) AND (y > YSPEED MAX)
P — YTGT	 YSPEED M:1X	 Q— YIYT	 YSPI{ED MIN
as previously noted. BeCILISe 1Or \Aidity yPOTTGT is required to be physically realizable (fourth row
of table 2), there are no other ca NeN in which PE (V) holds.
y Command mode— For vandll\ Ot' the y Command mode (third column of table 2), the thrust target
yPOTTGT must lie within reg ion I or on its boundary (fig. 10(c)), and priority must be set to PATH (not
illustrated).
Furthermore, PE (y) is required to held. For simplicity, the region is determined within which PE (y)
is violated (that is, within vv hlch \O I PE (y) holds). The definition of NOT PE (y) (table 2) shows
that its truth value depends on y,,, 1 . V. and y. It follows from the definition of NOT PE (y) that, if
NOT PE (y) holds, then the conditions (y161 ? 7POT MAX) and (V 5 VMIN DRAG) must hold, that is, the
point (V, yT(; T) must lie vv ithin region V or oil 	 boundary (fig. 12(c)).
Conversely, assume that the point 	 yr(;T) lies within region V or on its boundary, so that the
conditions (yT(;T ? 'YPOT M \\) and (\' <_ V MIN DRAG) hold. Then for the usual case illustrated by
figure 12 in which the condition (VI(; I > V MIN DRA() holds, (V S VTGT) must hold. In that case,
(YPOT MAX > YSPEED MAX) holds h\ the definition Of YSPEED MAX . But because (yTGT ^! YPOT MAX) holds
by assumption, the condition (yl(, ? YSPEED MAX) must hold. Because path capture takes place
rapidly, as explained previouSl y , the analysis can be simplified further by examining thrust satura-
tion only after path capture is complete (that is, after y becomes equal to yTGT). The condition
(yTGT ? YSPEED MAX) is then equi\ alert to the condition ( y >— ySPEED MAX ), so the conditions
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(7TGT ^! YPOT MAX), ( V< VMIN DRAG), and (y ^! YSPEED MAX) must all hold. It then follows from its
definition that NOT PE (y) holds.
This simplified analysis shows that PE (y) is violated if and only if the point (V, YTGT) lies within
region V or on its boundary ( fig. 12(c)); in regions I, 11, 111, and IV, PE (y) holds.
SYNTHESIS OF PATH/SPEED COMMAND SUPERMODE
The Synthesis Problem
The mode validity conditions summarized by table 2 complete the formulation of the synthesis
problem (see the section "Overview of Design Method," steps 1-8). Its solution ( see the section
"Overview of Design Method," steps 9-15) requires that mode control logic for the Path/Speed
Command supermode be synthesized in such a way that the required safety and effectiveness
properties are established by construction.
As already noted, no general theoretical method is known for synthesizing such a hybrid system so
as to ensure that its dynamical behavior meets requirements specified a priori. The behavior of such
systems is usually assessed by simulation, but this is a logically incomplete process that cannot
achieve formal verification or validation, as noted previously. In this section, a new method is pre-
sented for solution of the synthesis problem formulated by the discussion leading to the validity
conditions of table 2. The first step toward synthesis of the required mode control logic is the inver-
sion of table 2, interchanging its arguments with tabulated quantities.
Table 2 specifies the validity of each of the three primitive longitudinal control modes as a function
of the truth values of logical conditions that depend on flightpath, airspeed, and thrust targets, on
measured flightpath and airspeed, and on the path/speed priority parameter. In principle, what is
needed for selection of a primitive mode is an inverted table (that is, a truth table for table 2) that
shows, for each combination of logical conditions, which modes ( if any) are valid, and which viola-
tions of effectiveness require annunciation to higher levels of the mode hierarchy. However, a naive
attempt to construct such an inverted table by means of brute -force enumeration would lead to a
combinatorial explosion of cases, as the following analysis shows.
Naive Inversion
After separating the validity conditions of table 2 into binary logical propositions that are either true
or false, it is found that there are 5 binary conditions that determine the validity of the y -V Command
mode (first column of table 2), 7 binary conditions that determine the validity of the V Command
mode (second column), and 7 binary conditions that determine the validity of the y Command mode
(third column). If these binary conditions were all independent, there would be 2 5 = 32 combinations
of conditions requiring evaluation for assessment of the validity of the y-V Command mode, 2' = 128
combinations for the V Command mode, and 2 7 = 128 combinations for they Command mode.
After accounting for duplication of conditions between columns, it is found that there are actually
10 independent binary conditions in table 2. It follows that, for assessment of the validity of all three
primitive modes by inversion of the whole table, there would be 2 10 = 1024 combinations requiring
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enumeration. Furthermore, a mode selection policy would have to be formulated specifying a unique
mode selection for each of these 1024 combinations. Therefore, it must be expected that a naive,
brute-force approach based on enumeration of all cases would be found intractably complex.
Nevertheless, the inversion problem can be made tractable by developing heuristic design strategies
that enable partitioning of the table before inversion. This partitioning process bears a rough analogy
to matrix inversion, which can often be simplified by partitioning the original matrix, inverting the
partitioned elements, and re-assembling the results. To facilitate this development, it is convenient to
express the validity conditions in terms of symbolic logic.
Symbolic Logic
Readers unfamiliar with formal logic would no doubt find unintelligible the summary statement that
logical simplification ofcompoznld logical propositions formed by conjunction and disjunction of
Boolean variables is to be accomplished by application of elementary logical theorems established
by perfect induction based on truth tables, leading to results expressed in the form of condition-
action decision tables and statecharts characterized by logical consistency and completeness. Yet
the solution of the synthesis problem to be described depends vitally on use of the tools of formal
logic, in contrast to the formulation of the synthesis problem just completed, which has depended on
continuous mathematics and on aeronautical knowledge. It is clear that solution of the synthesis
problem will require a significant change in the reader's orientation, a mental "shifting of gears."
Fortunately, only knowledge of elementary formal logic (on the level of an introductory course) is
needed for the developments to follow.
At this point of the discussion, readers should refer to appendix D, which presents a brief tutorial
review of elementary propositional logic, and to appendix E, which discusses its application to real-
time computation within embedded systems. Familiarity with this background material is assumed in
what follows, with specific references provided as necessary. In particular, appendix D contains a
reference list of theorems in symbolic logic that are useful for simplifying compound logical prop-
ositions such as those in table 2; extensive use is made of these elementary theorems (Dromey,
1989; Bartee, 1985).
Expression of Validity Conditions by Symbolic Logic
Logical Notation
To express the validity conditions concisely, each validity condition is symbolized by a binary
logical proposition denoted by an upper-case letter and number. For example, the validity condition
( VTGT < V MiN) is denoted by the symbol VT1, and the validity condition ( VTGT > VMAx) is denoted
by the symbol VT2; mnemonically, VT2 is the second condition imposed on the Velocity Target,
and GT6 is the sixth condition imposed on the Gamma Target.
For typographical convenience, logical relationships between these propositions are denoted by the
following symbols:
Equivalence =	 Negation	 ^	 Implication	 =>
Logical OR	 v	 Logical AND will be omitted
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VTI = (V < V )TGT	 MIN VT2 = (V > V )TGT	 MAX
GTI = (7TGT < 7 SAFF 1 GT6 = (7TGT > 7 POT MAX)
For example, the logical proposition "p implies q" is expressed symbolically as p => q, and its
negation is expressed as -, (p => q). Similarly, the proposition "p OR q" is expressed as p u q, and
the proposition "p AND q" is expressed as p q.
Symbolic Logical Propositions
The validity conditions oftable 2 are expressed symbolically, using the following notation to
separate the conditions into binary form:
V I = ( V< VMIN DRAG)
Q - ( 7TGT < 7SPG11) NI I\ I	 P - (7 TGT > y SPEED MAX)
T S I = (Y Y SPLLD MIN ) - ( POT REF < y POT MIN)
TS-1 = (7 1 SLh11)MAX ) (7 POTREF > 7POTMAX)
TTI =- (y
	 =Y P()I \11\)
	
TT2 = (y POT TGT = 7POT MAX)
TT3 = (7POTTGT < Y Pt,I \III )
	 TT4 = (7 POTTGT > 7 POT MAX)
APP = ( PRIORITY SPi•.LD)	 PP = ( PRIORITY = PATH)
PFI - (y POTMAX -y POT MIN )
A complete list of symbolic log ical propositions can be found in the section "List of Symbols."
Symbolic Validity Conditions
Making use of these binary propositions. the validity conditions of table 2 can be expressed in
symbolic form by table 3.
Conjunction of Symbolic Validity Conditions
Inspection of table 3 shows that, by col joining the validity conditions for each of the three primitive
modes, these conditions can be summarized compactly as follows:
y-V Command mode:
PVT I —,VT2 SGT I	 Safe envelope limits
AND
STS 1 --,TS2	 Absence of thrust saturation
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V Command mode:
PVT 1 -,VT2 SGT 1
AND
—,PP
AND
PE(V)
y Command mode:
--,VTI --,VT2 —,GTI
AND
PP
AND
PE(y)
Safe envelope limits
Speed priority
Partial effectiveness of V Command mode
Safe envelope limits
Path priority
Partial effectiveness of y Command mode
The condition that the thrust target be physically realizable is satisfied by the heuristic strategy to be
discussed next. For simplicity, it is not included in this summary.
TABLE 3. SYMBOLIC VALIDITY CONDITIONS
y-V Command V Command y Command
VTGT -,VT I --,VT2
yrGT SGT 1
PE(V), PE(y) PE(V) PE(y)
Y OR yPOT TGT STS 1	 TS2 --,TT3	 —,TT4
PRIORITY =PP PP
DEFINITIONS:
PE (V) = ^[P AND (yPOT TGT # YPOT MAX)] AND	 [Q AND (yPOT TGT # YPOT MIN)l
PE (y) = (GT6 V I TS2)
APE (y) = (GT6 V 1 TS2)
P - (YTGT	 ySP) IiD MAX )	Q - (yTGT G 7SPEED MIN)
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Heuristic Design Strategies
As the first step toward partitioning the validity table (table 3) to simplify inversion, a heuristic
strategy is developed that ensures that the safety conditions
-,VTI 
= (VTGT > VMIN)	 —,VT2 — (V TGT  < VMAX) 	 ---,GTI = (7TGT > 7SAFE )
are satisfied by screening the target airspeed VTGT and the target flightpath VTGT at the system input.
Target Screening
According to table 3, the validity conditions PVT 1, --,VT2, and SGT 1 are required for all three
primitive modes. The compound condition (PVT I ^VT2 SGT 1) can be established by screening
the flightpath and airspeed targets before initial mode engagement and whenever the safe envelope
llmrts V MIN, VMAX, or YSAFI are changed. The rationale for target screening is that allowing system
operation with invalid targets is nonsensical.
Although continuous screening is necessary in practice to account for changing aircraft performance,
the flightpath and airspeed targets must not be changed after initial engagement without pilot con-
sent. Since the first-level Path/Speed Command supermode has no direct interface with the human
crew, the need for such target changes must be annunciated to the invoking entity, which must then
obtain pilot consent. The screening logic is specified by the following condition-action decision
table (appendix D):
Table 4 shows that the safety conditions
-,VT1 = (VTGT > VMIN)	 ^VT2 — (VTGT C VMAX)	 ^GTI = (7TGT > 7SAFE)
must hold after the screening process is complete. Therefore, the effect of the target screening
strategy is the effective removal of those conditions from the validity table, because a condition
known to hold can be dropped from the conjunction of conditions (Theorem 13, appendix D).
TABLE 4. TARGET SCREENING STRATEGY FOR PATH/SPEED COMMAND SUPERMODE
VTGT ^ V MIN VTCI :> VMAX VMIN :5 VTGT :!^ VMAX Y1'G-I :^ YSAFE YFGT^! YSAFE
Set VTGT equal to
VMIN
Set VTGT equal to
VMAX
Accept V T(;T Set VTGT equal to
YSAFE
Accept 'VTGT
Unsaturated Thrust
After the safety conditions just discussed have been removed from the validity table (table 3) by
target screening, it can be seen that in the absence of thrust saturation (that is, if the condition
STS 1 -,TS2 holds), the 7-V Command mode is valid. In that case, it should be selected.
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The rationale for this mode selection strategy is that it maximizes system effectiveness. The
T-V Command mode provides complete effectiveness (that is, capture of both the flightpath target
and the airspeed target), whereas either of the other two primitive modes could, at best, provide
partial effectiveness (that is, capture of one of these targets, but not both). Logically, control of both
path and speed dominates control of only one of them.
This heuristic decision to select the T-V Command mode when thrust is unsaturated removes the first
column from the validity table (table 3), leaving selection of either the V Command mode or the
yCommand mode as the only remaining possibilities. The same decision also removes the condition
('/POT MIN ^ TPOTTGT -`^ TPOT MAX) for absence of thrust saturation from the second and third columns,
leaving only the two possibilities
T I = ( 71 10T TGT — TPOT MIN) OR TT2 = (TPOT TGT — TPOT MAX)
The definition of PE (V) can now be simplified as follows:
PE (V) = ^(P TTl) ^(Q TT2)
The following heuristic strategy for setting the target thrust TPOT TGT determines which of the two
possible thrust settings TTI or TT2 is appropriate for operation in the V Command mode and the
T Command mode.
Target Thrust
When thrust is saturated, the thrust target should be set so as to provide the best physically realizable
approximation to the reference thrust TPOT REF . Therefore, the target thrust should be set to TPOT MIN
when the thrust saturation condition TSI = (TPOT REF < TPOT MIN) holds, and to TPOT MAX when the
condition TS2 = (TPOT RH ? TPW MAX) holds.
When thrust is unsaturated, the y-V Command mode is selected, as already noted. In that case, the
fixed target thrust is not used by the automated system, because it is used only when either the
V Command mode or the y Command mode is selected. However, it is convenient to set the target
thrust as it would be set by the best approximation rule just described, if thrust saturation resulted
from capture of the flightpath target YTGT. This strategy avoids unnecessary violation of the partial
effectiveness of the V Command mode by updating the target thrust appropriately whenever possi-
ble. In the absence of total propulsion failure ( that is, when the condition ^PF 1 holds), maximum
thrust remains comp >_Itationally distinct from minimum thrust. The complete strategy for setting
target thrust is specitied by the following condition-action decision table (table 5):
TABLE 5. STRATEGY FOR SETTING TARGET THRUST
PF1	 PF1
TS1	 TS2	 --,TS1 —,TS2
QP	 —, P —IQ
Set	 Set	 Set	 Set	 Set	 yPOT TGT
TT l	 TT l	 TT2
	
TT I	 TT2	 not
TRUE ;	 TRUE ;	 TRUE ;	 TRUE ;	 TRUE ;	 updated
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If the condition -,PFI -,TS I —,TS2 --,P  —Q holds, table 5 shows that the thrust target 7POT TGT is
not updated. in that case, the thrust target is not used by the flight control system. if the condition
--,PFi -,TSI -,TS2 ^P -,Q holds during initialization, the thrust target 7POTTCT is initialized
arbitrarily to 7POT MIN.
Because it ensures that the physical realizabiIity conditions -- 'TT3 = (yPOT TGT ? 7POT MiN) and
--,TT4 = (7POT TcT < 7POT MAX) hold, the strategy for setting target thrust effectively removes them
from the mode validity table (table 3).
Partitioning and Inversion of Validity Table
Partitioning
With the safety conditions (first two rows of table 3) removed by target screening, the first column
removed by selection of the 7-V Command mode when thrust is unsaturated, and the conditions
-,TT3 and -,TT4 (fourth row) removed by the strategy for setting target thrust, the validity table
(table 3) has been greatly simplified by this partitioning. The reduced table that remains when thrust
is saturated is now as follows:
V Command y Command
Partial Effectiveness
PRIORITY
PE (V)
=PP
PE (y)
PP
Inversion
This reduced table can now be inverted by inspection. Only three binary conditions remain: PE (V),
PE (7), and PRIORITY. Therefore, there are 2 3 = 8 combinations, which can be arranged as an
enumerated list with 8 rows. This enumerated list forms the inverted decision table (table 6) that
constitutes the solution to the mode selection problem when thrust is saturated; that is, table 6 is a
truth table (appendix D) for the reduced validity table just discussed.
For each of these 8 combinations, a unique mode selection policy must be formulated_ It can be seen
that, in half the cases enumerated in table 6, neither the V Command mode nor the y Command
mode is valid. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, one of these modes must be selected. The next
section turns to a discussion of mode selection criteria.
Mode Selection Criteria
III
	
3, 4, 6, and 8, one of the two modes is valid and the other invalid. Therefore, the mode
selection strategy can be based entirely on validity, and consists simply of avoiding the selection
of an invalid mode. In cases I and 5, the condition -,PE (V) APE (y) holds, so that neither the
V Command mode nor the 'y Command mode is valid (table 3). Because partial effectiveness does
not provide a basis for choice, mode selection must be based on priority, selecting the V Command
mode when priority is set to SPEED (case 1), and selecting the y Command mode when priority is set
to PATH (case 5). This strategy makes use of control flowing down from higher level, but it leaves
cases 2 and 7 unresolved.
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TABLE 6. INVERTED VALIDITY TABLE FOR PATH/SPEED COMMAND SUPERMODE
Condition V Command y Command
1. SPEED -APE (V) APE (y) INVALID INVALID
2. SPEED APE (V) PE (y) INVALID INVALID
3. SPEED PE (V) APE (y) VALID INVALID
4. SPEED PE (V) PE (y) VALID INVALID
5. PATH APE (V) —,PE (y) INVALID INVALID
6. PATH -,PE (V) PE (y) INVALID VALID
7. PATH PE (V) APE (y) INVALID INVALID
8. PATH PE (V) PE (y) INVALID VALID
In both cases 2 and 7, the selection could be based on partial effectiveness if the priority were
changed; that is, there is logical conflict between priority set at higher level and the relevant infor-
mation available at the primitive level based on partial effectiveness. In cases I and 5, where the
condition -,PE (V) APE (y) holds and neither mode is valid, it is clear that the dilemma must be
resolved at higher level by the invoking entity, because no relevant information is available within
the Path/Speed Command supermode. In cases 2 and 7 relevant information is available, but that
information is in conflict with the priority specified by the invoking entity. Therefore, because the
relevant information available is insufficient to resolve the conflict, the strategy should be the same
for cases 2 and 7 as for cases 1 and 5: base mode selection entirely on priority, and annunciate rele-
vant information based on effectiveness violation to the invoking entity for resolution there. This
strategy leads to the selection of the V Command mode in case 2, where priority is set to SPEED, and
to selection of the y Command mode in case 7, where the priority is set to PATH. With this system
structure, annunciation of the condition ^PE(V) -,PE(y) to the invoking entity constitutes informa-
tion flowing upward, and the path/speed priority constitutes control flowing downward. The decision
determining priority should be made at the lowest level within the control hierarchy at which suffi-
cient information is available.
With the adoption of this policy, which bases mode selection at the primitive level entirely on
priority when thrust is saturated, partial effectiveness becomes nonrelevant for the selection strategy,
and mode selection based on table 6 when thrust is saturated collapses to the following drastically
reduced table:
Condition V Command y Command
APP
PP
TRUE
TRUE
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Integrated Mode Selection Strategy
When the mode selection strategy for thrust saturation is combined with that for unsaturated thrust
discussed previously, the complete mode selection table for the Path/Speed Command supermode is
obtained (table 7):
TABLE 7. MODE SELECTION WITHIN PATH/SPEED COMMAND SUPERMODE
Condition y-V Command V Command y Command
--,TS1 —,TS2
--------------
TS1 u TS2
TRUE
--------------- -------------------------------
TRUE
—1PP
--------------
PP
TRUE
--------------------------------
TRUE
Definitions
STS 1 -,TS2: Thrust unsaturated 	 TS I u TS2:	 Thrust saturated
PP:	 SPEED priority	 PP:	 PATH priority
In this condition-action mode selection table (appendix D), each column of the table corresponds to
a single mode, and each row corresponds to a logical condition. The conditions that must hold for
selection of any mode are designated by the entry TRUE in the body of the table in the column
corresponding to that mode. For example, for selection of the V Command mode, the conditions
APP and TS I u TS2 must hold, as indicated by the entry TRUE in the second and third rows of
the second column. Blank spaces in the body of the table are not relevant to mode selection
(appendix D).
The mode selection strategy specified by table 7 constitutes the solution of the synthesis problem for
the Path/Speed Command supermode. An alternative form of specification for this mode selection
strategy can be obtained by constructing the equivalent statechart (appendix E), which is discussed
next.
Construction of Statechart
Mode Structure
To enable the state chart for mode selection to reflect the same partitioning that is evident in the
decision table (table 7), it is convenient to combine the V Command mode and the 7 Command
mode to form a supermode that is termed 7 O V Command. The statechart for mode selection 111us-
trated by figure 15 call 	 be constructed directly from table 7, as explained next. A simplified
discussion of statecharts can be found in appendix E.
Statechart for Mode Selection
Because the 7-V Command mode is selected according to table 7 whenever the condition
-,TS i TS2 holds, whatever the previous state, a transition arrow labeled with the condition
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STS 1 -,TS2 must lead to the y-V Command mode from they OR V Command supermode, and a
second arrow labeled -,TS 1 TS2 must lead to the y-V Command mode from the initial state outside
the Path/Speed Command supermwde boundary (fig. 15). Similarly, a transition arrow labeled with
the condition TS I v TS2 must lead to the y OR V Command supermode from the y-V Command
mode. Within the y OR V Command supermode, a transition arrow labeled with the condition PP
must lead from the V Command mode to the y Command mode, an arrow labeled with the condition
-,PP must lead from the y Command mode to the V Command mode, and similarly for initialization.
Statechart for Setting Target Thrust
The strategy for setting target thrust (table 5) can be represented as a concurrent state machine
within the Path/Speed Command supermode (fig. 15) by following a similar construction method.
It can be seen that the case in \\ hich the condition ^PF I -,TS 1 TS2 -,P --,Q holds, for which the
target thrust is not updated (tahle 5), is represented in the statechart by transition arrows that return
to the previous state.
Other Statecharts
The diagram of figure 15 also sho p\ s that the strategy for target screening and for evaluation of the
conditions APE (V), APE (y). and NE call also be represented as concurrent state machines within
the Path/Speed Command supernnlde. Their internal details, which are omitted from figure 15, are
specified for target screening,
 h\ tahle -t. and for effectiveness evaluation by the definitions of
APE (V), -,PE (y), and NE di ,,cu»ed previously.
Initial state	 Initial state
PATH/SPEED COMMAND
,PF1
MODE SELECTION I	 THRUST	 PF1
,TS1	 -V COMMAND	 TS2	
,PF
,TS2
	
	
TS1
TGTI
II TMAX 	 P TMINI
F ^\	 (	 ( TS1 U TS2	 I ,TS1
'for V COMMANL) ,TS2
,PP
,PP	 PP	 APP
/COMMAND
,I
TT2	 -PFI ,TS1 ,TS2 TT1
I Q
QI TS1 ,PF1I Q	 ,PF1
,PF1PF1
,TS1 ,TS2
1p-Q
,TS1 ,TS2
I
,P,Q
— — — — — —
I
I — —	 — — — i	 —
SCREEN V TGT	 I
I	 I
SCREEN vTGT
I	 I
-- - - - - -	
- - - - - 
-r- - - - - - -
 EVAL PE V EVAL PE a I	 EVAL NE
I I
I
I
I
I	 /
,PF1
,TS1
,TS2
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Statechart for Path/Speed Command Supermode
Figure 15 shows that the statecharts for all the concurrent state machines just described are com-
bined to form the statechart for the Path/Speed Command supermode. The resulting state machine
could, of course, also be specified in final form by table 7. Indeed, such decision tables may be
preferred to their equivalent statecharts for some purposes, such as providing a reference document
that can conveniently be reproduced.
However, the statechart of figure 15 provides a compact representation that is graphically suggestive
of the dynamical function of the state machine, and may be preferred to equivalent decision tables
for tutorial purposes after the interpretation of statecharts becomes familiar. Statecharts also facili-
tate verification of the essential logical properties of consistency and completeness.
Verification of Consistency and Completeness
Mode selection would be logicall y inconsistent it two or more transition arrows leading away from
any mode were labeled with the same condition. In that case, mode selection would be ambiguous
and would fail to be mutually exclusive, because two or more modes could be selected at the same
time.
Mode selection would be logically incomplete if any combination of conditions could occur for
which no transition is specified. In the statechart diagrams, clutter can be reduced by adopting the
convention that. in the absence of any defined transition away from each mode, the system remains
in that mode by default. If this convention is adopted, completeness can no longer be assessed
directly by inspection of the diagram, and must therefore be verified independently.
For a decision table, consistency would be violated if any two columns of the table contained the
same pattern of truth conditions, and completeness would be violated if the disjunction of truth
conditions involving each tested quantity failed to hold tautologically (appendix D). For example, in
table 7 there are two conditions involving TS I and TS2. Because the condition TS i v TS2 is logi-
cally equivalent to the negation of the condition STS 1 TS2 (Theorem 11, appendix D), their junc-
tion (TS l v TS2) v (STS 1 -,TS2) is tautologically true (Theorem 4, appendix D). Therefore,
table 7 is logically complete with respect to the conditions TS 1 and TS2. Evaluation of complex
decision tables for consistency and completeness is accomplished in practice by means of utility
programs developed for that purpose.
Implementation
A more subtle point regarding statechart representation arises during implementation. Conceptually,
the concurrency specified by the statechart of figure 15 could be realized by 7 processors (one for
each concurrent machine) operating in parallel, each executing a re-entrant program that would
repeat continuously. Such a system cannot be implemented exactly by a single sequential processor,
because such a processor can execute only one instruction at a time. Therefore, certain temporal
approximations must be made during implementation for sequential machines like those installed in
current transport aircraft. In consequence, the specification provided by the statechart of figure 15
must be regarded as ambiguous or incomplete for such implementations.
These issues are discussed in detail in appendix E, in which certain changes to standard statechart
semantics are proposed that enable exact implementation within a sequential processor, eliminating
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the need for introduction of temporal approximations during implementation. Such temporal approx-
imations could be a source of design error that could void the behavioral guarantees on which formal
validation depends. The same difficulties would, of course, be encountered during implementation
from equivalent decision tables. However, based on experience with implementation of similar sys-
tems for state estimation and flight control in experimental aircraft for which timing could be criti-
cal, the authors are of the opinion that statecharts offer unique clarity for understanding and solving
such problems.
System Properties for Path/Speed Command Supermode
Geometrical Regions for Mode Selection
For the system specified by the statechart of figure 15, selection of the y-V Command mode or the
y OR V Command supermode is determined entirely by the thrust saturation conditions
	
TSI 
—(7 POT
 
RI:F 
G y
POT MIN)	 TS2 — (7 POT REF j 7 POT MAX)
which, as already noted, are equivalent to the conditions
	
TSI = (7< ySPEED MIN )	 TS2 (y >_ 7SPEED MAX)
These conditions are physical, and correspond to well-defined geometrical regions within the (V, y)
plane, as discussed previously (fig. 12). Therefore, each region can be identified by the correspond-
ing mode, as illustrated by figure 16. It can be seen that the y-V Command mode is selected when
the (V, y) operating point lies within the central region within which thrust saturation is absent, and
the yOR V Command supermode is selected elsewhere. (Within they OR V Command supermode,
the V Command mode is selected when priority is set to SPEED, and the y Command mode is selec-
ted when priority is set to PATH; these selections are not illustrated by figure 16.)
y or V COMMAND	
YSPEED MAX
Tor V COMMAND
V MIN	 VTGT	 VMAX
Airspeed —►
Figure 16. Geometric regions for mode selection within Path/Speed Command supermode.
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Safety Properties
During operation in the Path/Speed Command supermode, the safety properties discussed previously
are enforced by screening the targets at the system input, as specified by table 4, and by the envelope
protection modes previously described. Therefore, the system behavior is constrained to respect the
safety envelope boundaries illustrated by figure 13. Invocation of any envelope protection mode,
which should occur only under abnormal conditions, is required to be annunciated by a suitable
warning.
Effectiveness Properties
During operation in the Path,'Speed Command supermode, the effectiveness of system behavior is
summarized as follows:
7 V Command mode- During operation in the y-V Command mode, capture of both the flightpath
target and the airspeed target are assured by the stability properties of the path and speed regulators
within the flight control system (fi gs.  I I (c) and 11(e)). Therefore, as defined previously, the
y-V Command mode is completely effective.
V Command mode- Durinu operation in the V Command mode, capture of the airspeed target VTCT
is assured by the stability property ol' the speed regulator within the flight control system (fig. i i (c)).
The flightpath angle ysp l :,:, ) is raptured. which provides an acceptable approximation to the flightpath
target yTCT provided that partial effectiveness (that is, PE (V)) holds for the V Command mode.
yCommand mode- Dunn_, operation in the yCommand mode, capture of the flightpath target yrcT
is assured by the stabilit y propert y of the path regulator within the flight control system (fig. 1 1(e)).
The airspeed target VTR 1 is not captured. but an acceptable point of stable airspeed equilibrium is
reached provided that partial cffecti\cness (PE (y)) holds for the'yCommand mode.
Longitudinal acceleration has the correct sign leading to capture of the airspeed target VTCT provided
that the normal effectiveness properties NEI and NE2 hold. Violation of NE1 results in the annunci-
ation "More drag," and violation of' NE2 results in the annunciation "More thrust."
Required annunciations- All effectiveness violations must be annunciated to the human crew, and
also to the invoking entity. Assurance that all such violations will be identified and annunciated as
required is provided by log ical completeness based on the geometrical regions discussed previously.
Concluding Remarks
The simplicity of the final mode selection strategy for the Path/Speed Command supermode, which
is specified by table 7, stands in ,harp contrast to the complexity of the table that would result from
brute-force inversion of table 	 \y hich as noted previously would contain 1024 rows.
It should be noted that the Path/Speed Command supermode does not constitute a complete automa-
ton, because the essential path/speed priority must be determined by the invoking entity (that is, a
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second-level supermode), accounting for all relevant information available at higher level. The
means by which that determination is accomplished is discussed in the next section, which describes
a supermode on the second level of the mode hierarchy.
SYNTHESIS OF ALTITUDE COMMAND SUPERMODE
In order to extend the synthesis method to higher level and to develop a system that constitutes a
complete automaton, this section discusses the synthesis of a second-level supermode to be termed
Altitude Command. Its development makes use of the same methodology employed for synthesis
of the Path/Speed Command supermode already described (see the section "Overview of Design
Method," steps 1-15). The Path/Speed Command supermode, which lies on the lowest level of the
three-level mode hierarchy, accepts flightpath angle and airspeed targets, as explained previously.
The Altitude Command supermode, which lies on the second level of the mode hierarchy, makes use
of the first-level Path/Speed Command supermode as an internal element, but generalizes its func-
tion to enable the system to accept altitude and airspeed targets. These targets can be entered
manually by the crew, providing operation functionally similar to that of the Flight Level Change
supermode in the autoflight systems of current transport aircraft.
Alternatively, the Altitude Command supermode can be invoked, and its altitude and airspeed
targets can be specified, by a supermode on the third level of the mode hierarchy. By this means,
operation similar to that of the vertical planning and guidance modes in current aircraft can be
provided, while avoiding functional duplication.
In general. it must be expected that moving upward to a higher level in the mode hierarchy will
involve consideration of new supermodes, each of which constitutes a hybrid system whose
continuous and discrete elements must both be specified. This is the case for the second-level
Altitude Command supermode, just as it is for the first-level Path/Speed Command supermode
discussed previously. For the Altitude Command supermode, there is only one continuous element:
the function of altitude regulation, which is described next.
Altitude Regulation
Because the aircraft altitude is governed by a differential equation, the aircraft model described
previously (eqs. (1), (2), and (4)) must be augmented by the altitude equation
DH/dt = V sin y
where the symbol H denotes height above mean sea level. In the flight control system illustrated by
figure I I, the height regulator is shown on the left of the broken line in figure 1 I (a) that separates
the Altitude Command supermode (outer-loop control) from the Path/Speed Command supermode
(inner-loop control). Its details are illustrated by figure 11(b).
Figure 1 1(b) shows that the height regulator combines two different height regulation laws. For
small height errors of 300 ft or less, the commanded vertical velocity (dH/dt) CMD is linearly propor-
tional to the height error AH, providing exponential convergence to the target altitude (lower row of
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diagram, figure 1 1(b)). For larger height errors, a parabolic law (upper row of figure 1 I (b)) is used
to obtain constant normal acceleration (approximately 0.1g) during the altitude capture maneuver,
avoiding excessive normal accelerations that would be commanded if the exponential law were used
for large height errors.
Because both the vertical velocity and the normal acceleration commanded by the parabolic law are
matched to those commanded by the exponential law at the point of transition, the commanded
vertical velocity (dH/dt)c MD is specified uniquely and continuously as a function of altitude error. It
is then divided by inertial speed to obtain the quantity sin yTCT, which is limited to ensure realizabil-
ity before inverting to obtain the flightpath target yTGT (fig. I I (b)).
Mode Structure
In order to relate the function of the Altitude Command supermode directly to the pilot's task during
operation within the National Airspace System, four mode elements termed Climb, Descend, Alti-
tude Capture, and Altitude Hold are specified as internal elements of the Altitude Command super-
mode. Each of these four modes contains the Path/Speed Command supermode as an internal
element. It may be recalled from the previous discussion that the Path/Speed Command supermode
contains the primitive modes y-V Command, V Command, and y Command as internal elements.
The Altitude Capture, Altitude Hold, Climb, and Descend modes are related to each other and to the
height regulator law in the following way.
Altitude Capture and Altitude Hold Modes
For altitude errors smaller than 300 ft, the height regulator makes use of the exponential law, as
already described. This exponential law corresponds to the Altitude Hold mode. For larger altitude
errors, the height regulator uses the parabolic law, which corresponds to the Altitude Capture mode.
In either the Altitude Capture or the Altitude Hold mode, priority is set to PATH. When the Path/
Speed Command supermode is invoked and the PATH priority is passed to it, the primitive
y-V Command mode is selected if thrust is unsaturated, as already explained. in that case, both the
path and speed targets are captured. If thrust saturates, with PATH priority the primitive y Command
mode is selected. In that case, only the path target is captured. Therefore, if thrust saturates, the
Altitude Capture mode and the Altitude Hold mode both capture the target flightpath yTGT at the
expense of the the speed target. Capture of the altitude target HTCT is then assured by the stability
property of the height regulator (fig. 1 1(b)).
Climb and Descend Modes
Foi- altitude errors so large in magnitude that the target flightpath angle yTGT commanded by the
height regulator (fig. I i (b)) lies outside the aircraft performance envelope (fig. 17), this commanded
flightpath target should be approximated by selecting the nearest point on the boundary of the per-
formance envelope at the target airspeed as the best physically realizable approximation for steady
climb or descent. If the altitude error AH is positive (that is, if the target altitude lies above the pre-
vailing altitude), such operation corresponds to the Climb mode. If the altitude error OH is negative,
such operation corresponds to the Descend mode. For example, if the commanded flightpath target
yTCT lies above the upper boundary of the performance envelope (point A of figure 17), then point B
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on the maximum-thrust contour of figure 17 at the target airspeed VTGT should be selected for
operation in the Climb mode.
It should be noted that the angular difference Dy between yTGT and 7POT MAX (fig. 17) is limited to a
maximum of 3 degrees by the limit imposed on 7T<;T within the height regulator (fig. 1 1(b)). This
angular increment is sufficient to ensure that maximum thrust is commanded during the climb, even
if moderate errors should enter the onboard performance calculation that estimates yPOT MAX. A
similar angular difference between yTGT and yPOT MIN ensures that idle thrust is commanded during
descent. These limits imposed on yTGT also serve to confine the corresponding symbol within the
field of view of the primary flight display (fig. 11(a)).
In the Climb mode, priority is set to SPEED. When the Path/Speed Command supermode is invoked
and the flightpath and speed targets and the SPEED priority are passed to it, the primitive 7-V Com-
mand mode is selected if thrust is unsaturated. If the thrust saturates, with SPEED priority the primi-
tive V Command mode is selected, with target thrust set at maximum. In that case, the flightpath
angle ysPEED MAX is captured, leading to capture of the speed target VTGT. Steady climb at point B
(fig. 17) then results.
If the commanded flightpath angle yTGT lies below the lower boundary of the performance envelope
(point C of fi gure 17), operation in the Descend mode is obtained in a similar way. Priority is set to
SPEED. Invoking the Path/Speed Command supermode and passing to it the flightpath and speed
targets and the SPEED priority results in steady descent at point D (fig. 17).
MIN	 VTGT	 uMAX
Airspeed —i
Figure 17. Approximation of flightpath target.
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Path/Speed Priority
It is clear from this discussion that the Climb mode and the Descend mode both require the path/
speed priority to be set to SPEED. In contrast, the Altitude Capture mode and the Altitude Hold mode
both require that the priority be set to PATH to enable capture of the target altitude. Setting priority is
an action that must be associated with mode selection on the second level of the mode hierarchy.
Functional Specification
Accounting for the mode structure just discussed, the functional specification for the Altitude
Command supermode can be summarized as follows. The control flow and information flow within
the supermode hierarchy, which are similar for all the second-level supermodes, are illustrated by
the block diagram of figure 18. The discussion that follows relates only to the Altitude Command
supermode; the other supermodes illustrated by figure 18 are discussed later, and should be ignored
for the present.
Inputs and Outputs
The Altitude Command supermode can be invoked by the human crew via the mode control panel
during manual operation (fig. 18), or, alternatively, by a supermode on the third level of the mode
hierarchy (not illustrated by figure 18). The Altitude Command supermode accepts from the invok-
ing entity the following two inputs: the altitude target HTGT and the airspeed target V TGT . The quan-
tities VMIN, VMAX, HSAFE, and HMAX must also be specified for use in screening the altitude and
airspeed targets (fig. 18). The Altitude Command supermode must determine the flightpath target
yTGT from the height regulator law (fig. 1 I (b)). In addition, the Altitude Command supermode must
Cockpit Interface
MODE	 I
	 OTHER SECOND-LEVEL SUPERMODES
:........................I..... ANNUNCIATION.........................................	 ILS APPROACH SUPERMODE
I	 I
I Supermode	 ALTITUDE COMMAND SUPERMODEselection
MODE	
0-
I
I	 CONTROL	 I HTGT VTGT	 Level 2PANEL	 Related to operation task
I	 I
H SAFE. HMAX	 VTGT, VTGT	 PE(V)
	
Control	 Priority
	
PE(()
V MIN, VMAX	 flow	 VMIN VMAX	 NE (^
P, Q
Onboard
calculation
PATH/SPEED COMMAND SUPERMODE
Information
flow
Discrete - ........•.. 	 Level 1Related to aircraft behavior
Continuous
Figure 18. Distributed decision-making: control flow and information flow within
supermode hierarchy.
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determine the path/speed priority as a Boolean control variable. The Altitude Command supermode
invokes the first-level Path/Speed Command supermode, and passes to it the following three outputs:
the flightpath target yTGT, the airspeed target VTGT, and the Boolean path/speed priority (fig. 18).
The Path/Speed Command supen-node accepts from the invoking entity (that is, from the Altitude
Command supermode) the following three inputs: the flightpath target 7TGT, the airspeed target VTGT,
and the Boolean path/speed priority. Based on thrust saturation and on the Boolean path/speed
priority, the Path/Speed Command supermode selects one of the three primitive modes y-V Com-
mand, V Command, or y Command. The selected mode determines the elevator and throttle servo
commands from the continuous elements of the flight control system (fig. 11).
In addition, the Path/Speed Command supermode evaluates the partial effectiveness of the y Com-
mand mode and of V Command mode, and the normal effectiveness of the y Command mode, as
previously defined, and returns them to the invoking entity (fig. 18). The Path/Speed Command
supermode must also evaluate and return the two conditions P and Q (fig. 18) that will be used by
the Altitude Command supermode for mode selection. These Boolean variables were previously
defined (eq. (1 11) as follows:
P (7TGT > ySPEED MAX )	 Q - (7TGT < 7SPEED MIN)
Annunciation requirements
The mode selection status of the primitive y-V Command mode, y Command mode, and y Command
mode are also annunciated to the crew, together with the caution and warning messages generated
within the Path/Speed Command supermode (fig. 18). All other lower-level details, such as thrust
saturation, regulator errors, and the like, are hidden within the Path/Speed Command supermode.
Mode Control Panel
The Altitude Command supermode is selected manually by means of the Mode Control Panel.
A representative implementation for the mode control panel is described briefly in this section,
omitting details for clarity. Flight control system architecture relating the Mode Control Panel to the
Altitude Command supermode is illustrated in statechart form by figure 19(a), and representative
Mode Control Panel functions are illustrated by the statecharts of figures 19(b) and 19(e) and the
block diagram of figure 19(d).
This description of the Mode Control Panel is presented in order to illustrate a representative inter-
face with the human crew. Because the focus of the present work is on the Altitude Command
supermode, no claims are made for formal validation of the Mode Control Panel functions illustrated
by figures 19(b), 19(c), and 19(d). Features of the Mode Control Panel termed display blinking and
time-out are described briefly in this section, their purpose is to provide protection against certain
human errors to be discussed in detail later.
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Mode Selection
It is assumed that the Altitude Command supermode is one of several second-level supermodes
available for manual selection (fig. 18). Supermode selection must be mutually exclusive. (Modes
internal to the Altitude Command supermode such as the Climb and Descend modes cannot be
selected manually.) The ALTITUDE DISPLAY statechart (fig. 19(b)) and block diagram (fig. 19(d)),
I
MODE CONTROL PANEL
I
1	 I
ALTITUDE DISPLAY 	 I	 AIRSPEED DISPLAY
I	 I
I	 I
I	 I
I
l	 i
I	 I
I
-	
I
a) System architecture.
ALTITUDE DISPLAY
Initialize
Pilot request
	
H NORMAL
ALTITUDE CMD	
-,H1 -H2
holds	
Set H DISP = HTGT
Pilot set HKNOB
Set H DISP - HKNOB
[Reset 10-sec timer,
Start 10-sec timer	 Set HTGT - HDISPTime
out
H PROMPT
Pilot enter HTGT
1 sec on
1 sec off 1
Blink H display
b) ALTITUDE DISPLAY statechart.
Figure 19. Mode control panel.
98
b) AIRSPEED DISPLAY statechart.
Request
ALTITUDE CMD 1 4 Enter HTGT H SAFE H MAX	 H prompt	 H promptpushbutton ?	 pushbutton	 HDISPLAY1	 BLINK	 i Pilot enter HTGT
.............
	 PILOT	 HKNOB	 SCREEN	 O^	 ► HOLD	 HTGTALTITUDE CMD	 -H1 -1-12 holds	 t H normal
pushbutton light 	 VKNOB	 SCREEN	 -VT1 ^VT2 H normal
d) Block diagram for ALTITUDE DISPLAY (AIRSPEED DISPLAY similar).
Figure 19. Mode control panel (concluded).
show that the crew requests the Altitude Command supermode by pushing a labeled button, which is
then magnetically latched. The crc^\ is prompted for entry of altitude and speed targets, which must
be completed before the systen) cnua ges the requested supermode. Prior to engagement, the system
continues to operate in the pre% iouslV engaged supermode, or in manual control. Supertnode engage-
ment status is indicated by illumination of its pushbutton (fig. 19(d)). The Altitude Command super-
mode is de-selected h_y pushing the illuminated button.
Altitude and Airspeed Targets
The mode control panel displa y , the altitude and airspeed targets in display windows. The pilot
adjusts the displayed altitude Hl,lsrt.,» by turning an adjacent knob (figs. 19(b) and 19(d)). After the
altitude is set as desired, it is entered into the system by pressing a button adjacent to the altitude
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display window, which causes the internally stored altitude target HTGT to be set equal to HDISPLAY.
If the pilot resets the altitude knob, so that HDISPLAY is no longer equal to HTGT, the window blinks to
prompt the pilot to enter the new altitude target. If entry is not completed within 10 sec, HDISPLAY
again displays the previous HTGT. Airspeed targets are entered in a similar manner (figs. 19(c) and
19(d)).
Mode Annunciation
The engagement status of modes internal to the Altitude Command supermode is annunciated to the
crew by a mode display panel. The engagement status of the primitive modes within the Path/Speed
Command supermode is also indicated by suitable symbols within the primary flight displays,
enabling the crew to anticipate mode transitions as two symbols approach coincidence. This sym-
bology is discussed in detail in the section "Design Recommendations."
Safety Requirements
In addition to the safety requirements on VTC;T and yTGT previously imposed on the Path/Speed
Command supermode, further safety requirements on target altitude and airspeed must be added for
the Altitude Command supermode, as follows.
Minimum Altitude
The minimum safe altitude is determined by requirements for safe terrain clearance. This minimum
safe altitude HSAFE should be determined from the National Airspace System database as a function
of the geographic position of the aircraft. In order to make the Altitude Command supermode
suitable for use with area navigation, the restriction H SAFE ? 1500 ft above ground level must be
imposed for safety. Operation below 1500 ft above ground level requires more precise navigation,
which would be obtained from an approach navigation aid such as an Instrument Landing System
(ILS) during operation in a suitable approach mode. Fully automated operation in the Altitude
Command supermode can be permitted at minimum altitudes HMIN as low as 400 ft above ground
level after takeoff, provided that the target altitude meets the requirement HTGT ? HSAFE.
Maximum Altitude
The maximum altitude is determined by the reserve thrust required at the target airspeed to avoid
small losses of airspeed during coordinated turns, which result from the increase of induced drag
(appendix B) owing to the increased lift required in coordinated turning flight (appendix Q.
Calculations for the generic transport aircraft described in appendix B show that, after accounting
for the thrust needed for a coordinated turn with approximately 20 degrees of bank, the thrust
required is near that available at the optimal cruising altitude. Therefore, the maximum altitude
HMAX is closely approximated by the optimal cruising attitude, which ranges from 28,000 ft to
43,000 ft depending on aircraft wing loading (table B-3, appendix B). The exact value of HMAx
under prevailing conditions must be determined from the performance database of the aircraft. The
required performance at H MAx is discussed in more detail later.
Minimum Airspeed
In order to mitigate the adverse safety consequences of invocation of underspeed protection, the
minimum airspeed VMIN should be set equal to the minimum-drag airspeed VMIN DRAG. This mitiga-
tion strategy resolves a conflict between safety and effectiveness to be discussed after defining
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effectiveness for the Altitude Command supermode. In practice, the performance envelope diagram
for the generic transport discussed in appendix B (fig. B-7, appendix B) shows negligible perform-
ance degradation for airspeeds as low as 20 kt EAS below VMiN DRAG, owing to the characteristic
increase of thrust with decreasing airspeed (fig. B-4). Therefore, the minimum airspeed VMiN for the
Altitude Command supermode can be set 20 kt EAS below the minimum-drag speed VMiN DRAG (or,
in the takeoff configuration with wing flaps extended, 5 kt EAS below the takeoff safety speed Vz)
without significant performance penalty.
Maximum Airspeed
The maximum airspeed VMAx is limited by structural considerations at low altitude, and by compres-
sibility (Mach) effects at high altitude (appendix B). For a fixed maximum operating Mach number,
the corresponding equivalent airspeed V I, decreases with altitude until the maximum altitude HMAx
is reached (eq. (B-7m), appendix B).
Safety Envelope
The restrictions on altitude and airspeed just discussed combine to limit operation in the Altitude
Command supermode to the safety envelope illustrated by figure 20. The limits on prevailing
airspeed are enforced by the underspeed and overspeed protection modes discussed previously
during development of the Path/Speed Command supermode. The limits HMiN and HSAFi? on prevail-
ing altitude can be enforced by the descent path protection mode discussed previously, by making
the safe descent flightpath limit ysAFE depend appropriately on HMiN and HSAFE and on inertial speed.
Therefore, the limits on prevailing altitude and prevailing airspeed can be enforced by the envelope
protection modes already discussed, and impose no new safety requirement on the Altitude Com-
mand supermode. On the other hand, the limits on target altitude and target airspeed must be
enforced by the target screening algorithms that are included within the Altitude Command super-
mode, which will be discussed in detail later.
HMAX
H
C7F-
HSAFE
MIN
	
uMAX
Airspeed
Figure 20. Safety envelope for Altitude Command supermode.
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Effectiveness Requirements
Effectiveness definitions
The effectiveness properties defined previously for the Path/Speed Command supermode can be
generalized as follows for the Altitude Command super-node and its elements, the Altitude Capture,
Altitude Hold, Climb, and Descend modes. Complete effectiveness is defined to hold if and only if
both the altitude target H T( ;-t and the airspeed target VTGT are captured.
Partial effectiveness is defined to held for the Altitude Capture and the Altitude Hold modes if and
only if the altitude target H T( ; 1 is captured, and a point of stable airspeed equilibrium is reached that
constitutes an acceptable approximation to VT6T. Partial effectiveness is defined to hold for the
Climb and Descend modes if and only if the speed target VTGT is captured, and a point of stable path
equilibrium is reached that constitute an acceptable approximation to YTCT•
Normal effectiveness is defined to hold if the vertical velocity dH/dt and the normal acceleration
both have the correct sign fir capturr of the altitude target HTGT, and the longitudinal acceleration
dV/dt has the correct sign for rapture of the airspeed target VTGT. In practice, the magnitude of the
vertical velocity should be required to exceed a nominal threshold value during climb and descent.
These stronger conditions are termed climb and descent effectiveness. The property of normal
effectiveness is closely related to the Smoothness of the altitude and speed capture maneuvers, which
are discussed later.
Altitude Command Supermode
If complete effectiveness hold', for the Path,'Speed Command supermode as previously defined,
which ensures that both the Ii g htpath tar^^ct yTGT and the airspeed target VTGT are captured, complete
effectiveness for the Altitude CO 11111 and supermode then follows from the stability property of the
height regulator. Conditions sufl icicnt to ensure complete effectiveness are discussed later.
Altitude Capture and Altitude Hold Modes
Because the Altitude Capture and Altitude Hold modes both use the primitive yCommand mode
during thrust saturation, as alread\ noted. partial effectiveness of the y Command mode is required
to ensure partial effectivcncss of hoth the Altitude Capture mode and the Altitude Hold mode. If
partial effectiveness holds li)r the y Command mode, which ensures that the flightpath target yTGT is
captured and that an acceptablc point ofairspeed equilibrium is reached, partial effectiveness of both
the Altitude Capture mode and the Altitude Hold mode then follows from the stability property of
the height regulator. Denoting partial effectiveness of the Altitude Capture mode and the Altitude
Hold mode by PE (CH), thi ', propert y can be expressed symbolically by the equivalence
PE (CH) = PE (y).
Climb and Descend Modes
Because the Climb and Descend modes both use the primitive V Command mode during thrust
saturation, as already noted. partial effectiveness of the V Command mode is required to ensure
partial effectiveness of both the Climb mode and the Descend mode. If partial effectiveness holds for
the V Command mode, which ensures that the airspeed target VTGT is captured and that the flight-
path angle ySPEED provides an acceptable approximation to the flightpath target yTGT, partial effec-
tiveness of both the Climb mode and the Descend mode then follows from the stability property of
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the speed regulator. Denoting partial effectiveness of the Climb mode and the Descend mode by
PE (CD), this property can be expressed symbolically by the equivalence PE (CD) = PE (V).
In addition, climb effectiveness should be required to hold in the Climb mode, and descent
effectiveness should be required to hold in the Descend mode, as already noted. The nominal
threshold vertical velocity, which is based on the minimum climb performance required at the
maximum altitude HMAX, is discussed later.
Annunciation Requirements
Any violation of partial effectiveness of the Altitude Command supermode or any of its internal
elements should be annunciated to the human crew and to any other invoking entity. Because partial
effectiveness of the Altitude Capture mode and the Altitude Hold mode is required to ensure capture
of the target altitude, violation of partial effectiveness PE (CH) could result in an altitude clearance
violation.
Trajectory Prediction and Replanning
Altitude overshoot can be predicted if, at any time during altitude capture, the normal acceleration
commanded by the height regulator exceeds the limit on normal acceleration imposed by the normal
acceleration limiter (fig. 1 i (d)). To provide sufficient authority for correction of errors resulting
from atmospheric disturbances and the like, the limiter setting a N LIM is made equal to twice the
maximum normal acceleration expected during altitude capture (fig. 1 I(d)). If the acceleration
commanded by the height regulator, which is equal to the product V dy R ,; F/dt (fig. 1 I (d)), exceeds
this limiter authority setting, then the authority should be increased temporarily (with pilot consent)
to avoid altitude overshoot. (For a definition of management by consent, see Billings, 1996,
page 104.)
Because the planned trajectory during altitude capture is specified implicitly by flight control system
parameters such as limiter authority, such a temporary increase of limiter authority amounts to
replanning of the trajectory segment that comprises altitude capture. This replanning illustrates a
general design principle that is capable of generalization to higher levels in the mode hierarchy: Any
violation of trajectory constraints should be predicted, and should force trajectory replanning so as to
satisfy those constraints if possible.
In general, such violations should be annunciated on a case-by-case basis to higher levels within the
mode hierarchy (fig. 18) for resolution there (or, ultimately, by the human crew). In some cases,
local resolution is possible simply by changing path/speed priority appropriately. In other cases,
resolution could require strategic action at the very top of the mode hierarchy such as development
of a completely new flight plan, terminated perhaps by emergency landing at an alternate airport.
Such extensive replanning is beyond the scope of this report, which focuses on the tactical levels of
the mode hierarchy.
However, the distributed decision-making structure developed here lays a foundation for treating
such replanning problems by future extension. This concept of distributed decision-making is
illustrated by figure 18: Information flows upward to provide a basis for setting policy at higher
level, and control flows downward to provide policy for decision-making at lower level.
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Safety Versus Effectiveness
In the trajectory replanning example just discussed, conflict between an external constraint imposed
at high level within the mode hierarchy and an internal constraint at lower level was resolved by
modifying the lower-level constraint. A related example shows how information available at higher
level within the Altitude Command supermode can be used to resolve a conflict between safety and
effectiveness by modifying a safety envelope constraint imposed within the lower-level Path/Speed
Command supermode.
Underspeed Protection
Invocation of the Underspeed Protection mode can have adverse consequences for flight safety,
even though all a priori safety requirements are satisfied. If terrain clearance becomes critical, it is
essential for flight safety to achieve the best climb gradient of which the aircraft is capable. How-
ever, this objective is not, in general, achieved by the envelope protection modes previously
discussed, which sacrifice effectiveness (that is, performance) in favor of safety requirements
imposed a priori.
For example, aircraft performance limitations following engine failure could preclude capture of the
flightpath target. Following engine failure, selection of PATH priority could lead to airspeed diver-
gence toward stalling speed, resulting in invocation of underspeed protection. Priority would then be
given automatically to speed, and the primitive V Command mode would be selected, as previously
discussed. The aircraft would then stabilize at the minimum airspeed V MIN at the flightpath angle
determined by maximum available engine-out thrust. The performance envelope of figure 21 shows
that this operating point (point A) would result in significantly poorer performance (that is, reduced
climb gradient) than that available at the speed for best angle of climb (point B), which lies near the
speed for minimum drag (appendix B).
7POT MIN
V MIN	 VMIN DRAG	 VMAX
Airspeed — ►
Figure 21. Engine -out performance.
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The adverse consequences of this conflict between safety and effectiveness can be mitigated almost
completely by imposing an additional restriction on the safe operating envelope limits selected a
priori. This additional envelope restriction, which is discussed next, provides improved performance
by adjusting the a priori safety envelope limits (fig. 13) so as to match them more closely to the
needs of the specific operational situation.
Mitigation strategy
By redefining the minimum-airspeed safety envelope limit VMIN so as to make it equal to the
minimum-drag airspeed V MIN DRAG as a default value, the adverse consequences of invocation of
underspeed protection can be avoided, and the best possible performance can be assured. In the
Underspeed Protection mode, the airspeed is stabilized near the redefined VMIN (that is, near
V MIN DRAG). It can be seen from the performance envelope that the resulting operating point
( VMIN DRAG, ynoT MAX) (that is, point B of figure 21) achieves the maximum available climb angle.
For many operational situations, such as drift-down to lower altitude following engine failure during
high-altitude cruising flight, this behavior is optimal. The envelope restriction imposed by setting
VMIN equal to V MIN DRAG; is unimportant during climbing, cruising, or descending flight, because in
normal operation the airspeeds scheduled for those flight phases exceed the speed for minimum drag
(appendix B). Those are, of course, the flight phases in which the Altitude Command supennode
would usually be selected.
However, other situations require operation below the Mill mum-drag speed, such as climb just after
takeoff where obstacle clearance precludes immediate acceleration. Furthermore, some transport
aircraft operate below the minimum-drag speed during landing approach. These special cases can be
handled by enabling the higher-level entity of the mode hierarchy that invokes the primitive level to
adjust the default value of VMIN as necessary (fig. 18). In this way, the numerical value of VMIN can
be made to depend on higher-level modes and/or phase of flight in whatever manner is considered
desirable, a strategy providing great design flexibility. For safety, it is of course essential that any
such redefined envelope limits lie within the a priori safety envelope.
To summarize, basic safety is assured by invocation (if necessary) of envelope protection modes.
Restricted envelope limits should depend appropriately on the higher-level supermode engaged
and/or the phase of flight. Within those envelope limits, aircraft performance and safety can both be
maximized by timely high-level decisions that avoid invocation of envelope protection.
Mode Validity for Altitude Command Supermode
Mode validity is defined to require that both safety requirements and effectiveness requirements be
satisfied. The following validity conditions on the altitude target HTGT and the airspeed target VTGT
apply to all the internal elements of the Altitude Command supermode.
Condition on HTGT
As already noted, the altitude target HTGT must lie within the following envelope limits:
HSAFE < H TGT C HMAX	
(17a)
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By defining the binary logical conditions H 1 = (HTGT < H SAFE) and H2 = ( HTCT > HMAX), condition
(17a) can be expressed symbolically as ^H 1 -,H2.
Condition on VTGT
The validity requirements on the airspeed target V TGT for the Altitude Command supermode are
formally the same as those for the Path/Speed Command supermode:
vMiN vTGT ` vMAX
	 (17b)
By using the binary logical conditions VT  = (V TGT < VMiN) and VT2 = (VTGT > VMAx), as defined
previously, condition (17b) can be expressed symbolically as —,VTI —,VT2. The numerical value of
VMiN is increased during operation in the Altitude Command supermode, as already discussed, in
order to mitigate the performance penalty and the associated adverse safety consequences resulting
from invocation of underspeed protection.
Validity of Altitude Capture and Altitude Hold Modes
For validity of both the Altitude Capture and the Altitude Hold modes, partial effectiveness must
hold for the y Command mode, as already noted. For validity of the Altitude Hold mode, the
condition I AH <_ H„ must hold for the altitude error OH. The altitude deviation threshold H„ is set
nominally to 300 ft. Therefore, validity of the Altitude Hold mode assures operation within ATC
tolerances.
For validity of the Altitude Capture mode, the condition I AH I > Ho must hold.
Validity of Climb and Descend Modes
For validity of both the Climb and Descend modes, partial effectiveness must hold for the primitive
V Command mode, as already noted. For validity of the Climb mode, the condition AH >_ 0 must
hold for the altitude error AH, and the climb effectiveness condition dH/dt >_ (dH/dt)o should hold for
the vertical velocity dH/dt. Similarly, for validity of the Descend mode the condition AH < 0 must
hold for the altitude error OH, and the descent effectiveness condition dH/dt <— —(dH/dt)o should hold
for the vertical velocity dH/dt.
If climb effectiveness holds, altitude error is reduced monotonically during climb. Therefore, climb
effectiveness ensures that the target altitude will eventually be reached. Similarly, if descent effec-
tiveness holds during descent, the target altitude will eventually be reached. Violation of climb or
descent effectiveness should be annunciated to the crew, or to any other higher-level entity invoking
the Altitude Command supermode.
It should be noted that violation of climb effectiveness does not imply an immediate threat to con-
tinued safe operation in the Climb mode. Therefore, climb effectiveness is not required for validity
of the Climb mode, but any violation must result in a cautionary annunciation. Such an annunciation
could occur, for example, during manual operation if the pilot failed to follow flight director indica-
tions with sufficient accuracy. Similarly, descent effectiveness is not required for validity of the
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Descend mode, but any violation must result in a cautionary annunciation. A suitable threshold value
(dH/dt) () for the vertical velocity can be determined as follows.
Condition on Vertical Velocity
During climb, the vertical velocity decreases with altitude as available thrust decreases (appen-
dix B). At the maximum altitude HMAX, a small thrust reserve is necessary to avoid loss of airspeed
during turns, as previously noted. In wings-level climbing flight, the same thrust reserve enables a
minimal positive vertical velocity to be maintained.
Calculation of this minimum vertical velocity for the generic transport aircraft described in
appendix B shows that a nominal vertical velocity of 250 ft/min can be required over the whole
altitude range up to HMAX:
	Climb effectiveness:	 dH/dt >— (dH/dt) o	(18a)
where (dH/dt)o = 250 ft/min.
The threshold vertical velocity for descent can conveniently be chosen as —250 ft/min:
	
Descent effectiveness:	 dH/dt 5 —(dH/dt) o	(18b)
where (Dh/dt)o = 250 ft/min. Climb effectiveness is denoted symbolically as CE, and descent
effectiveness as DE.
It is found that, during initial pull-up or push-over before the vertical velocity has stabilized, annun-
ciation based on the conditions ( 18a) or (18b) could generate nuisance warnings. During initial pull-
up or push-over, the nornial acceleration limiter (fig. I I (a)) is active, but during steady climb or
altitude capture it can be shown that the limiter is inactive. Therefore, nuisance warnings can be
suppressed by conjoining conditions (18a) and (18b) with the requirement that the normal acceler-
ation limiter be inactive:
	
dH/dt I >- ( dH/dt)„ AND	 I V d7,F ,:/dt I < I aN LIM I	 (18c)
where (dH/dt)o = 250 ft/min.
Definition of HMAX
At the cruising speed corresponding to M = 0.825 (appendix B), the condition (dH/dt _> 250 ft/min)
corresponds to the condition (7 1'()T MAX >— 0.3 degree) on 7roT MAX. This latter condition will be taker
as the defining condition that establishes HMAx-
Summary of Validity Conditions
The validity conditions for the Altitude Command supermode just discussed are summarized by
table 8.
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TABLE 8. VALIDITY CONDITIONS FOR ALTITUDE COMMAND SUPERMODE
Altitude Capture Altitude Hold Climb Descend
H TGT
VTGT
HSAFE < HTGT < HMAX
VMIN < VTGT < VMAX
AH I AH I > H„ I AH I <_ H„ AH >_ 0 AH < 0
PE (•) PE (y) PE (V)
Heuristic Strategy
Validity conditions are not sufficient, in general, to determine mode selection logic. Avoiding the
selection of an invalid mode is an obvious requirement, but choosing the most desirable mode
selection from several valid possibilities requires a mode selection strategy that goes beyond
questions of validity. Such a strategy can be based on the general notion of maximizing system
effectiveness. For example, complete effectiveness should be chosen in preference to partial
effectiveness, as noted previously during development of the Path/Speed Command supermode.
The mode selection strategy might also have to deal with a situation in which none of the modes are
valid. Selection should then favor the choice that minimizes adverse consequences, but determining
the least adverse choice requires detailed analysis of each possible flight situation. No general poli-
cy, such as sacrificing effectiveness in favor of safety requirements imposed a priori, is certain to
minimize adverse consequences under all conditions. After presenting the strategies to be used
for screening the altitude and airspeed targets, the mode selection strategy is discussed in detail.
Initialization of the Altitude Command and the Path/Speed Command supermodes are discussed
after presenting the final mode selection strategy.
Target Screening
At engagement, the Altitude Command supermode must screen the candidate values of the altitude
and airspeed targets to ensure that the target operating point lies within safety limits and within the
performance capability of the aircraft. At any time after engagement, the crew (or other invoking
entity) must be permitted to change the altitude and airspeed targets as desired, subject only to
screening. Continuous screening is necessary to account for changing performance capability, but
manually selected targets must not be changed after entry without pilot consent.
Denoting by HKNOe and VKNO13 the altitude and airspeed set by the pilot by adjusting the mode
control panel knobs (fig. 19), the target screening strategy is summarized by table 9. When the pilot
enters HOls p , HTGT is set equal to HoISP (fig. 19(b)). Similarly, when the pilot enters Vols ►', VTGT is
set equal to VDISP (fig. 19(0).
Partitioning of Validity Table
Because the target screening strategy ensures that the validity conditions on HTGT and VTGT (table 8)
always hold, these conditions can be dropped from the table (Theorem 13, appendix D). Other useful
simplifications of the validity table can be obtained by means of two heuristic revisions to the mode
structure, which are described next.
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TABLE 9. TARGET SCREENING STRATEGY FOR ALTITUDE COMMAND SUPERMODE
H KNOB ":^ "SAFE HKNOB -- H MAX HSAFE S HKNOB :!^ "MAX
Set HDISP = H SAFE Set H DISP = H MAX Set HDISP = HKNOB
VKNOB ':^: VMIN VKNOB > VMAX VMIN S VKNOB 5 VMAX
Set VDISP = VMIN Set VDISP = VMAX Set VDISP = VKNOB
Altitude Capture/Hold supermode— Because the height regulator laws specify the target flightpath
angle YrGT uniquely and continuously as a function of altitude error, as already noted, it is convenient
to combine the Altitude Capture and Altitude Hold elements into a single Altitude Capture/Hold
supermode. Within this supermode, transitions between the Altitude Capture and Altitude Hold
states are controlled by the magnitude of the measured height error (fig. 11(b). Because within the
Altitude Capture/Hold supermode one or the other of the conditions on I AH I must always hold, both
of the conditions can be dropped from the revised table.
To verify this formally, note that within the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode the conditions
( I OH I <_ Ho) and the condition ( AH I > Ho) form a logical disjunction that holds tautologically,
because the disjunction [( I AH I <_ H O ) OR ( I AH I > H 0I )] - TRUE. Therefore, these conditions on I AH
can be dropped from the revised validity table for the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode.
Climb/Descend supermode— In a similar manner, combining the Climb mode and the Descend
mode into a single Climb/Descend supermode enables the conditions on AH to be dropped from the
revised validity table for the Climb/Descend supermode. It is clear that the Climb and Descend
modes are functionally similar, differing only in the sign of the altitude error AH, which determines
the sign of the flightpath target yTGT according to the height regulator law. Therefore, it is convenient
to combine the Climb and Descend elements into a single Climb/Descend supermode. Within this
supermode, transitions between the Climb and Descend states are controlled by the measured height
error AH, which must be nonnegative for the Climb mode and negative for the Descend mode.
Within the Climb/Descend supermode the disjunction [(AH 5 0) OR (AH > 0)] holds tautologically;
therefore, the conditions on AH can be dropped from the revised validity table for the Climb/Descend
supermode.
Mode selection strategy— Within the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode and the Climb/Descend
supermode, the strategy for selecting the Altitude Capture, Altitude Hold, Climb, and Descend
modes and for setting priority can be summarized by the condition-action mode selection process
(appendix D) shown in table 10:
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TABLE 10. MODE SELECTION WITHIN ALTITUDE CAPTURE/HOLD SUPERMODE AND
CLIMB/DESCEND SUPERMODE
Altitude Altitude
Condition Capture Hold Climb Descend
ALTITUDE
CAPT/HOLD TRUE
selected
----------- --------------------------------------------------
CLIMB/
DESCEND TRUE
selected
I AH 15 H„
----------- ------------
TRUE
------------
I AH I > H ii TRUE
AH >_ (l
-----------
TRUE
-------------------------
AH < 0 TRUE
Actions Set PATH priority Set SPEED priority
Select PATH/SPEED COMMAND supermode
Enter table 7
Inversion of Reduced Validity Table
After removing from table 8 all the conditions just discussed, only the partial effectiveness
conditions PE (V) and PE (y) remain, forming the following reduced validity table:
ALTITUDE CAPT/HOLD	 CLIMB/DESCENT
PE (•)	 PE (y)	 PE (V)
This reduced validity table can be inverted by inspection, with the resulting four cases enumerated as
shown in table 11.
TABLE 11. INVERSION OF REDUCED VALIDITY TABLE FOR ALTITUDE COMMAND
SUPERMODE
Condition ALTITUDE CAPT/HOLD CLIMB/DESCEND
I.	 APE (y) APE (V) INVALID INVALID
2.	 APE (y) PE (V) INVALID VALID
3.	 PE (y) APE (V) VALID INVALID
4.	 PE (y) PE (V) VALID VALID
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Table I 1 shows that cases 1, 2, and 3 are abnormal, because each involves invalidity of one or both
superrnodes. Mode selection strategy is discussed first for these abnormal conditions.
Mode Selection Strategy for Abnormal Conditions
If partial effectiveness is violated for the primitive y Command mode but holds for the primitive
V Command mode (case 2), then only the Climb/Descend supermode is valid. It should therefore be
selected.
If partial effectiveness is violated for the primitive V Command mode but holds for the primitive
y Command mode (case 3), then only the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode is valid. It should
therefore be selected.
If partial effectiveness is violated for both the primitive y Command and V Command modes
(case 1), then neither the Altitude CapturelHold supermode nor the Climb/Descend supermode is
valid. The Performance Degradation Theorem (Theorem 1, appendix F) shows that the condition
APE (y) APE (V) can hold only if yPOT MAX < 0; that is, if aircraft performance becomes so severely
degraded that available thrust is insufficient for level flight. Detailed analysis of this situation, which
could occur following engine failure at high altitude, shows that selection of the Climb/Descend
mode is the only appropriate choice. Therefore, in case 1 the Climb/Descend supermode should be
selected.
This completes the formulation of the supermode selection strategy for abnormal conditions, for
which the strategy is based on considerations of validity. For normal conditions (case 4), for which
both supermodes are valid, the selection strategy can be based on considerations of effectiveness,
which are discussed next.
Mode Selection Strategy for Normal Conditions
When partial effectiveness holds for both of the primitive V Command and y Command modes,
table 1 I shows that both the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode and the Climb/Descend supermode
are valid. In that case (the normal situation), the mode selection strategy can be based on the desire
for a smooth altitude capture, which can be achieved by avoiding violations of the normal effective-
ness properties previously defined. There are two design issues: first, smoothness of normal acceler-
ation and flightpath; and second, smoothness of longitudinal acceleration and airspeed. Both issues
can be clarified by examining the geometric stability regions traversed during altitude capture
(fig. 22).
Flightpath smoothness— If the magnitude of the altitude error AH is so large that the target flight-
path angle yI(;I commanded by the height regulator (fig. 1 1(b)) lies in a region where thrust is
saturated (that is, the condition 1' Utz Q holds, where P and Q are defined by equation (1 11)), the
Climb/Descend mode should be selected, as already noted. The system then captures the flightpath
ysPEED- if capture of the target airspeed is also complete, the operating point (V, y) coincides with
the point ( VTCT, ysPEED)• If airspeed capture is not yet complete, the operating point lies elsewhere
(fig. 22) on the ysPEED MAX boundary during climb or on the ysPEED MIN boundary during descent, with
the longitudinal acceleration (indicated by arrows in the diagram) directed toward the target airspeed
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Figure 22. Geometric regions for mode selection within Altitude Command supermode.
As the aircraft approaches the tarlel altitude, the magnitudes of the height error IOH I and of the
flightpath target IyToTI steadily dccreasc toward zero, so that the condition
--,I 
-^Q — ( SPIN{D MIN ^ yTGT < SPEED MAX
must eventually hold (fig. 2-1 ). \\ hcn the Altitude Capture/Hold mode is selected, the system shifts
from capture of ysPEED to capture ut * the target flightpath yTGT . Therefore, to ensure smoothness of
both normal acceleration and fli g htrath during the transition, the Altitude Capture/Hold mode
should be selected when y l ^, l coincides with ysPla:D; that is, as soon as the condition -,P -,Q holds. It
remains to determine whether this simple mode selection strategy also ensures smoothness of longi-
tudinal acceleration and airSpeeLl.
Airspeed smoothness- It \^ ill he recalled that the normal effectiveness (NE) property of the primi-
tive y Command mode holds \^ hcn the longitudinal acceleration has the correct sign leading toward
capture of the airspeed target. Violation of normal effectiveness generates cautionary annunciations
("More thrust" or "More drag." as shown by figure 22). Because violation of normal effectiveness
leads to an airspeed reversal and possihly to a thrust reversal, such violations should be avoided to
I 1
ensure a smooth altitude capture, even though normal effectiveness is not required for validity of the
Altitude Capture/Hold mode.
During altitude capture, the flightpath target yTGT approaches the V axis monotonically (fig. 22)
according to the height regulator law. If yTGT changes continuously, as it does during a normal alti-
tude capture for which the altitude target HTGT remains fixed, the stability property of the path regu-
lator ensures that the actual flightpath angle y tracks the target y TGT closely. Therefore, it may be
expected that under normal circumstances, if the condition
'P 'Q (SPEED MIN `:^^TGT 7SPEEDMAX)
holds, then the condition (ySPEED Mw ^ y ^ ySPEED MAX) also holds, ensuring that thrust is unsaturated
(eqs. (11 g) and (1 1 h)). The primitive y-V Command mode is then selected, for which normal effec-
tiveness always holds. Figure 22 shows that, when the flightpath target enters the central region in
which the condition —,P --,Q holds, it remains in that region as it moves toward the V axis during
altitude capture. Therefore, the simple mode selection strategy of selecting the Climb/Descend mode
if the condition P v Q holds and selecting the Altitude Capture/Hold mode if the condition —,P —,Q
holds ensures that normal effectiveness holds during altitude capture under normal circumstances.
If a small change of the altitude target should be entered by the flight crew during altitude capture,
the result would be a discontinuous change in yTGT that could not be tracked closely by the actual
flightpath angle y. It is then possible that thrust could be saturated and that normal effectiveness
could be violated during the short term before path capture is completed, even if the condition
-,P -,Q holds. Under these exceptional circumstances, temporary violation of normal effectiveness
can be permitted, provided that partial effectiveness of they Command mode holds.
Undesired mode transitions— Near the boundaries of the central -,P —,Q region, altitude variations
owing to atmospheric disturbances could cause repetitive cycling between the conditions 	 --IQ
and P vQ, resulting in repetitive mode transitions ("chattering"). Suppression of unwanted mode
transitions must be dealt with during implementation, when uncertainties in the measurement and
estimation of physical quantities ("noise") can be accounted for by means of simulation. In order to
prevent repetitive mode transitions owing to noise, it will probably be necessary to incorporate
hysteresis bands at the boundaries of the geometric regions governing mode transitions. However,
hysteresis that prevents repetitive cycling owing to noise might not be sufficient to suppress all
undesired mode reversions. Furthermore, the simple mode selection strategy just discussed is more
restrictive than necessary to prevent violation of normal effectiveness.
In figure 22, the regions in which normal effectiveness holds for the Altitude Capture/Hold mode
are marked with the legend NE. It can be seen that there are regions adjacent to the central --,P ^Q
region (indicated by hatching) in which reversion to the Climb/Descend mode to prevent violation
of normal effectiveness is unnecessary, because normal effectiveness would continue to hold uncon-
ditionally without reversion. In other regions (indicated by absence of hatching), normal effective-
ness holds temporarily for the Altitude Capture/Hold mode, but the airspeed trend (indicated by
acceleration/deceleration arrows) would lead to future violation. A mode selection criterion based on
prediction of future states would be excessively complex. The situation is further complicated by the
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fact that the target airspeed must be reset as a function of flight phase (for example, climb, cruise, or
descent) according to a schedule of optimal speeds (appendix B). Such changes in target airspeed
could cause unnecessary mode reversions by shifting the boundaries of the -,P -,Q region horizon-
tally relative to the prevailing operating point.
Mode latching- A simple method sometimes used in the past to suppress unwanted mode reversions
was to "latch" the mode selection logic; for example, with such latching incorporated, the transition
to the Altitude Capture/Hold mode would become a one-way transition. Latching can be regarded as
a kind of hysteresis applied to the mode selection logic itself. In contrast to the conventional hyster-
esis discussed previously, which would blur to a minor extent the regional boundaries treated in this
report as mathematically sharp, latching would destroy the relevance of those boundaries for mode
selection because, if a latched mode state were entered, it would be maintained without regard to
conditions based on geometrical regions.
Discussion- Mode latching would be unacceptable for the synthesis method developed in this
report. If latching were incorporated, because mode selection would then depend partially on previ-
ous mode states, the desirable Markovian property of the selection logic (to be discussed later)
would be destroyed, together with the unique relation of the selection logic to the geometrical
regions already described. Aircraft behavior would then become dependent not only upon the
regions in which the target point ( VTGT, yrcT) and the actual operating point (V, y) lie, but also upon
the sequence in which those regions were traversed. This unwelcome increase in complexity would
complicate analysis of system properties and could lead to unpredictable behavior, a situation that
should be considered unacceptable for safety-critical systems.
Future development- The development of a more sophisticated mode selection strategy that would
suppress unnecessary mode reversions without introducing unpredictable system behavior is left as
a problem to be addressed in future work. Until simulation based on implementation of the present
design has indicated the extent to which unnecessary mode reversions are objectionable, further
development seems premature.
Summary of Supermode Selection Strategy
The complete supermode selection strategy for the Altitude Command supermode is summarized by
the following condition-action mode selection table (table 12).
Altitude Capture Example
To illustrate the sequence of mode selection during performance of a representative task, the same
altitude capture task discussed previously is selected. it is assumed that the conditions PE (y) and
PE (V) hold throughout the altitude capture process; that is, operating conditions are normal.
Initial conditions- It is assumed that an aircraft initially in level flight at 15,000 ft with the Altitude
Command supermode engaged is cleared to climb to 35,000 ft (Flight Level 350) at an airspeed of
250 kt. In level flight, the condition -,P -,Q holds (fig. 22). It then follows from table 12 that, ini-
tially, the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode is selected. The mode selection process then continues
with table 10.
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TABLE 12. SUPERMODE SELECTION WITHIN ALTITUDE COMMAND SUPERMODE
Conditions ALTITUDE CAPT/HOLD CLIMB/DESCEND
NORMAL ABNORMAL NORMAL ABNORMAL
PE (Y) TRUE
------------------
TRUE
------
TRUE
------------- -----------
--------
-,PE (Y)
---
TRUE
PE(V)
--- ---
TRUE
------------------ ------
TRUE
------------- -----------
-----
--- 1PE(V) TRUE
—,P -IQ TRUE
-- ------------
------------- -----------
--------
P U Q
--- ----------
TRUE
Action ErIter table 10
Definitions
PE (Y) - (YTGT C YPOT MAX) OR (V 	 V MIN DRAG) OR (Y C YSPEED MAX)
PE (V) = --, [P AND TT 1 ] AND —[Q AND TT2]
P - (YTGT > YSPEED MAX) Q - (YTGT < YSPEED MIN)
-P -Q
- (YSPEED MIN ':^ YTGT ^ YSPEED MAX)
P U Q = (YTGT ^! YSPEED MAX) OR (YTGT < YSPEED MIN)
It is assumed that the initial altitude error is small, so that the condition I OH <_ H IS holds. In that
case, it follows from table 10 that the Altitude Hold mode is selected, priority is set to PATH, and the
first-level Path/Speed Command supermode is invoked. The mode selection process then continues
with table 7.
Because by assumption the aircraft is initially in level flight, the thrust is unsaturated, as already
noted; that is, the condition STS 1 -,TS2 holds. It then follows from table 7 that the primitive
y- V Command mode is selected initially.
Pull-up After verifying the legality and feasibility of the clearance (fig. 1), the flight crew initiates
the climb by setting the target altitude to 35,000 ft in the altitude window of the Mode Control Panel,
and pressing the ENTER button (fig. 19). Upon entry of the ne^,v altitude target, a new flightpath tar-
get is calculated as follows. The altitude error becomes (fig. I I (b))
OH = 35,000 — 15,000 = 20,000 ft.
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Because the absolute height error exceeds the threshold value Ho = 300 ft, the parabolic altitude
capture law is used (fig. 1 1(b)) to calculate the flightpath target yTGT, which is limited to an angle
3 degrees larger than the maximum steady climb angle yPOT MAX (fig. 1 1(b)). Therefore, the condition
(yTGT ^! 7POT MAX) holds. Because 7POT MAX = 7SPEED MAX holds at V = VTGT, the condition
P — (yTGT — 7SPEED MAX
holds on entry of the new altitude target. It then follows from table 12 that the Climb/Descend super-
mode is selected, and from table 10 that the Climb mode is selected. Priority is set to SPEED, and the
Path/Speed Command supermode remains invoked ( table 10).
The aircraft pulls up as the y- V Command mode attempts to capture yTGT, subject to the normal
acceleration limit imposed by the acceleration limiter (fig. I l (a)). During pull-up, the increase in
flightpath angle is fed forward to command increased thrust, and the airspeed regulator maintains the
target airspeed of 250 kt ( fig. 1 1(c)).
Climb— When the Ilightpath angle y reaches 7SPEED MAX (fig. 22), the thrust saturates ( the condition
TS2 holds). With SPEED priority, the primitive V Command mode is selected (table 7). The target
thrust 7POTTGT is then set to 7POT MAX (table 5). The airspeed regulator (fig. 1 1(c)) maintains the
target airspeed of 250 kt during climb.
Altitude capture— As the aircraft approaches the target altitude of 35,000 ft, the altitude error is
reduced. The target flightpath angle yTGT is likewise reduced, and is no longer limited. When yTGT
reaches 7SPEED MAX and the condition --,P -,Q holds (fig. 22), table 12 shows that the Altitude
Capture/Hold supermode is selected. Table 10 then shows that, depending on the magnitude of the
height error, either the Altitude Capture or the Altitude Hold mode is selected. In either case, priority
is set to PATH (table 10), the Path/Speed Command supermode is invoked, and the primitive
y Command mode is selected while the thrust remains saturated. It is assumed that the height error
initially exceeds the threshold value of 300 ft, so that the Altitude Capture mode is selected. In that
case, the altitude capture trajectory is governed by the parabolic law (fig. 1 1(b)) until the height error
has been reduced to 300 ft. When the condition
--,TS2 ° (y < 7SPEED MAX)
holds, the thrust becomes unsaturated, and the primitive y-V Command mode is selected (table 7).
Altitude hold— When the height error becomes equal to the threshold value of 300 ft, the Altitude
Hold mode is selected (table 10). The aircraft trajectory is then governed by the exponential law
(fig. 1 1(b)), and the height error is nulled. The aircraft stabilizes at the target altitude of 35,000 ft
and the tar< let airspeed of 250 kt, completing the example.
Initialization
For initialization of the Altitude Command supermode, the first task is initialization of the target
thrust yPOTTGT, which is carried out within the Path/Speed Command supen-node by the strategy for
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setting target thrust, as discussed previously. Inspection of the strategy for setting target thrust
(table 5) shows that this strategy is applicable for initialization except when thrust is unsaturated and
the condition -,P ^Q holds, in which case the target thrust is not determined.
But in that case, the y-V Command mode is selected because thrust is unsaturated (table 7). Because
the target thrust yPOTTGT is nonrelevant for operation in the y-V Command mode, it can be initialized
arbitrarily to 7POT MIN . Therefore, invoking the Path/Speed Command supermode (with priority
assigned arbitrarily) returns the quantities PE (7), PE (V), P, and Q, which determine initial mode
selection for the Altitude Command supermode according to the usual mode selection strategy
(table 12).
A simpler alternative is to initialize the Altitude Command supermode unconditionally to the Climb/
Descend mode. The rationale for this simplified strategy is that, under normal conditions, it corres-
ponds to the supermode selection when P u Q holds (table 12), the least restrictive possibility. If
the condition PE (V) is violated initially, the mode validity table (table 8) shows that this simplified
initialization strategy could result initially in operation that is invalid. Nevertheless, the following
analysis shows that this initialization is acceptable. There are two possibilities.
First, if PE (y) is also violated, so that APE (y) -,PE (V) holds, the Climb/Descend mode would be
selected according to the mode selection strategy (table 12). Therefore, the simplified initialization
strategy is in agreement with the mode selection strategy for this abnormal case.
Second, if PE (7) holds, so that PE (7) -,PE (V) holds initially, then the Altitude Capture/Hold mode
is selected (table 12) after one frame (appendix E) of operation in the Climb/Descend mode. Detail-
ed analysis shows that system behavior during the first frame is the same for operation in the Climb/
Descend mode as it would be in the Altitude Capture/Hold mode, and that during subsequent frames
system behavior is governed by the mode selection strategy (table 12), as previously discussed.
Therefore, the simplified initialization strategy is acceptable.
Re-initialization— If a new altitude target is entered after the Altitude Capture/Hold mode has been
selected, so that the condition P u Q again holds, the system should revert to the Climb/Descend
mode, as already noted. Iflivsteresis has been applied to the regional boundaries (fig. 22) to suppress
repetitive mode transitions ownw, to noise, as discussed previously, the whole system including the
hysteresis bands should be re-initialized, and the Altitude Command supermode should be
re-initialized to the Climb/Descend mode.
This re-initialization to the Climb/Descend mode does not apply to the entry of a new airspeed
target. Such re-initialization must be ruled out because it could allow the aircraft to deviate from the
target altitude during capture of the new airspeed target, violating the partial effectiveness of the
Altitude Command supermode.
The rationale for this difference in re-initialization strategy is that the altitude target is regarded as an
external constraint imposed by ATC that determines the pilot's task. In contrast, the airspeed target
can be chosen freely for performance optimization (appendix B). This rationale holds despite the
fact that external airspeed restrictions are sometimes imposed by ATC, because in those cases the
altitude constraint always remains primary.
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Construction of Statechart
The statechart for supermode selection (fig. 23(a)) can now be constructed directly from table 12. It
may be seen that there are two scenarios (columns) for selection of the Altitude Capture/Hold super-
mode. For normal conditions, the conditions PE (y), PE (V), and -,P -,Q must hold. Therefore,
transition arrows labeled with those conditions must lead to the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode
from the Climb/Descend supermode (fig. 23(a)). For the abnormal condition PE (y) APE (V), a
transition arrow labeled with that condition (shown broken to indicate abnormality) must lead from
the Climb/Descend supermode to the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode.
Similarly, table 12 shows that there are two scenarios (columns) for selection of the Climb/Descend
supermode. For normal conditions, the conditions PE (y), PE (V), and P U Q must hold. Therefore,
transition arrows labeled with those conditions must lead to the Climb/Descend supermode from the
Altitude Capture/Hold supermode. For the abnormal condition APE (y), a transition arrow labeled
with that condition (shown broken to indicate abnormality) must lead from the Altitude Capture/
Hold supermode to the Climb/Descend supermode.
By following the construction process just described, the statechart illustrated at the left of
figure 23(a) is obtained. The two priority states PATH and SPEED can be represented in statechart
form by a two-state machine. The statechart for setting priority illustrated at the right of figure 23(a)
can be synthesized directly from table 10.
Certain Mode Control Panel actions are indicated schematically in statechart form by figure 23(a),
but many details are omitted for clarity. As indicated, new altitude or airspeed targets can be entered
at any time after initial engagement. It should be noted that entering a new altitude target HTCT
results in re-initializing the Altitude Command supermode to the Climb/Descend mode, as illustra-
ted. However, entering a new airspeed target VTGT has no effect on mode selection, as required by
the re-initialization strategy already discussed.
The internal elements of the Climb/Descend supermode can be synthesized directly from table 10,
and are illustrated in detail by the statechart of figure 23(b). It can be seen that violation of the climb
effectiveness CE or the descent effectiveness DE generate appropriate warnings, which are annunci-
ated to the human crew and also to any other invoking entity.
The internal elements of the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode can also be synthesized directly from
table 10. They are illustrated in detail by the statechart of figure 23(c). Figures 23(b) and 23(c) show
that the first-level Path/Speed Command supermode (fig. 15) constitutes an internal element of the
second-level Climb and Descend modes (fig. 23(b)) and of the second-level Altitude Capture and
Altitude Hold modes (fig. 23(c)).
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Figure 23. Statechart for Altitude Command supermode.
119
Initial state
ALTITUDE CAPTURE/HOLD
IoHI > H O
 / \ JAHI < HO
ALTITUDE CAPTURE	 ALTITUDE HOLD
PATH/SPEED COMMAND	 IAHI > HO	 PATH/SPEED COMMAND
IHI < Ho
c) Altitude Capture/Hold supermode.
Figure 23. Statechart for Altitude Command supermode (concluded).
System Properties for Altitude Command Supermode
Functional Dependence of Mode Selection Logic
Mode selection logic for the Altitude Command supermode is governed by the Boolean variables
PE (y), PE (V), P, and Q, as already noted. The definitions are repeated for convenience as follows:
_PE (Y) — (YTGT YPOT MAX) AND (V < V MIN DRAG) AND (y YSPEED MAX)
APE (V) = [P AND ( yr(IT TGT = YPOT MIN)] OR [Q AND (YPOTTGT = YPOT MAX)]
P — (YT(;T ^! YSPEED MAX)
	
Q = (YTGT < YSPEED MIN)]
From these definitions, it can be seen that their arguments fall into three categories. First, the argu-
ment YTGT is the flightpath target. Second, the arguments yPOT MAX, YPOT MIN, VMIN DRAG, Y, and V are
physical quantities. Third, the arguments YPOTTGT, YSPEED MAX, and YSPEED MIN, are computed quanti-
ties whose functional dependence requires further analysis.
Inspection of the strategy for setting the thrust target 'yPOT TGT (table 5) shows that YPOT TGT depends
on the physical quantities y, '/POT MAX, and YPOT MIN, and on the flightpath target YTGT . The definitions
(eqs. (8a) and (9d))
YSPEED MAX = YPOT MAX —(I /g)(dWd t)('MD	 YSPEED MIN = YPOT MIN —(I /g)(dV/dt)CMD
120
show that ysPEED MAx and ysPFED MIN depend on the physical quantities yPOT MAx and YPOT MIN and on
the commanded longitudinal acceleration (dV/dt)(,Mt), which in turn depends on the airspeed error
AV = VTGT — V and on the acceleration limits, which are physical.
Therefore, it can be concluded that mode selection depends only on the target point (VTGT, yTGT), the
operating point (V, y), and the other physical quantities just mentioned. This functional dependence
enables mode selection to be specified geometrically in the following way.
Geometrical Regions for Mode Selection
The geometrical regions cor-respondin g to selection of the Climb, Descend, and Altitude Capture/
Hold modes are illustrated by fi_lures 24(a) and 24(b). It can be seen that, after path capture is
complete, mode selection is determined entirely by the geometrical regions in which the target
point lies, and is independent of the sequence in which these geometrical regions are traversed.
Markovian Property
This independence ofmode selection from mode states previous to the current states is termed
the Markovian property of the mode selection strategy (that is, selection of the next set of modes
depends only on current modes and on fight conditions). Based on this mathematical property,
general theorems can be estahlishcd that govern system behavior, enabling its safety and effective-
ness to be assessed theoreticall y . hive such theorems are discussed next; these theorems provide a
check of system design intcgrm that is independent of the synthesis process, and enable formal
validation of the complete m stem to he achieved. Proofs of these theorems can be found in appen-
dix F. It should be noted that currentl y available codes for automated hypothesis testing can provide
the basis for a theorem-pro\ imp, tool. tllrther discussion can be found in appendix F.
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Figure 24. Supermode selection within Altitude Command supermode.
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Performance Degradation
The first issue to be evaluated relates to the soundness of the design decision to select the Climb/
Descend mode in the case where both PE (y) and PE (V) are violated, so that neither the Climb/
Descend mode nor the Altitude Capture/Hold mode is valid. The first theorem shows that this
situation can arise only if aircraft performance has become so severely degraded that maximum
available thrust is insufficient for level flight:
Theorem I (Pernrmanc•e Degradation Theorem)
If both PE (y) and PE (V) are violated, then the condition ('yroT MAX < 0) must hold.
Proof can be found in appendix F.
Recovery from --,PE(y) —,PE (V)
Severe performance degradation could result from engine failure at high altitude. The aircraft must
then descend ("drift down") to a lower altitude at which sufficient thrust is available. Safe recovery
from severe performance degradation is demonstrated by the second theorem, which shows that
aircraft behavior is near optimal even without intervention by the human crew:
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Theorem 2 (—,PE (y) -,PE (V) Recovery Theorem)
If both PE (y) and PE (V) are violated initially, and if the Altitude Command supermode
is selected and the target altitude HTGT and the target airspeed VTGT remain fixed, then in
the absence of total propulsion failure
(a) the condition ( VTCT < V :5  V MiN DRAG) must hold initially;
(b) recovery from the condition APE (y) APE (V) occurs before VTCT is captured;
(c) if the conditions APE (y) PE (V) and TC1 ° ( yPOT MAX < 0) hold at capture of VTCT
and continue to hold thereafter, then the aircraft stabilizes in descent at V = VTCT,
and the V Command mode remains selected; and
(d) if a lower altitude is reached where the condition (yPOT MAX = 0) holds in the long
term, then the aircraft stabilizes in level flight at V = VTCT.
Proof can be found in appendix F.
Assurance of safe terrain clearance at the final stabilized altitude is provided by appropriate aircraft
certification and operation requirements.
It should be noted that the effects of thrust asymmetry on flight control have not been considered,
but it is reasonable to suppose that advanced automated control systems in future transport aircraft
can incorporate suitable means for handling asymmetric thrust effects, especially those systems with
full-authority, fly-by-wire capabilities.
Recovery from PE(y) APE (V)
The third theorem shows that violation of PE (V) is self-correcting without intervention by the
human crew:
Theorem 3 (PE (21 —,PE (V) Recovery Theorem)
If PE (V) is violated initially, but PE (y) holds, and if the Altitude Command super-
mode is selected and the target altitude HTGT remains fixed with HTGT < H MAx, then
in the absence of total propulsion failure PE (y) PE (V) must eventually hold.
Proof can be found in appendix F. The hypothesized condition corresponds to inappropriate setting
of the target thrust, so that idle thrust is set when maximum thrust is desired, or the contrary. This
condition can be induced by pilot abuses such as entering a lower altitude target during climb or
engaging the Altitude Command supermode at an operating point that lies outside the performance
envelope of the aircraft. Failures and abuses are discussed in detail in the next section.
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Recovery from APE (y) PE (V)
The fourth theorem shows that violation of PE (y) is self-correcting without intervention by the
human crew:
Theorem 4 (APE ()I PE (V) Recovery Theorem)
If PE (y) is violated initially, but PE (V) holds, and if the Altitude Command super-
mode is selected and the target altitude HTGT remains fixed with HTG7T < H MAX, and
if climb effectiveness holds while in the Climb mode, then in the absence of total
propulsion failLIN the condition PE (y) PE (V) must eventually hold.
Proof can be found in appendix F. The hypothesized condition is classified as abnormal, but holds
during steady climb at airspeed ,, helms the speed for minimum drag (for example, just after takeoff).
However, because the Climb,'Descend supermode is selected during steady climb, PE (y) is not
required for validity. PE (y) holds \\ hen the aircraft approaches the target altitude, provided that the
target altitude lies at or belox\ I Im %\.
The hypothesized condition could also result from engine failure during climb after takeoff, dras-
tically reducing available thrust. 11OWever, assurance that the condition (yrOT MAX > 0) continues to
hold is provided by the	 climhgradient required for certification. If engine failure should
occur during operation in the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode, for which PE (y) is required for
validity, the system would rc\ ert to the Climb/Descend supermode until the aircraft approaches the
target altitude more closely, so that the ;Altitude Capture/Hold supermode again becomes valid. A
failure of this kind is discussed in detail III 	 next section.
Altitude Command Supermode Effectiveness
The final theorem guarantee the c 1 'tccti\ mess ofthe Altitude Command supermode under general
conditions:
Tlieorenr 
_S (AItimile Command Supermode Effectiveness Theorem)
If the target altitude I I,,, t hc^ at or below H MAx and HTGT remains fixed, and if climb
effectiveness holds \^ hile in the Chinh mode, and if descent effectiveness holds while
in the Descend mode, then selection of the Altitude Command supermode ensures
that
(a) the target altitude I1 1 ,, 1 \v ill he captured: and
(b) if normal ettectivencss of the y Command mode holds while in the Altitude
Capture/Hold mode. then the target airspeed VTGT will also be captured.
Proof can be found in appendix F. It should be noted that violation of any of the effectiveness con-
ditions required by the hypothesis is annunciated to the human crew, and also to any other higher-
level entity invoking the Altitude Command supermode. Certainty that such violations will be
detected and annunciated as rcduircd is provided by the logical completeness properties described
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previously. Therefore, in the absence of such annunciations, the human crew can have complete
confidence in the effectiveness of the Altitude Command supermode.
Failures and Abuses
Assurance of safe and effective system behavior under all possible conditions is provided by the
general theorems just presented. However, it may not yet be clear how the design characterized by
these general properties can protect the system against various specific failures and abuses without
special-purpose algorithms ("error traps") like those employed in the past to identify specific faults
and take remedial action.
This point is crucial for the design of new systems, because the enumeration of specific faults is
necessarily incomplete even after extensive operational experience has been accumulated. To illus-
trate the remedial action provided by general-purpose protective mechanisms, two representative but
challenging situations are analyzed in detail.
Engine Failure After Takeoff
It is assumed that engine failure occurs during climb after takeoff with the Altitude Command super-
mode engaged and operating in the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode, and that the resulting drastic
reduction of available thrust causes the target flightpath angle YTGT commanded by the height regula-
tor to exceed the aircraft performance envelope (fig. 6). It is further assumed that the effects of thrust
asymmetry on flight control are dealt with by the continuous elements of the flight control system.
Because the condition
_PE (y) = (7TGT YPOT MAX) AND (V S V MIN DRAG) AND>	 (Y> ySPEED MAX)
holds, PE (y) is violated, causing the Altitude Capture/Hold supermode to become invalid. If the
Altitude Capture/Hold supermode were to remain selected and continued operation were attempted,
flightpath would be controlled at the expense of a rapid decrease of airspeed, resulting in potentially
catastrophic wing stall or other loss of control (fig. 6).
Because the condition APE (y) PE (V) holds after the engine failure occurs, according to the Altitude
Command supermode selection strategy the Climb/Descend supermode is selected because it is the
only valid choice, and the system reverts to the Climb mode. In the Climb mode, airspeed is control-
led at the expense of flightpath, as expressed by selection of SPEED priority.
After the engine failure occurs, the thrust saturation condition (y> YSPEEDMAX) holds. According to
the strategy for setting target thrust, the target thrust yPOT TGT is set to YPOT MAX, and the primitive
V command mode is selected. The system pushes over to capture the flightpath angle ySPEED MAX,
resulting in capture of the target airspeed VTGT . Climb then continues in the V Command mode at
the flightpath angle ySPEED MAX, which is the steepest climb angle of which the aircraft is capable at
the target airspeed with the maximum thrust available after engine failure (fig. 6). Assurance of safe
obstacle clearance at this reduced climb angle is provided by the minimum engine-out climb gradi-
ent required for certification. Provided that the target altitude lies at or below the reduced HMAx
characterizing the engine-out condition, as the aircraft approaches the target altitude the target
flightpath angle commanded by the height regulator is reduced to a value less than yPOTMAX, the
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condition PE (y) again holds, and PE (y) PE (V) holds, as required by the APE (y) PE (V) Recovery
Theorem. The Altitude Capture/Hold supermode is again selected, and the target altitude is captured.
It should be noted that no identification of engine failure is required to enable the sequence of events
just described. To the contrary, the general algorithm for determination of the performance envelope
accounts for engine failure, without specific identification of the cause of the reduced performance.
It follows that a similar performance reduction resulting from any other cause, such as tailwind shear
or failure of landing gear retraction owing to some hydraulic system fault, would result in the same
system behavior, and therefore would result in a similar safe recovery.
Climb Engagement Abuse
It is assumed that, during operation in manual control, the aircraft is pulled up into a steep climb at a
flightpath angle exceeding the upper limit of the aircraft performance envelope, and that the Altitude
Command supermode is engaged with a target altitude below the altitude prevailing at the instant of
engagement. Because the thrust saturation condition (y> ysPEED MAX) holds, according to the strategy
for setting target thrust the target thrust yPOT TGT is set to yPOT MAX (table 5). Because the condition
Q = (7TGT < ySPEED MIN) also holds, the partial effectiveness of the V Command mode is violated; that
is, the condition
APE (V) = [P AND (YPOT TGT = yPOT MIN)I OR [Q AND (YPOT TGT = 7POT MAX)1
holds. Therefore, the condition PE (y) -,PE (V) holds.
This abnormal condition results because maximum thrust is required for consistency with the
engagement condition, but minimum (idle) thrust is required for consistency with the target condi-
tion. Because the condition Q = (yrGT < y sPEED MIN) holds, if thrust were unsaturated the target thrust
yPOT TGT would be set to yPOT MIN , but so long as thrust remains saturated at maximum thrust owing to
the anomalous engagement condition, according to the thrust setting strategy the target thrust cannot
be reset to idle (table 5). If operation in the Climb/Descend mode were attempted, which would be
consistent with the target condition, the aircraft would continue to climb with maximum thrust
instead of descending with idle thrust as desired.
The Altitude Command supermode selection strategy resolves this problem by selecting the Altitude
Capture/Hold supermode because the Climb/Descend supermode is invalid when APE (V) holds
(table 12). The system then attempts to capture the target flightpath by pushing over toward yTGT.
Since Q - (yTGT < ySPEED MIN) holds by assumption and the condition (y SPEED MIN < 0) always holds
by the property of the longitudinal acceleration limiter, as already noted, the flightpath angle y is
driven downward toward zero immediately upon engagement, so that the thrust becomes unsatur-
ated. But when the thrust becomes unsaturated, the target thrust yPOT TGT is reset to 'YPOT MIN
(table 5). Therefore, PE (V) holds, the normal condition PE (y) PE (V) holds as required by the
PE (y) APE (V) Recovery Theorem, and the Climb/Descend supermode becomes valid and is
selected. The aircraft then descends in the Descend mode as desired.
The same abnormal condition could be induced after initial engagement if, during climb, the crew
entered a target altitude below the instantaneously prevailing altitude, perhaps in response to a
request from ATC. A similar abnormal condition could occur during descent, if the crew entered a
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target altitude higher than the instantaneously prevailing altitude. Whatever the specific details of the
abuse leading to the abnormal condition PE (y) APE (V), assurance of safe recovery is provided by
the general PE (y) --,PE (V) Recovery Theorem.
Concluding Remarks
Engineering design of the Altitude Command supermode is now complete. Decision tables and
statecharts have been presented that specify the mode selection strategy in forms that, together with
semantic conventions described in appendix E, are suitable for exact implementation within single
sequential processors like those installed in current transport aircraft. The dynamical behavior of the
complete system has been summarized by general theorems that enable formal validation to be
achieved.
Furthermore, methodology has been developed for synthesizing mode selection logic directly from
design requirements, this methodology can be applied to development of other modes not treated by
this report. In the next section, guidelines for simplified development of other second -level and
third-level modes are presented briefly.
OTHER SECOND-LEVEL AND THIRD-LEVEL SUPERMODES
This section presents guidelines for simplified development of other second - level and third-level
supermodes based on modifications to the second-level Altitude Command supermode just dis-
cussed, and shows how the complete Vehicle Management System could be used in airline service.
Approach Supermodes
Second-level approach supermodes are needed that are suitable for executing well-defined approach
procedures based on ILS facilities, on other ground -based radio aids, or on satellite navigation.
These second-level approach supermodes occupy positions within the mode hierarchy similar to that
of the Altitude Command supermode, as illustrated by the block diagram of figure 18. If a reliable
electronic library of approach procedures ( that is, approach plates) were available on board, the
flight crew could select the destination procedure by name from a displayed menu, radio frequen-
cies, identifiers, weather mininia. the missed approach procedure, and various numerical parameters
specific to the selected approach would then be entered automatically into the system.
Tracking of an approach glideslope can be achieved by generalizing the altitude capture and hold
function of the Altitude Command supermode (previously described in detail) to define'the approach
path by means of a dynamically varying tar^^et altitude. To avoid an altitude bias error while tracking
the glide slope, a commanded fli g htpath angle equal to the published glide-slope angle must be
added to the system within the path regulator ( fig. i i (e)). For details, consult a previous publication
(Sherry, Youssefi, and Hynes, 1995).
The safety envelope for an approach mode is defined by appropriate limits on lateral and vertical
deviations from the intended approach trajectory, and by the published minimum descent altitude.
Under normal conditions, approach mode operation should terminate with transition to a flare mode
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(either manual or automated), or else (under abnormal conditions) with transition to the published
missed-approach procedure.
Go-Around Supermodes
During go-around following a missed approach, initial climb can be achieved in a simple way by
specifying targets for climb angle and airspeed, setting priority to SPEED, and invoking the first-level
Path/Speed Command supermode. To maximize obstacle clearance, the airspeed target should
remain fixed at the final approach airspeed; because no acceleration is then required, all excess
thrust is used for climb. The climb angle target can conveniently be set to a fixed angle (perhaps
10 degrees) corresponding to use of maximum thrust at an aircraft weight intermediate between
maximum and minimum landing weight. This choice results in use of maximum thrust and maxi-
mum available climb angle at heavy weight, and avoids excessive thrust at light weight while ensur-
ing safe obstacle clearance (Lambregts, 1983). After safe obstacle clearance has been achieved, the
published altitude at the missed-approach holding fix should be selected as the altitude target, and
the second-level Altitude Command supermode should be invoked.
Departure Supermodes
Second-level departure supermodes are needed that are suitable for executing well-defined departure
procedures (Standard Instrument Departures). These second-level departure supermodes can include
noise-abatement procedures to be used for departures from specific runways. If a reliable electronic
library of such procedures were available on board, the flight crew could select the departure proce-
dure by name from a displayed menu; radio frequencies, identifiers, weather minima, and various
numerical parameters specific to the selected procedure would then be entered automatically into the
system.
Tracking of the departure flightpath specified for each segment of the departure procedure can be
achieved in the same manner as for the Go-Around supermode just described, by specifying targets
for climb angle and airspeed, setting priority to SPEED, and invoking the first-level Path/Speed
Command supermode. For unrestricted departures, manual operation following takeoff would be
continued until the Altitude Command supermode can be selected at 400 ft above ground level.
The safety envelope for a departure mode is defined by appropriate limits on lateral and vertical
deviations from the intended departure trajectory. After safe obstacle clearance is achieved, depar-
ture mode operation should terminate with transition to the Altitude Command supermode for climb.
Third-Level Supermodes
At least one third-level Vertical Navigation supermode is needed to enable the aircraft to follow
optimized fuel-conservative and time-conservative trajectories during climb and descent (Erzberger,
1982). In general, it must be expected that each third-level supermode would constitute a hybrid
system containing both continuous and discrete elements, as pointed out previously. However, in
this case such modes can be developed simply by selecting appropriate altitude and airspeed targets
from the Reference Flight Path (fig. 1) and invoking the second-level Altitude Command supermode
(previously described). By this means, the aircraft can be made to follow any trajectory in the
128
vertical plane (within its performance capability) that is composed by joining straight-line segments
in a piecewise-continuous manner, with appropriate smoothing at the joints (control points) between
segments. Mathematically, such third-level modes contain only discrete elements, because all
hybrid-system aspects of the design are confined to the second level (provided that third-level sys-
tem dynamical behavior can be approximated as quasi-static, which is assumed).
Nevertheless, if a trajectory with continuous curvature in the vertical plane were generated by
varying the altitude target dynamically, the aircraft would follow the curved path with an altitude
bias error dependent on path curvature. Elimination of such bias errors would require development
of a new path regulator on the third level, instead of making use of the second-level height regulator
(fig. 1 1(b)) already available. The third-level modes would then become hybrid systems, with signif-
icant increase of complexity.
It seems likely that curved-path bias errors characterizing the simplified design will be found to be
insignificantly small compared with other errors within the modernized ATC system. However, if
future ATC system refinement indicates the need, third-level modes that enable an aircraft to follow
any feasible path with high accuracy can be developed by applying the synthesis methods described
in this report.
Operational Use of Automated System
Operational use in airline service of the Vehicle Management System described by this report
(fig. 1) can be summarized as follows. Takeoff is accomplished manually; it is assumed that all the
remaining flight phases are to be automated. At any time, partial automation could be chosen at the
pilot's option by selecting augmented manual control. In that case, only the guidance and display
functions would be automated; the pilot's manual control task would be to follow the guidance
symbology displayed by the primary flight displays.
The initial climb after takeoff would make use of a Departure supermode specialized to the runway
in use and selected by name; the specified departure flightpath would include any required noise-
abatement procedure.
The climb, cruise, and descent would all make use of a third-level Vertical Navigation supermode,
which would select appropriate altitude and airspeed targets for each flight segment from the
onboard Reference 17110ht Path. and would invoke the Altitude Command supermode for execution.
Automation of the task of updating the Reference Flight Path with the aid of an air-ground datalink
is discussed later, in the section "Future Work."
At the destination airport, the instrument approach would make use of an Approach supermode
specialized to the runway in use and selected by name. Landing flare, touchdown, and roll-out would
make use of an Autoland supermode similar to those in current use (not treated by this report). For a
missed approach, a Go-Around supermode would be used to execute the specified missed-approach
procedure.
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The flight profile just described shows that, with the exception of takeoff, the whole of a typical
airline flight could be carried out by means of only five supermodes selected directly by the flight
crew. The simplicity of this mode structure stands in sharp contrast to the complexity and functional
duplication (Lambregts, 1983) characterizing the mode structure of the flight management systems
installed in current transport aircraft.
130
PART III
CONSEQUENCES
AIRWORTHINESS, CERTIFICATION, AND COCKPIT INTERFACE DESIGN ISSUES
As stated in the "Introduction." the present work is directed toward three specific objectives: (1) to
enable formal validation by dc\ eloping a practical design procedure for synthesis of hybrid systems
that satisfy general safety and cffcctiveness properties specified a priori; (2) to realize the potential
of formal validation for impro%cd operational safety, with particular concern for the design integrity
of the complete system, includin,1 the human/machine cockpit interface, and to provide a firm tech-
nical basis for new certification criteria; and (3) to contribute to the development of more general
theoretical methods for synthesizing h ybrid systems directly from design requirements.
The first of these three objcctr\ es has been achieved. Development of methodology for engineering
design of the hybrid system for transport aircraft longitudinal control illustrated by the block dia-
gram of figure 1 is complete. The third objective has been achieved in part by means of this detailed
design example (fig. 1), the potcntial fi r g eneralization of the design methodology to other hybrid
systems not related to aircraft is discussed later, in the section "Future Work." This section addresses
the second objective, by assessrn;, the implications of the design methodology for airworthiness and
certification, and for design of' the h1.liiianimachine cockpit interface.
Airworthiness and Certification Issues
The arguments presented tall into m o catc(ories. First, the safety and effectiveness properties
imposed on the design of the h% hnd s y stem for aircraft control (fig. 1) were not selected arbitrarily.
On the contrary, these properties are closely related to design criteria used by the aircraft industry,
such as Military Standard 1707 ( An0nVn10US, 1985), and to certification criteria used by regulatory
authorities, such as Part 2^ of the federal Air legulations (Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations,
2001). These criteria are based on more than 40 years of operating experience with both civil and
military jet transport aircraft. and specify functional requirements for aerodynamic, structural, and
propulsion design. Howc\ cr. for reasons to be discussed, no such broad functional criteria apply to
the design of avionic systems.
The authors believe that safct\ anal effectiveness properties similar to those developed in this report
can provide a suitable basis for nc%\ criteria for design and certification of avionic systems, and that
application of such criteria can inrprov e operational safety. This view is supported by analysis of
transport aircraft accidents aiiLl rncidcnts in which certain actions by the avionic system played a key
role, and several such cases are discussed for illustration. These matters are all questions of engin-
ering desi gn, which tell into the first category for discussion.
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Cockpit Interface Design Issues
The second category relates to design of the human/machine cockpit interface. To clarify the human-
factors issues involved, an analogy is developed between delegation of a cockpit task to the auto-
mated system, and delegation of the same task to a human crewmember. It follows that direct mode
selection by the pilot can be regarded as an expression of the pilot's intentions. The discussion
shows how the dynamical behavior theorems developed in this report can guarantee achievement
of the pilot's intentions under all normal operating conditions; exceptions are required to generate
appropriate warnings.
The term trustworthiness is used to characterize this desirable behavior in carrying out an assigned
task, and it is argued that today's automated systems often exhibit a lack of trustworthiness that
would be recognized as unacceptable if displayed by a human crewmember. Several cases are
illustrated, and several heuristic guidelines for system and interface design are proposed. The dis-
cussion leads to recommendations that cockpit interface design be integrated into the system design
process, and that formal validation be extended to include the cockpit interface.
Before considering the airworthiness and certification issues in detail, two categories of failures
involving system and aircraft hardware elements are briefly discussed.
Hardware Failures
Sensor and Computer Hardware Validity Requirements
It should be noted that nothing has been said thus far concerning system hardware reliability. Except
for a brief discussion in appendix E of certain computational limitations on failure detection, no
system errors or failures have been treated, and the synthesis process has been developed under the
tacit assumption of ideal system reliability. A complete discussion of these issues lies beyond the
scope of this report, and would necessarily be specific to particular systems and aircraft.
However, it is an obvious extension of the concept of mode validity developed previously to add the
requirement that for validity of any mode to hold, each of the parameters that enter the computations
specified for that mode must be determined with sufficient accuracy. Therefore, sensor or computer
hardware failures that violate this requirement must result in mode invalidity. These hardware
requirements can be handled within the framework of the synthesis methodology already developed,
by conjoining them with other conditions required for mode validity.
Engine and Aircraft System Failures
In contrast to sensor and computer hardware failures within elements that are internal to the Vehicle
Management System, engine failure and other aircraft system failures (within the aircraft hydraulic
system, electrical system, and the like) are failures external to the Vehicle Management System to
which that system is required to react (fig. 1). Engine failure, which has consequences that are
similar for most transport aircraft, has been treated in some detail.
Failures within other aircraft systems have consequences for the Vehicle Management System that
are specific to each aircraft type, and cannot be treated in general by means of examples like those
presented for engine failure. Nevertheless, when the failure modes and effects are known in detail
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for a specific aircraft type, aircraft system failures can be handled in a manner similar to that illus-
trated by the engine failure examples. A simple example based on failure of a single hydraulic
system illustrates the process.
Hydraulic Failure Example
Assume that an aircraft hydraulic system failure renders the yaw damper inoperable while the
aircraft is cruising at 35,000 ft, and assume further that this failure makes it necessary to restrict the
maximum operating altitude of the aircraft to 25,000 ft. (Otherwise, objectionable motions could
result, owing to excitation of the dutch-roll mode at higher altitudes where aerodynamic dutch-roll
damping becomes especially weak.) To account for the effect of yaw damper inoperability upon the
Vehicle Management System, its detection must cause appropriate restriction of the calculated
maximum altitude HMAx of the aircraft (fig. 20). Because by assumption the currently prevailing
altitude of the aircraft exceeds Hm Ax, the system is then required (Theorem 5) to generate an appro-
priate annunciation to the flight crew, prompting the crew to request clearance to a lower altitude.
As pointed out previously, the performance envelope limits of the aircraft must be recalculated
continuously by the onboard system to enable target screening. However, after initial system
engagement the target screening algorithm is not permitted to change the target altitude value
without pilot consent, because that requires a strategic action (obtaining an amended clearance) that
is beyond the scope of the tactical system (fig. 1).
As already noted, mode selection depends only on the geometric regions of the performance enve-
lope within which the target point and the operating point lie; mode selection is independent of the
sequence in which those regions are traversed (the Markovian property). Therefore, once the aircraft
maximum altitude has been restricted appropriately, no other Vehicle Management System modify-
cation is required to account for the effect of the assumed hydraulic failure.
Avionic System Certification
Background
Historically, the autoflight system (AFS) evolved from the older autopilot. In contrast, the flight
management systems (FMSs) in current transport aircraft were developed during the late 1970s. The
FMS contains the trajectory synthesis structure corresponding to the third-level supermodes in the
system discussed in previous sections of this report, and is much more complex than the AFS. In the
first-generation aircraft, weak integration of the FMS with the AFS may have justified their treat-
ment as two separate systems.
The following comments relating to certification issues are based on discussions with the late
H. B. (Berk) Greene, FAA certification pilot and system specialist. According to Greene, the regu-
latory basis for certification of current flight management and flight control systems is that these
systems (with the exception of autoland) are regarded as pilot aids that are not to be used under
safety-critical conditions (Greene, personal communication, 1994). This long-standing regulatory
posture avoids detailed specification of system functionality by placing on the flight crew the burden
of determining whether system actions are safe and appropriate, despite mounting human-factors
evidence that, faced with the complexity of today's systems, the crew cannot always identify unsafe
or inappropriate system actions in time to avoid potentially catastrophic consequences.
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Discussion
It seems to the authors doubtful whether the position that pilot aids are not safety-critical can be
maintained for the future, as the level of automation advances and system integration is strength-
ened. An alternative position that is taken here holds that any violation whatever of the safety and
effectiveness properties established by design synthesis should be considered potentially safety-
critical.
This alternative view is supported by the analysis of selected transport accidents and incidents that
follows. Simple but plausible analysis shows that, although the causes of these accidents and inci-
dents differ greatly in detail, each of them resulted from some violation of the safety and effective-
ness properties developed in this report. Furthermore, these problems have not been alleviated by
experience, because the most recentl y designed systems are characterized by violations of safety and
effectiveness properties similar to those encountered in previous design generations.
At this point of the discussion readers should refer to appendix G, which summarizes the aspects of
four selected accidents and incidents that are considered relevant to issues of system design. No
criticism of the design or certification of the systems installed in those aircraft is intended or should
be inferred, because the methods employed were based on the state of the art available at the time.
Four aircraft have been selected. \^ rth installed systems that represent each avionic design generation
since the first digital systems. To relate the systems in the aircraft involved in these accidents and
incidents to those synthesized in the previous sections of this report, it should be noted that the AFS
in current transport aircraft contains the fli g ht control structure that corresponds to the first-level
Path/Speed Command supermode and the second-level Altitude Command supermode discussed
previously, the FMS in current transport aircraft corresponds roughly to the third-level supermodes.
L-1011, Everglades, 1972 (Analog System)
Since the barometric hold nmdc \\ as engaged directly by the pilot and its purpose was to hold
altitude, a reasonable interpretation of'cilectiveness for that mode would reduire that barometric
altitude be held accurately unless the niode were disengaged intentionally by the pilot. (Bumping the
control column is not a suitahle means oh disengagement because of the possibility of accidental
disengagement, and violates the first and second of the seven cockpit interface guidelines to be
presented later.) From this y ic%\ point. it is clear that, because the target altitude was not held, the
reversion from the barometric altitude hold mode to the pitch attitude hold mode in the aircraft
violated the effectiveness of the haromctric altitude hold mode. Furthermore, a crucially important
safety property was violated. hccausc ( from the present viewpoint) penetration of an appropriate safe
descent limit should have caused rc\ ersion to an envelope protection mode, with an appropriate
warning.
B-767, San Francisco, Late 1980s (First-Generation Digital System)
Since the supermode engaged by the crew was intended to result in capture of the target altitude,
failure to transition to the altitude capture mode violated supermode effectiveness, because the target
altitude was not captured. FUrthcnnorc, the safety hazard resulting from the altitude overshoot was
compounded by the absence of any annunciation.
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Detailed analysis shows that the aircraft mode transition logic contained three separate faults. First,
no reasonableness test can be logically complete, because only a subset of invalid signals can be
detected—logically complete failure detection requires at least duplex redundancy. Second, the
numerical criterion used for the reasonableness test was incorrectly related to the performance
capability of the aircraft, generating false invalidities. Third, the action taken (that is, skipping the
transition test) was logically erroneous, because it permitted continued operation in the climb mode
under invalid conditions. The presence of these deficiencies in a certificated system shows the
weakness of current avionic certification standards.
B-737, Early 1990s (Second-Generation Digital System)
Since the ILS approach mode is engaged by the crew in order to track the ILS glide-slope, reversion
from the ILS approach mode to the vertical velocity hold mode following failure of the glide-slope
receiver in the aircraft violates the effectiveness of the ILS approach mode, because the ILS glide-
slope is not tracked.
It should be noted that operation in the vertical velocity hold mode in the aircraft has no exact
counterpart in the system described in this report because an "open" descent of this kind is not
allowed, but it corresponds roughly to operation in the Altitude Command supermode with the target
altitude set to ground level, which could cause the aircraft to fly into the ground. In the system
described in this report, such operation would violate two safety properties: first, the validity condi-
tion that restricts the target altitude to lie above 1500 ft above ground level; and second, the validity
condition that restricts operation in the Altitude Command supermode to measured altitudes above
400 ft above ground level. These safety violations would generate appropriate warnings.
To summarize, glide-slope receiver failure violates the effectiveness of the approach mode in the
aircraft without generating an appropriate warning, and subsequent operation in the invalid vertical
velocity hold mode following reversion is potentially catastrophic.
A-330, Toulouse, June 1994 (Third-Generation Digital System)
Since the supermode engaged by the crew was intended to result in capture of the target altitude, it is
clear that continued operation in the altitude capture mode after the engine cut violated supermode
effectiveness, because the target altitude was not captured. The discussion of the dynamical behavior
of transport aircraft presented previously shows that in this situation (path target exceeding maxi-
mum steady climb angle), the airspeed must decay Until either an underspeed protection mode is
invoked or else some flight envelope boundary is violated, unless path control is given up tempor-
arily in favor of airspeed control. In the case of the A-330 accident, the airspeed penetrated the
mimmumcontrol-speed boundary for asymmetric thrust (fig. 6), resulting in catastrophic loss of
control.
As pointed out previously, the availability of envelope protection modes should not be regarded as
reducing the designer's obligation to ensure that the normal modes operate safely. Stated less for-
mally, the authors' position is that, since the envelope protection modes are the last line of defense
against potentially catastrophic system behavior ( like a parachute), they should not also be the first
line of defense. Restricting attention to operation of the normal modes, the A-330 accident can be
considered to have resulted from flawed mode selection logic that permitted continued operation in
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the altitude capture mode following a loss of thrust which rendered that operation invalid. It is also
true that, in the case of the A-330 accident, envelope protection modes were not effective for
accident prevention.
Summary
Analysis of the transport aircraft accidents and incidents just presented has shown the broad applica-
bility of airworthiness principles based on the safety and effectiveness properties developed in this
report. It follows that new certification criteria using these principles might significantly improve
operational safety.
However, realization of the potential for improving operational safety depends on effective com-
munication of system annunciations and warnings to the human crew. The discussion turns next to
cockpit interface design.
Cockpit Interface Design
Design of Annunciation Systems
A major challenge for cockpit interface design is to develop interfaces that make all necessary
information relative to aircraft and system operation available to the human crew, without over-
loading them or interfering with higher-level tasks. The design synthesis methodology already
developed might aid design of improved interfaces, if interface design were based on the required
annunciations emerging from the design synthesis process. Because these annunciations constitute
essential safety-critical information, redundant information might be eliminated and information
overload reduced.
Furthermore, the assurance of logical completeness provided for the annunciation system by formal
validation might enable the crew to limit their attention to higher-level system elements while
retaining confidence that, in the absence of annunciations, lower-level details of aircraft and system
operation are being properly managed; the concept has been termed management by exception
(Billings, 1996). By this means, the mental workload associated with system monitoring and super-
vision might be reduced. These are issues for interface design that are broader than that of informa-
tion transfer.
Delegation of Authority
As defined previously, a mode consists of a set of actions that the machine can take; that is, a
physical behavior. From the human-factors viewpoint, the pilot selects a mode in order to obtain its
characteristic set of actions, so that mode selection constitutes an expression of the pilot's intentions.
At the same time, by selecting a mode, the pilot delegates to the system the authority to perform that
set of actions. Thus, by analogy, mode selection can be regarded as a command given to the system,
just as if it were given to a human crewmember.
System Behavior
This viewpoint immediately raises the issue of the dynamical behavior of the automated system
following the pilot's mode selection, because it is this subsequent behavior that determines whether
the pilot's intentions will be carried out. For example, the actions characteristic of the Altitude
Command supermode involve capturing (and subsequently holding) the altitude and airspeed targets
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selected by the crew, as previously described in detail. Therefore, selection of the Altitude Com-
mand supermode indicates to the system that the pilot intends to capture these targets.
Assurance that the system will carry out this task properly (that is, assurance of system effective-
ness) is provided by Theorem 5 (Altitude Command Supermode Effectiveness Theorem). Conditions
sufficient to ensure that the theorem holds are stated explicitly in the hypothesis, and violation of
any of these conditions is required to generate an appropriate warning. Certainty that such violations
will be detected and annunciated as required is provided by the logical completeness properties
described previously. Therefore, in the absence of such annunciations, the crew can have complete
confidence in the effectiveness of the Altitude Command supermode.
The term trustworthiness is used to characterize this desirable behavior in carrying out an assigned
task, since this term seems equally applicable whether the task is assigned to the automated system
or to a human crewmember. With this definition, the discussion that follows shows that today's
automated systems often exhibit a lack of trustworthiness that would be recognized as unacceptable
if displayed by a human crewmember. This anthropomorphic viewpoint is an interesting one from
which to study the accidents and incidents previously analyzed from the system perspective.
L-1011, Everglades, 1972 (Analog System)
In the L-101 1 accident, the system exhibited a lack of trustworthiness because it failed to hold the
assigned altitude after being instructed to do so. (It decided to hold pitch attitude instead.) The
resulting safety hazard was compounded by absence of an appropriate amlunciation; the mode
reversion should have generated a warning, but the annunciation in the aircraft was cautionary in
nature and was not recognized by the crew.
B- 767, San Francisco, Late 1980s (First-Generation Digital System)
In the B-767 incidents, the system exhibited a lack of trustworthiness because it failed to capture
the assigned altitude after being instructed to do so. (It decided to wait and see whether the vertical
velocity, erroneously considered invalid. would become valid again.)
B-737, Early 1990s (Second-Generation Digital System)
In the B-737 incidents, the system exhibits a lack of trustworthiness because it cannot track the ILS
glide-slope after glide-slope receiver failure, and does not provide an effective warning to the pilot.
(It decides to hold vertical velocity instead, and provides only a cautionary annunciation—compare
with the L-101 1 accident.)
It should be noted that, by selecting the ILS approach mode, the pilot has expressed to the system the
intention to make an ILS approach. Safety considerations based on terrain clearance require that
such an approach must terminate in one of only two ways: under normal conditions, by transition to
landing flare; under abnormal conditions, by transition to go-around. Therefore, reversion to the
vertical velocity hold mode is inconsistent with the pilot's intentions, and should not be permitted
under certification criteria based on safety and effectiveness properties.
It is true that following glide-slope receiver failure the pilot might decide to continue the approach to
the localizes-only minimum altitude, and might use the vertical velocity hold mode for that purpose
if "open" descent were allowed during final approach. Nevertheless, the descent velocity required in
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that case would not generally coincide with that chosen by the system, which holds the vertical
velocity that happens to prevail at the instant of failure, perhaps during a downward correction to
the glideslope. In that case, continued operation in the vertical velocity hold mode would cause the
aircraft to fly into the ground short of the runway.
On the other hand, the reported ceiling and visibility might be below localizes-only minimums, so
that the appropriate decision would be to go around. The system behavior here goes beyond a simple
lack of trustworthiness, greatly exceeding the authority properly delegated to it by the pilot's
selection of the ILS approach mode.
A-330, Toulouse, June 1994 (Third-Generation Digital System)
In the A-330 accident, the system behavior went beyond a simple lack of trustworthiness, because
it blindly commanded the altitude capture trajectory appropriate for normal operation with both
engines, even after it became clear that this trajectory was beyond the performance capability of the
aircraft with one engine out. The catastrophic loss of airspeed resulted.
The resulting safety hazard was compounded by the absence of mode annunciations from the
primary cockpit displays at the most critical time. (The system had decided not to bother the flight
crew with mode annunciations at excessively steep nose-high pitch attitudes, in order to avoid
overloading the crew with unimportant details at a critical time.) The information removed by
de-cluttering the primary display was crucial, and its absence may have fatally delayed the pilot's
decision to take over manually. This de-cluttering behavior exceeded the authority properly dele-
gated to the system by the pilot's mode selection.
Discussion
No doubt anthropomorphic comments like those above seem inappropriate when they are applied to
automated systems. Nevertheless, they may perhaps drive home the point that pilot "aids" like those
just described cannot reasonably be considered not to be safety-critical.
Summary
In all the cases just analyzed, poor annunciation compromised effective supervision of system
actions by the human crew. The analysis suggests strongly that the design integrity of the cockpit
interface cannot be separated from the design integrity of the underlying aircraft systems. If those
systems are not trustworthy in carrying out the pilot's intentions as expressed by mode selection,
improved information transfer at the interface cannot remedy those basic system deficiencies.
Design Recommendations
In order to realize the potential for improved operational safety made possible by the design syn-
thesis methods developed in this report, design of the cockpit interface must be treated as an integral
part of the system design process, and current statements of human-centered automation philosophy
(Billings, 1996) must be expanded and combined with synthesis methods to form complete system
design and certification criteria on which new airworthiness standards can be based. In the mean-
time, the rationale just presented leads to several heuristic guidelines for system and interface
design.
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Because mode selection expresses the pilot's intentions directly, the system should never attempt to
infer those intentions from observation of aircraft states such as configuration, thrust setting, control
deflection, or the like (although limit manual control deflection should probably cause reversion to
fully manual control, as it does for many current transport aircraft). For the same reason, the system
should not change the pilot's selection by automated mode reversion, unless violation of safety
limits invokes envelope protection. In that case, appropriate warning should be annunciated, and the
system should return to the pilot's selected mode if it again becomes valid.
This prohibition of automated mode reversion does not apply to automated transitions between
lower-level elements of a supermode selected by the pilot, because those transitions are included
within the set of characteristic actions to be expected by the pilot when selecting that supermode.
For example, suppose the pilot selects the second-level Altitude Command supermode. Then auto-
mated transitions among its elements Climb, Descend, Altitude Capture, and Altitude Hold are
expected actions for which authority has been delegated by the pilot's supermode selection, although
they should of course be annunciated as they occur. On the first level of the mode hierarchy, the
Path/Speed Command supermode is automatically invoked to perform the necessary control tasks,
and transitions between its elements (the three primitive modes) should also be expected. It seems
clear that, when selecting a mode, the pilot needs to know exactly what actions to expect over the
entire mode hierarchy invoked by that selection.
Anticipating Mode Transitions
To assist the flight crew in actively supervising operation of the system instead of reacting passively
to its initiatives, it seems desirable to provide symbology integrated with the primary flight displays
that enables the crew to anticipate at least the primitive mode transitions. The Bray/Hynes head-up
display (Bray, 1980; Hynes, Franklin. Hardy, Martin, and Innis, 1989) may be regarded as present-
ing to the crew a vertical cross-section through the aircraft performance envelope (fig. 25) at the
prevailing speed, so that the fundamental dynamical behavior of the aircraft is made visible. (Read-
ers familiar with the well-known Flight Dynamics head-up display currently in airline service will
recognize its similarity to the illustrated concept, this similarity results from the fact that NASA-
Ames flight research provided a basis for the commercial display development.) As illustrated by
figure 25, the symbology required for mode anticipation fits naturally into this flightpath-centered
display concept.
Head-up Display Symbology
Figure 25 illustrates display indications during the maneuvers involved in the altitude capture
example discussed previously in detail. As noted previously, the corresponding transition paths in
the (V, y) plane are illustrated by the diagrams of figure 14, which for clarity are repeated at the right
side of figure 25 with the same vertical (flightpath) scale as that for the diagrams on the left. (In the
aircraft cockpit, head-up display scaling is determined by the requirement for conformality of the
display with the outside world view.)
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Figure 25. Head-up display symbology.
On the head-up display (left-hand diagrams of figure 25), the flightpath symbol represents the
aircraft velocity vector; it lies above the horizon line by an angle equal to the flightpath angle y
(fig. I I (a)). The flightpath acceleration symbol (the chevron) at the left of the flightpath symbol
displays YPOT (fig. 1 1(a)), which is defined by the expression sin 'YPOT = (T — D)/W (eq. (1b). The
angular difference yPOT —'y corresponds to the normalized acceleration along the flightpath (eq. (I c).
The maximum steady-state climb angle YPOT MAx available with maximum thrust is indicated by the
diamond symbol, and the flightpath ang le target YTGT is indicated by the altitude leader symbol
(fig. 1 1(a)), which also displays the altitude target numerically (fig. 25(a)).
Altitude Capture Example
At the start of the altitude capture example, an aircraft in level flight at 15,000 ft is cleared to climb
to 35,000 ft at an airspeed of 250 kt. When the pilot enters the target altitude of 35,000 ft (Flight
Level 350) into the mode control panel, the numerals 350 are displayed by the altitude leader symbol
(fig. 25(a)). Since the altitude error relative to the target altitude is initially large, the altitude leader
symbol is limited to a position (point B, fig. 25(a)) 3 degrees above YPOT MAX (fig. I l (b)). When the
Climb mode is engaged, the diamond symbol appears on the display (point C), ]ndlcating YPOT MAX-
(If the Descend mode were engaged, the diamond would indicate YPOT MIN-) The diamond is the only
symbol added to the head-up display to enable mode anticipation, minimizing display clutter. Since
the aircraft is initially in level flight. the flightpath symbol lies on the horizon (point A, fig. 25(a)),
and the primitive y-V Command mode is selected.
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During the initial pull-up at constant airspeed with increasing thrust, the flightpath symbol and the
chevron move upward together toward the altitude leader as the y-V Command mode attempts to
capture 7TGT at point B (fig. 25(a)). When the thrust reaches its maximum limit, the chevron coin-
cides with the diamond at point C, and the system transitions to the V Command mode. The pilot
can anticipate this primitive mode transition by observing approach of the chevron toward coinci-
dence with the diamond (fig. 25(a)). During the steady climb, the flightpath symbol continues to
coincide with the diamond, and the V Command mode remains selected.
As the aircraft approaches the target altitude, the altitude error is reduced (fig. 1 1(b)), and the
altitude leader symbol moves downward (point B') off its limit toward the diamond (point C,
fig. 25(b)). When the altitude leader symbol coincides with the diamond (point C), the system
transitions to the Altitude Capture mode, and the diamond vanishes. Again the pilot can anticipate
this mode transition. Upon transition to the Altitude Capture mode, the airspeed target is reset to
280 kt, as explained previously. Durin g the push-over, the altitude leader symbol and the flightpath
symbol move downward together. as the aircraft follows the curved trajectory CDE shown at the
right of figure 25(b). When the altitude error is reduced to 300 ft, the altitude leader symbol vanishes
to indicate transition to the Altitude Hold mode (fig. 1 1(b)).
This example shows that, with the svmholo gy described, the pilot can anticipate mode transitions
and maintain mode awareness durin_l ty pical maneuvers by observing the primary flight display,
without scanning separate tliuht modc annunciators. This display was evaluated favorably by NASA
and industry test pilots during an c\ploratory simulation carried out on the NASA-Ames Vertical
Motion Simulator (Sherry, Youssch. and Hynes, 1995). Based on that preliminary evaluation, it
seems possible to extend the head-up display concept, including mode anticipation, to conventional
head-down primary displays. I urthcr research is needed to verify this conjecture.
Summary of Cockpit Interface Design Guidelines
The guidelines for cockpit interface dcsi g n can be summarized as follows:
1. The flight crew should he rcyuircd to express their intentions clearly by direct mode selection.
2. The automated system should never attempt to infer pilot intention from observation of system
states such as aircraft ContieUration or thrust setting.
3. Automated mode reversion should never over-ride the pilot's mode selection unless an envelope
protection mode is invoked 16r safety.
4. In that case (0), appropriate %^arning should be provided, and the system should revert to the
pilot's selected mode if that again hccomes valid.
This limitation on automated mode reversion (#3) does not apply to sub-modes within a pilot-
selected supermode, because transitions between such sub-modes are characteristic actions for
which authority has been delc__ated by supermode selection.
6. Symbology integrated with primary flight displays should enable pilots to anticipate primitive
mode transitions.
7. Training should familiarize pilots with characteristic actions to be expected for each pilot-
selected mode or supermodc.
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FUTURE WORK
The elements of the Vehicle Management System treated in detail by this report are indicated by the
shaded blocks in the diagram of figure 1, as previously explained, and the elements for which guide-
lines for simplified development are presented are indicated by cross-hatching. On the right-hand
(Tactical) side of the diagram, it can be seen that the continuous elements treated are the guidance
function, the outer-loop control, the inner-loop control, and the aircraft itself together with its control
surface and throttle servos; the discrete elements treated consist of the mode control logic for the
three levels of the mode hierarchy. The navigation function and the corresponding elements for
lateral-directional control can be treated by applying the synthesis methodology developed in this
report.
It can be seen that, on the right (Tactical) side of the vertical dashed line in figure 1, the two remain-
ing elements are, first, the cockpit interfaces grouped within the display function, and second, the
human crew's role in tactical supervision. The first part of the following discussion is concerned
with the human-factors research needed to model the cockpit interfaces and the human crew's role in
tactical supervision. As previously explained, application of the synthesis method described in this
report to the aircraft guidance and control systems results in drastic simplification of mode structure.
This simplification can be expected to clarify the problems involved in modeling the crew's role;
such modeling could enable complete integration of the human-automation system to be achieved on
the tactical level.
On the left (Strategic) side of the diagram (fig. 1), the data-entry task (accomplished manually in
current aircraft) is discussed, and the need for automation is pointed out. Brief comments are offered
on automation of knowledge-based activities. Finally, the potential for generalizing the synthesis
methodology developed in this report to other safety-critical systems such as those for
petrochemicals and nuclear power is discussed in some detail.
Human-Automation Integration
Tactical Supervision
At a later stage, it may become feasible to extend formal validation to the complete human/machine
interface by focusing on the human crew's activities in selecting system modes so as to enable the
aircraft to fly a clearance that has already been accepted. Because this selection process is rule-based
(after the clearance has been accepted and the desired aircraft trajectory is known), mode selection
could, in principle, be fully automated. Alternatively, mode selection can be partially or frilly man-
ual, as in current aircraft.
It may be possible to capture the essential aspects of this rule-based pilot behavior by modeling the
human pilot's activities in selecting modes and monitoring displays, in effect treating the pilot at the
rule-based level as part of the machine. To represent the pilot's behavior realistically, the model
must allow mistakes, such as pressing a wrong button, failing to notice an inconspicuous display,
skipping a checklist item, or the like. Assessment of the complex system dynamical behavior
characterizing modal transitions could then include the contribution of likely pilot errors, enabling
formal proof of design integrity to be extended to include the complete human/machine system.
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Studies directed toward modeling human supervisory activities would require an interdisciplinary
approach coordinating the efforts of human factors research and engineering design groups.
Although the results to be expected must remain speculative for the present, the proposed human
modeling effort seems worthwhile because pilot behavior at the tactical level is rule-based, and is,
furthermore, tightly constrained by the definition of the mode selection/annunciation machine
interface (fig. 1).
It should be noted that studies of crew interaction with flight management systems up to this time
have necessarily been based on the systems in current aircraft, despite the obstacles that excessive
system complexity and flawed design concepts (Lambregts, 1983) have placed in the path toward
successful modeling of crew behavior. As mentioned in the "Introduction," system architectures
capable of formal validation must make use of a drastically simplified mode structure. Piloted
simulation studies of crew errors in the use of such simplified systems known to be free of logical
design flaws may be expected to clarify the modeling problem at the tactical level. An example
based on the Mode Control Panel specification is presented next to show how human-factors cockpit
interface design issues might be identified and resolved by low-level modeling of tactical super-
vision tasks.
Mode Control Panel Design Example
The tactical supervisory task selected for analysis is that of manual entry of a desired target altitude
into the Mode Control Panel, and of checking the resulting system setup for correctness. It will be
shown that even this apparently simple task is vulnerable to human error induced by task interrup-
tion, with potentially catastrophic consequences. Furthermore, such errors are a direct result of well-
known limitations on the capacity of human short-term memory, and it must be expected that such
errors will be committed in flight unless specific precautions are taken to prevent them.
For example, system redundancy could be increased operationally by requiring both pilots to verify
the system setup independently whenever the target altitude is changed, but this requirement would
increase both task complexity and human workload. Alternatively, by adding to the mode control
panel specification the features of display blinking and time-out described in a previous section, the
automated system can be made robust against expected operator errors. As mentioned previously,
two hypothetical scenarios will show the purpose of these features.
First, assume that the aircraft is in level flight at 10,000 tt with the Altitude Command supermode
engaged, and that the pilot wishes to change the target altitude from 10,000 ft to 35,000 ft (Flight
Level 350). After setting 35,000 ft into the Mode Control Panel altitude window by turning the
altitude knob (fig. 19), the adjacent ENTER button must be pressed to enter the new altitude target
into the system. Suppose now that the pilot is interrupted by another task (such as a radio call)
before the ENTER button has been pressed. If, owing to a lapse of short-term memory, the pilot
forgets that the ENTER button has not been pressed, the setup appears to be correct.
Nevertheless, the aircraft continues to be controlled to the previous internally stored altitude target
of 10,000 ft, which differs drastically from the number displayed in the altitude window (35,000 ft),
but is not displayed anywhere. If high terrain lies ahead, this situation is potentially catastrophic. The
blinking feature added to the specification (figs. 19(b) and 19(d)) provides protection by causing the
altitude displayed in the altitude window (35,000 ft in this example) to blink whenever it differs
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from the internally stored altitude target, alerting the pilot to the fact that the system setup is incom-
plete. Furthermore, the specification ensures that blinking can cease only when the ENTER button is
pressed, which replaces the previous target (10,000 ft) with the new target (35,000 ft), correcting the
discrepancy.
A second example based on likely human error illustrates the purpose of the time-out feature. The
airspeed target is selected by means of a window and a knob on the Mode Control Panel similar to
the altitude window and knob, and adjacent to them (fig. 19(c)). Suppose that the pilot wishes to
select a new airspeed target, but turn; the altitude knob by mistake. Pilots often use the altitude
window as an electronic scratch pad in which to record the clearance altitude. in the absence of a
back-up record, the pilot's Ilypotllctical error has destroyed the only onboard record of the clearance
altitude. Since reliance on unsupported memory for clearance altitude is potentially catastrophic, the
crew has no alternative to all embarrassing query to ATC.
The time-out feature added to the specification (figs. 19(b) and 19(d)) requires that the ENTER button
be pressed within 10 sec after the altitude knob is turned; otherwise, the system returns to its pre-
vious state, and the previous altitude tar get is again displayed in the window. In the hypothetical
example, the pilot has to wait onl y a few seconds for time-out to recover the clearance altitude
destroyed by mistake. More gunurall y , the time-out feature protects the system against entry of stale
data (that is, data no longer operationally relevant) by requiring a connected sequence of actions to
take place within a limited time intcr\ al.
in both of the examples just discussed. the human errors involved resulted from well-known human
limitations that could. in principle. he modeled, and their consequences for system design assessed.
It seems likely that research etiirrts in those directions could enable the need for new features such
as blinking and time-out to he identified by a computational synthesis process, instead of relying on
experience and ingenuity as at present. The general objective of this research would be detection of
usability problems that mi g ht other\\ ise be overlooked until their presence is revealed by incidents
or accidents in flight. Furthermore. s y nthesis methods similar to those described in this report could
achieve formal validation of' the complete automated system, including the cockpit interfaces,
guaranteeing that the addition of features such as display blinking and time-out does not introduce
new deficiencies into the dcs1211.
Strategic Planning
On the left (Strategic) side of the block diagram (fig. 1 ), the planning activities illustrated are in
general knowledge-based because they require cause-and-effect understanding of whole disciplines
such as meteorology and airline fli,,ht operations, as explained previously. However, the rule-based
tasks involved in data entr y constitute an important exception.
In current aircraft dependent on %oice radio conlnlunications for transmission of ATC clearances
between ground and aircraft, those data-entry tasks must be accomplished manually. As a practical
consequence, the flight crew cannot afford the time required for manual data entry in a radar-
vectored environment with rapid and unpredictable clearance changes, a situation often encountered
during descent into busy terminal areas (Cas per. 1994). Under such conditions, the crew is forced to
abandon flight-plan updating (accomplished by means of the control display unit (CDU)), and to fall
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back on second-level (autoflight) operation (accomplished rapidly by means of the mode control
panel (MCP)). Efficiency is exchanged for simplicity of operation.
The prospective availability of air-ground communications by two-way datalink will enable elimin-
ation of most manual data-entry tasks by means of appropriate automation, allowing automation of
the entire Trajectory Synthesis function (left side of figure I) throughout the flight. (Indeed, with
selection of appropriate third-level guidance supermodes, operation of the entire tactical system
(right side of figure I ) could then be automated, except the pilot's role supervising execution of the
flight plan.) Trajectory synthesis algorithms are well understood (Erzberger, 1982), and form the
basis of flight management systems in current aircraft.
In the opinion of the authors, low-level, labor-intensive, error-prone data-entry tasks are inappro-
priately placed on the human operator in current aircraft. It should be noted that these low-level
tasks are sometimes viewed as beneficial because they increase the pilot's involvement in planning.
The authors disagree with that viewautomation of low-level tasks allows the flight crew to con-
centrate on the high-level strategic planning and checking tasks (left side of figure 1) that require
human judgment. Because the data-entry tasks are rule-based, the necessary automation could in
principle be developed by taking the same human modeling approach already discussed for the
interfaces involved in tactical supervision.
In contrast, crew modeling at the planning level would involve knowledge-based behavior, and its
full scope would extend over the entire strategic flight planning and execution functions. Research
directed toward limited-scope decision aiding is currently extending the crew modeling knowledge
base (Geddes, 1985). However, within the dynamically varying environment of worldwide flight
operations over the 20-25 year service lifetime expected of a new aircraft model, knowledge-based
modeling sufficiently comprehensive to provide a basis for formal validation seems too broad in
scope to be attempted with present knowledge.
Generalization to Other Safety-Critical Systems
The question can be raised of the extent to which the design method described in this report could be
generalized to enable the solution of hybrid-system control problems in other safety-critical systems,
such as the ATC system, or highly automated industrial process-control plants for petrochemicals
and nuclear power. No attempt has been made to study this matter systematically, but it seems obvi-
ous that most of the steps in the design method discussed previously (fig. 5) could be generalized.
One important limitation results from the use of geometrical methods to partition the state space.
Number of dimensions
Since geometrical methods are most useful when the number of dimensions is small, it is of interest
to review briefly the steps by which the six-degree-of-freedom aircraft problem is reduced to two
dimensions (appendix B). First, the bilateral symmetry of the aircraft separates its six-degree-of-
freedom system of equations into two independent groups, each of three degrees of freedom. Next,
the three-degree-of-freedom longitudinal equations are reduced to two degrees of freedom by the
assumption that pitch control can generate any desired lift variation without saturation. This
assumption is justified for transport aircraft designed to meet applicable flying qualities criteria for
manual control, because pitch bandwidth and control power are much higher than required for low-
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bandwidth automated control of path and speed, especially when modest acceleration limits are
imposed for passenger comfort. (High-bandwidth tasks such as automatic landing are not considered
in this report.) This pitch-control assumption reduces the longitudinal system from three to two
degrees of freedom by eliminating the pitching-moment equation, and enables the aircraft to be
treated as a point mass concentrated at its center of gravity. (Simulation of the three-degree-of-
freedom system shows response differences that are quite insignificant relative to the response of the
two-degree-of-freedom system assumed (appendix 13)).
The addition of closed-loop control of path and speed to the basic aircraft could result in additional
degrees of freedom associated with differential equations specified by the control laws. However,
the nonlinear inverse control employed here cancels aerodynamic and propulsion feedbacks, so that
the aircraft in cascade with its inverse is reduced to a simple chain of integrators. In consequence,
the specification of primitive modes characterized by the same dynamical behavior as the basic
aircraft results in control laws that do not contribute additional degrees of freedom. It should be
noted that only this closed-loop behavior is of interest for the design of the hybrid system.
Higher-level modes in the system hierarchy (for example, height control) involve additional degrees
of freedom, but separation of the system into hierarchical levels with different time scales (that is,
higher-level modes are characterized by less rapid motions) avoids the need to consider all the
degrees of freedom at the same time.
All these methods of reducing the number of dimensions can be expected to apply to other systems
not related to aircraft. Thus the practical limitation to a small number of dimensions may not prove
to be so great an obstacle to generalization of the method as initial impressions might suggest. The
same is true with regard to the restriction of desired (target) values of response states so as to lie
within the steady-state performance envelope of the aircraft.
Definition of System Properties
It seems likely that specification of the desired safety and effectiveness properties will be the most
difficult element of the design process to generalize. This specification must make a sharp distinc-
tion between acceptable versus unacceptable system behavior. On the one hand, from the system
design viewpoint the defined properties should be strong and specific, enabling proof of safety and
effectiveness theorems that provide assurance of desired system behavior while ruling out behaviors
that are undesired or unsafe. If the system can misbehave without generating a warning based on
violation of a defined property, then the guarantees provided by formal validation become worthless.
On the other hand, from the human-factors viewpoint the system behavior theorems should hold
under weak, general conditions, reducing to a minimum the number of violations that must be
detected and annunciated. Unless violations of safety and effectiveness properties are isolated events
and the significance of each annunciation is clear, the human operator could be presented with an
impossibly demanding task.
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Finding an appropriate balance between these conflicting objectives will doubtless require an itera-
tive design process, and the contribution of formal validation to overall design success can be evalu-
ated only a posteriori. It is the authors' hope that the present results may contribute by example to
the development of more general theoretical methods for synthesis of hybrid systems. They should
also be of practical interest to designers of next-generation transport aircraft avionic systems.
CONCLUSIONS
Methods have been demonstrated for synthesizing hybrid systems for aircraft longitudinal control
directly from design requirements. Systems were developed that satisfy general safety and effective-
ness properties, enabling formal validation to be achieved. Three primitive modes were developed
for control of path and speed that correspond to the three kinds of dynamical behavior characterizing
transport aircraft. Validity conditions for each of these primitive modes were derived directly from
the governing differential equations and from safety limits imposed a priori, and were related geo-
metrically to the aircraft performance envelope. The three primitive modes were then combined to
form the lowest-level hybrid system. Mode transition logic within this lowest-level supermode was
synthesized from the validity conditions, and was simplified by heuristic arguments based on general
notions of maximum effectiveness and logical dominance.
In cases where aircraft performance limitations preclude capture of path or speed targets, the exact
nature of the limitation is annunciated for resolution at higher levels within the mode hierarchy, or
by the human crew, with assurance of logical completeness. Extension to higher-level supermodes
was described.
At all times, selection of the next set of modes depends only on currently selected modes and on
prevailing flight conditions, and is independent of past history. It was shown that, following engine
failure, correct mode selection does not require specific identification of engine failure.
Airworthiness and certification issues were discussed, and analysis of selected transport accidents
and incidents led to the suggestion that new airworthiness criteria based on general safety and
effectiveness properties might improve operational safety.
These general properties might also provide a basis for design of improved interfaces between air-
craft guidance and control systems and the human crew, enabling the crew to limit their attention to
higher-level system elements while retaining confidence that lower-level details of aircraft and
system operation are being properly managed. By this means, the mental workload associated with
system monitoring and supervision might be reduced.
Regarding the pilot's mode selection as a command given to the system enabled analysis of the same
accidents and incidents from the human-factors perspective, which suggested that cockpit interface
design should be treated as an integral part of the system design process. Several heuristic guidelines
for system and interface design were presented.
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The need for future work related to human-automation integration was discussed, and it was sug-
gested that modeling the human crew's role in tactical supervision might enable complete integra-
tion of the human-automation system to be achieved on the tactical level.
The potential for generalization of the design method described in this report to other safety-critical
hybrid systems such as highly automated industrial plants for petrochemicals and nuclear power was
discussed briefly.
The present results may contribute by example to the development of more general theoretical
methods for synthesis of hybrid systems. They should also be of practical interest to designers of
next-generation transport aircraft avionic systems.
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